Doug's blog is ace. I very much recommend it!

The drama caused in other sciences due to not sorting authors alphabetically is truly depressing.

I think he's more of a legendary monster than a species of any ordinary troll, though he probably fits best as one of the scientists.

Funny pictures. Other than that, it looks like a viable case study for Yvain's meditation on superweapons and bingo.

You deserve at least 24 upvotes for pointing this out.

Strictly speaking it's not precisely the same font size. A few, such as "rationality" and "meta" appear to be one size bigger.

Some tags such as “meetup”, “psychology” or “rationality” do appear to have a slightly larger font size, in my browser at least.

Has anyone tried this?Is anyone interested in this?

Yes, I've been looking into it in relation to this project. If you'd like to join our little informal research group feel free to contact me via PM and share your email address. :)

Are there other easy ways to make and publish online lessons without paying money?

A few but they seem kind of sketchyware and I haven't tried them.

Thanks. I'll take a glance at it when I have some spare time.

I saw this pop on arXiv, but I doubt it will be very useful to anyone who doesn't know most of the stuff in it beforehand. The exposition is pretty terse, and there are well over 1000 stated theorems.

Any good books on mathematics for software engineers?

What kind of problems in particular would you like to be able to solve better? I don't really find myself needing much mathematics in everyday programming.

That said, Knuth's Concrete Mathematics comes to mind as a book on the sort of mathematics used in computer science, and Alexander Stepanov's Elements of Programming takes an interesting mathematics-like first-principles approach to constructing programs in a C++-like language (Stepanov came up with the STL for C++).

There are also people claiming that category theory can be used as a foundation for software engineering, but I'm not able to point to many convincing examples of a real-world software engineering problem solved neatly using category theory. I could sort of follow some of the bananas and barbed wire paper, which constructs CT-ish algebraic representations for basic looping constructs in programs.

Actual category theory stuff just puts my brain to sleep by the time it jumps to the third level of abstracting categories into categories with me still without a motivation for connecting the thing to something I can do something with, but Pierce's Basic Category Theory for Computer Scientists is at least thin and has a title which makes you think you should read it. There's also Conceptual Mathematics that explains categories at a college freshman reading level with several examples, which I should probably get back to reading at some point. I could actually follow it, but still came out with no idea what I would actually want to use categories for.

For AI and probability, Bishop's Pattern recognition and machine learning comes up a lot.

I haven't actually read any of these to the end, though I'm pretty sure I've read the first chapter from each.

ETA: I actually did read the Cinderella Book cover to cover as an undergraduate. It's an introduction to the theory of formal languages and automata, working its way up to Turing machines and the theory of computation. Basically this is the book you read to understand what people mean when they say "Turing-complete". The take-away message for practical software engineering is that there's a hard line between easily tractable, Turing-incomplete languages and fundamentally undecidable Turing-complete ones, and you shouldn't cross it without a good reason.

Also, Pierce's Types and Programming Languages is about the mathematical modeling of the type systems for programming languages, coming from the direction of the Standard ML family of languages. The pressure between tractability and expressiveness of a type system can be an actual concern for real-world software.

I assume they teach mathematics, because it's useful for software engineers.

Maybe, but I think a bigger reason is that it is useful for computer scientists, and these courses aim to prepare you for research as well as for work in industry.

I assume they teach mathematics, because it's useful for software engineers.

Be aware that computer science and software engineering are different disciplines, and don't assume that people who design university curricula are experts on teaching software engineering. You can find top-notch computer scientists at universities, but top-notch software engineers tend to end up in the industry instead of academia.

Oxford

Oxford's course is unusually pure. My freinds reading it don't actually use, you know, computers. They just write their algorithms down on paper.

It looks like you're talking about software engineering, but looking at computer science courses.

I assume they teach mathematics, because it's useful for software engineers.

No, they teach mathematics because it is necessary for computer science. They probably have little care for what is useful to software engineers.

I loved those things when I was a kid.

I've never thought of real numbers as any more real (in the non-mathematical sense of the word) than other numbers, and I've been peeved by popularizations which use “real” and “imaginary” without making it clear that they're using them with a specific technical meaning (e.g. stuff like “special relativity has shown that if space is real time must be imaginary, and vice versa” -- yeah, they do have squares with opposite signs (though modern notation uses real 4-vectors and a non-positive-definite metric), but that's not how a reader would be most likely to interpret that sentence).

