There have been recent discussions on determinism in Newtonian/classical mechanics within the philosophy of science literature. See, e.g.:
Norton, John D. 2008. “The Dome: An Unexpectedly Simple Failure of Determinism.” Philosophy of Science 75:786–98. doi:10.1086/594524
Newton’s equations of motion tell us that a mass at rest at the apex of a dome with the shape specified here can spontaneously move. It has been suggested that this indeterminism should be discounted since it draws on an incomplete rendering of Newtonian physics, or it is “unphysical,” or it employs illicit idealizations. I analyze and reject each of these reasons.
Wilson, Mark. 2009. “Determinism and the Mystery of the Missing Physics.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60:173–93. doi:10.1093/bjps/axn052
This article surveys the difficulties in establishing determinism for classical physics within the context of several distinct foundational approaches to the discipline. It explains that such problems commonly emerge due to a deeper problem of ‘missing physics'.
If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post, even in Discussion, it goes here.