If this is true, then consequentialists must oppose having children, since all children will die someday?
The corollary, I suppose, is that you are acting intensely "immoral" or "unjust" right now because you are "allowing" hundreds of innocent people to die when your efforts could probably be saving them. You could have, for example, been trained as a doctor & traveled to Africa to treat dying children.
Even then, you might have grown tired. If you nap, innocent children may die during your slumber. Does the consequentialist then say that it is immoral or unjust for the doctor in Africa to sleep?
I can see no way that a consequentialist can, in the real world, determine what is the "most moral" or "most just" course of action given that there are at any point in time an almost countless number of ways in which one could act. To say that anything less than the optimal solution (whatever that is) is immoral or unjust leads us down the path of absurdity.
If this is true, then consequentialists must oppose having children, since all children will die someday?
Again, not necessarily. A consequentialist who values the absence of a dead child more than the presence of a living one would conclude that one ought not have children, since it likely (eventually) results in a loss of value . A consequentialist who values the presence of a living child more than the absence of a dead one.
You seem to keep missing this point: consequentialism doesn't tell you what to value. It just says, if X is valuable, then choice...
Will Crouch has written up a list of the most important unsolved problems in ethics:
The Practical List
What’s the optimal career choice? Professional philanthropy, influencing, research, or something more common-sensically virtuous?
What’s the optimal donation area? Development charities? Animal welfare charities? Extinction risk mitigation charities? Meta-charities? Or investing the money and donating later?
What are the highest leverage political policies? Libertarian paternalism? Prediction markets? Cruelty taxes, such as taxes on caged hens; luxury taxes?
What are the highest value areas of research? Tropical medicine? Artificial intelligence? Economic cost-effectiveness analysis? Moral philosophy?
Given our best ethical theories (or best credence distribution in ethical theories), what’s the biggest problem we currently face?
The Theoretical List
What’s the correct population ethics? How should we value future people compared with present people? Do people have diminishing marginal value?
Should we maximise expected value when it comes to small probabilities of huge amounts of value? If not, what should we do instead?
How should we respond to the possibility of creating infinite value (or disvalue)? Should that consideration swamp all others? If not, why not?
How should we respond to the possibility that the universe actually has infinite value? Does it mean that we have no reason to do any action (because we don’t increase the sum total of value in the world)? Or does this possibility refute aggregative consequentialism?
How should we accommodate moral uncertainty? Should we apply expected utility theory? If so, how do we make intertheoretic value comparisons? Does this mean that some high-stakes theories should dominate our moral thinking, even if we assign them low credence?
How should intuitions weigh against theoretical virtues in normative ethics? Is common-sense ethics roughly correct? Or should we prefer simpler moral theories?
Should we prioritise the prevention of human wrongs over the alleviation of naturally caused suffering? If so, by how much?
What sorts of entities have moral value? Humans, presumably. But what about non-human animals? Insects? The natural environment? Artificial intelligence?
What additional items should be on these lists?