Agreed. I have no beef with the term 'complex' for the complex numbers. It's the 'real' for the others, and the 'imaginary' for the new stuff, that I mind.

I wonder if a very short treatment of abstract algebra should be given in high school, right before you get to complex numbers. Might reduce the number chauvinism and help with the illusion of number realism.

One can potentially consider finite integers as the most "real", given that they correspond to discrete objects we can see, count and calculate.

Lots of numbers correspond to things. It seems arbitrary to say that integers are real numbers, because they correspond to discrete objects we see, but rotations aren't numbers, even though they correspond to transformations we can make on an object.

I more or less agree with you that the terms are inappropriate and often actively misleading. In relation to this, I've often wondered about the usual justification for the postulate that observables in quantum mechanics must be represented by Hermitian operators. The justification is that the expectation values of our observables must be real numbers. Doesn't this sort of justification stem from an intuition that real numbers are somehow more real than imaginary numbers? The attitude seems to be: Imaginary numbers can certainly play a theoretical role in physics, but when it comes to describing our immediate empirical situation, quantification must be in terms of real numbers -- it makes no sense for a measurement outcome to be described by a complex number.

Maybe this doesn't really represent the crux of the justfication. The argument might be that quantum mechanics needs to approximate classical mechanics at the macroscopic level, and classical mechanics only involves real numbers. Since observables correspond to measurement procedures, and measurement procedures are macroscopic, observables must have real expectation values. This argument seems fine if you genuinely think of observables as representing measurement procedures, but if you think of observables as representing measurable properties (this seems to be a common perspective) then these properties need not be macroscopic, in which case it is unclear why they are constrained by a requirement to replicate classical mechanics.

I'm not questioning the claim that observables must be Hermitian, just suggesting that the usual justification isn't really that great. Maybe we should provide other arguments for this claim when teaching QM, in order to avoid entrenching the "real numbers are more real" fallacy. For instance, one could argue that the quantities we measure in QM experiments (energy, momentum, spin) are quantities that are conserved if certain symmetries hold (I think one might be able to construct an argument that any quantity that is properly considered measurable must satisfy this constraint). Symmetry transformations are represented by unitary operators, so measurable quantities must be represented by generators of such transformations, which must be Hermitian operators. I haven't thought through this argument carefully, but my intuition is that something of this sort is a better justification for the preference for Hermitian operators than the constraint that expectation values must be real.

One can potentially consider finite integers as the most "real", given that they correspond to discrete objects we can see, count and calculate. The rest are simply useful mathematical abstractions.

I fail to see the contrast.

I've taught a few people about the complex numbers, by stepping through expanding the naturals with the introduction of negatives to make integers, fractions to make rationals, irrationals to make reals, and finally (the 'novel' stage for my audience) imaginary numbers to make the complex numbers.

I emphasise the point that the new system always seems weird and confusing at first to the people who aren't used to it, and sometimes gets given a nasty name in contrast to the nice name of the old system (especially 'imaginary' vs 'real' and 'irrational' vs 'rational') but the new numbers are never more or less worthwhile than the old system - they're just different, and useful in new ways.

I don't think this is what you're looking for, but just in case: The Repugnant Conclusion discusses morality systems quite a bit, so it might mention the article or name the idea you're looking for at some point, though I don't remember it if it does. I do remember that the article was entertaining, at least.

utilitarianism...?

Scalar is the right word. Scalar consequentialism is a thing. It's possible the comment you're thinking about was one of mine; I've introduced a fair few people to this (IMHO) superior version of consequentialism.

I think a chain of feelings would be much more useful. As they say, you can't reason someone out of a belief they didn't reason themselves into.

What is the most effective chain of thoughts that a theist can make, that will make him realise that there is no God?

"People not in my tribe are sexy and cool. I want to be like and/or mate with those people. I believe I have a sufficient chance of successfully joining and gaining status within the tribe with sexy and cool people in it. I will now change my signalling beliefs."

Effectiveness should be measured by results. So you would have to look at deconversion stories.

The problem of evil witnessed on a personal and intense level has done it for some. Historical scholarship on the origins of their religion has done it for others. For others again, materialist science leaving ever-shrinking gaps for God to be in.

Gwern's reality marble, Unlimited Essay Works, is the original, of which Unlimited Blade Works is a mere copy.

Come on, Gwern deserves more than a favorable comparison to the FDA.

I know several people who have more credibility than the "FDA and the entire decision-making apparatus of the United States government", at least when it comes to drugs. Not because I know so many cool folks, but because drug regulation is a paramount example of government irrationality.

Technically, we don't have incontrovertible proof that Gwern isn't a mostly-friendly AI that consumes a lot of anime.

I went to the library and it was empty. They said Gwern stopped by for a quick lookup.

They went to upload Gwern's brain. They said they couldn't do it, but they were glad that someone had made most of the internet redundant.

Are reviews of "proof techniques" common in math/CS theory? Are they actually useful for researchers or for students in those fields?

In short: at least in mathematics, yes. The kind of papers you're talking about usually figure as communal lore or online preprints. Sometimes these things are written as a kind of propaganda for a relatively new or obscure field of mathematics; see, for instance, "Generatingfunctionology."

if modafinil were legal, it would become expected, and everything would be harder to match the increased ability of humans to be productive.

I tend to agree that this is a silly argument, especially given that it can be applied to coffee as much as to modafinil, so we better ban coffee, lest those allergic to it be at a disadvantage.

What is his main proposition? He has a model of the world in which enormous amounts of energy and money are being spent running a rat race where the satisfaction only comes from winning it, not from running it, and meanwhile there are numerous places where just a small fraction of that energy and money could be spent, creating great and lasting benefits. His proposition is that in the current situation, modafinil is known mostly to a minority which includes people working on some of those important neglected matters, but if modafinil becomes as well known as Prozac or Viagra, its main consequence will be that the rats in the rat race will all run faster, with no net benefit.

Your comments imply that you disagree with this model, but you need to say where and why.

It bothers me that no one is applying a reversal test here. The paper even calls out intelligence augmentation as the prime example!

I'm inclined to trust Bostrom's well thought out paper on the matter, but I'd be curious to hear opposing views.

Yvain has seen the misery of Haiti and India firsthand; but it seems only with his eyes.

I very specifically mentioned potential First World outlays to Third World countries as exceptions to my point. For example, I said:

There may be useful indirect actions, like advancing technology, increasing tax revenue that can be spent on useful absolute goods, and increasing the amount that flows as charity to the Third World (emphasis added)

Other than that, my entire argument was based on the "happiness follows economic growth up to a certain point, then stops" argument that has been mentioned here so many times before. That means a parable talking about how great certain interventions could be for the Third World is irrelevant; the post was very specifically and explicitly aimed at the First.

(I also think the benefits from lack of iodine deficiency are a lot less siphon-away-able)

The "60% serious" number may indeed be too high, though. I meant it to signal that I thought the argument was correct in all of its main points, but probably falls apart because the increase in productivity would produce very small benefits rather than no benefits, and "very small benefits" multiplied by the entire economy still end out pretty huge, especially if some of them end out in the Third World through the indirect methods I mentioned earlier.

That's a very long winded way of objecting to Yvain's model of the American economy as largely zero-sum games (eg. poker). If the village is a static economy with fixed output... Then sure, modafinil is fairly questionable. But this story is a way of asserting it is not with hypothetical examples.

Of course, it's not obvious that iodine is necessarily a good thing. Malthusian models come to mind: if intelligence has no effect on subsistence wage, then it can have no effect on per capita wealth and so any effects are redistributional, and if you want to argue it's a good thing you need to appeal to extra things like quality of life... which actually probably would affect subsistence wage since now you don't need so much wages, your quality of life has been improved. Intelligence might come with a one-time increase in wealth, which of course simply causes the population to expand and that the temporarily-increased-per-capita-wealth will eventually fall back down to equilibrium as people reproduce more. :)

"It was a bit sloppy essay of Yvain - cool idea, kinda weak execution" is what I might say if he had posted it to Main instead of his blog.

I disapprove of this thread on the principle that people should be able to idly speculate on their own blog without being harangued elsewhere.

I disapprove of your use of parables to smuggle in your economic hypotheses, rather than arguing for them competently and clearly.

I disapprove of your commentary, because I agree with wedrifid here:

(Claiming to have) mind read negative beliefs and motives in others then declaring them publicly tends to be frowned upon. Certainly it is frowned upon me.

Although I'm unsure of the etiquette of posting about personal blogs on other sites, I was also disappointed with the blog post in question. It was the first time that Yvain wrote something I disagreed with after reading his post in full and digesting in. I've often disagreed with him before reading it, but he usually persuades me.

This post seemed to rely on the principle that having more spare time is a positional good, with which I disagree strongly. Essentially, giving everyone another four hours of awake, productive time, is the same as extending your life by four hours for each day you are alive [and you do so in good health - extending the human lifespan from 80 to 95 might or might not be a good thing, but adding years to your healthy, productive life, seems a good thing]

Yvain's claim seems to be that 100% of the extra four hours will be diverted into work, but to me that's a) almost certainly not true [the figure would be more than 0% and less than 100%], b) not a bad thing.

a) It seems very likely that, given that our day is > 0% work and > 0% leisure, an extra four hours a day will add more than 0 hours of leisure.

b) If all med students get more studying done, it's far from obvious that the net result is a bad one. I assume that there is some value to med students' knowledge of medicine [okay, for anatomy courses this might not hold]. If, say, Apple workers work 50% more, then we stand to get better and faster Macs]

Not inordinately.

Less-than-sincere modesty is probably the culprit for missing the interval.

"Vote against slavery" is not something that happens in a vacuum. There isn't someone reading minds who realizes the country has a majority of people who would prefer slavery be illegal (even if you ignore the minds of the slaves), and calls a vote to happen on the issue of "should slavery be a thing". In any given district (town, city, country, whatever area), you would have to campaign and convince people both that they would be better off without slavery, AND that this means it should be illegal. There are reasons why people don't form coalitions of 80 percent to rob the 20 percent.

In a lot of places, you had to own property to vote.

(Also, there were plenty of places where slavery was, indeed, outlawed relatively quickly. Just not everywhere.)

Why not also vote to prohibit holding capital? People get rich by owning capital, and it's hard to compete with them if you don't. What's the difference?

I think you're conflating your ethical views on slavery with what you wish other people would decide for consequential reasons.

For one thing, one of the main groups suporting seperating from Great Britain (especially in the southern colonies) were slaveholders who were scared that the British were going to outlaw slavery (something that they had threatened to do in response to the revolution).

I don't know anything about the politics of slavery in the US at the time, but in general, a relevant question is: how strongly did the non-slaveholders desire slavery to be outlawed, as compared to their desires with regard to other issues?

In general, in politics it's quite common that the majority of the populace has a moderate preference to do X, a much smaller fraction of the populace has a very strong preference to not do X, and the desires of the minority win out. For the majority, the issue might not be important enough that they'd change their vote because of it, especially if the politician in question supports other issues who the people feel are more important. For the minority, however, the issue may be important enough to be the deciding factor in whom they vote. So the politican will maximize their votes by doing what the minority wants with regard to issue X, and what the majority wants with regard to everything else. At the same time, if the minority and majority vote for different politicians, then it's beneficial for the elected politicians to barter votes, so that the majority "buys" the minority's support for laws that they might not be able to pass otherwise, in exchange for giving the minority what they want on an issue that feels less important for the majority.

Of course, all of this presumes that the voters act "rationally", and give their support to the candidates who most accurately match the desires of the voters. Pretty much everything that we know about voter behavior says that this isn't the case. (Rationally was in scare quotes because, given how little influence a single vote actually has on an election, not bothering to figure out what your candidate actually does may in fact be the most rational use of your time.)

As I understand it, people suspected something like the Civil War would happen if they tried that.

A lot of compromises were made to forge a single country out of this mess.

Yes you should be as confident as possible.

In interview, you can admit that you used to have flaws, which you identified and corrected, but this is as close as you can get.

I've heard that cover letters are not very popular these days, some people are doing away with them and viewing them as just another thing that can get you rejected.

Before you put a lot of effort into this, you might want to check around and see if anyone even wants cover letters anymore. I know at least one significant company that does not even accept them.

Huh, ditto, and un-downvoting it didn't make it stop being hidden.

Yes, and here's another. On the page of all that user's posts, it does appear, at -4. But the permalink to the post shows it as hidden.

Is this a bug or a new feature?