Things philosophers have debated

Eliezer Yudkowsky

I just had to stare at this a while. We can have papers published about this, we really ought to be able to get papers published about Friendly AI subproblems.

My favorite part is at the very end.

Trivialism is the theory that every proposition is true. A consequence of trivialism is that all statements, including all contradictions of the form "p and not p" (that something both 'is' and 'isn't' at the same time), are true.^[1]

[edit]See also

[edit]References

^ Graham Priest; John Woods (2007). "Paraconsistency and Dialetheism". The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic. Elsevier. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-444-51623-7.

[edit]Further reading

Paul Kabay (2008). "A defense of trivialism". PhD thesis, School of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Social Inquiry, The University of Melbourne.
Paul Kabay (2010). On the Plenitude of Truth. A Defense of Trivialism. Lambert Academic Publishing. ISBN 978-3-8383-5102-5.
Luis Estrada-González (2012) "Models of Possibilism and Trivialism", Logic and Logical Philosophy, Volume 21, 175–205
Frederick Kroon (2004). "Realism and Dialetheism". In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb. The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-926517-6.
Paul Kabay (2010). Interpreting the divyadhvani: On Why the Digambara Sect Is Right about the Nature of the Kevalin. The Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association Conference
Bueno, O. V. (2007). "Troubles with Trivialism". Inquiry 50 (6): 655–667. doi:10.1080/00201740701698670. edit
Priest, G. (2000). "Could everything be true?". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2): 189–195. doi:10.1080/00048400012349471. edit

This logic-related article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.

Straight from Wikipedia.

I just had to stare at this a while. We can have papers published about this, we really ought to be able to get papers published about Friendly AI subproblems.

My favorite part is at the very end.

[edit]See also

[edit]References

^ Graham Priest; John Woods (2007). "Paraconsistency and Dialetheism". The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic. Elsevier. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-444-51623-7.

[edit]Further reading

Paul Kabay (2008). "A defense of trivialism". PhD thesis, School of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Social Inquiry, The University of Melbourne.
Paul Kabay (2010). On the Plenitude of Truth. A Defense of Trivialism. Lambert Academic Publishing. ISBN 978-3-8383-5102-5.
Luis Estrada-González (2012) "Models of Possibilism and Trivialism", Logic and Logical Philosophy, Volume 21, 175–205
Frederick Kroon (2004). "Realism and Dialetheism". In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb. The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-926517-6.
Paul Kabay (2010). Interpreting the divyadhvani: On Why the Digambara Sect Is Right about the Nature of the Kevalin. The Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association Conference
Bueno, O. V. (2007). "Troubles with Trivialism". Inquiry 50 (6): 655–667. doi:10.1080/00201740701698670. edit
Priest, G. (2000). "Could everything be true?". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2): 189–195. doi:10.1080/00048400012349471. edit

This logic-related article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.

Spinoza: His views are tricky, because of his particular brand of monism. You're right that we should generally take the 'Ethics' as a work of a priori reasoning, but nevertheless he considered our knowledge of the contents of nature to be empirical knowledge: in order to know that there is a knife on the table, my mind has to interact with the 'mind' of the knife, and this involves physical contact.

Plato: The trouble with saying something like this about Plato is that he neither deployed the a priori/a posteriori distinction, nor had views similar to ours about knowledge. And he predates the very idea of deductive logic.

For Plato, knowledge was distinct from 'correct opinion' in being unchangeable. This means that knowledge was necessarily not about nature. However, it doesn't follow from this that the knowledge is a priori. So in dialogues like the Meno or the Phaedo, Plato claims that we have access to knowledge of things like geometry through recollection. If we take him literally, then this could not be in any way a priori knowledge: recollection is firmly an experience (remember, 'a priori' doesn't refer to innate knowledge, or knowledge that is temporally prior to experience). There's plenty of room to take him less literally, of course.

Ah, but in the case of Spinoza, you can't get real 'empirical knowledge' because to get 'knowledge' of the knife on the table, you'd have to learn the entire causal history of the knife on the table. Otherwise, you don't have knowledge, you have something like an incomplete modification of an idea. So the only way he can have knowledge is a priori reasoning, which is why he relies so heavily on his axiomatic system.

I'll grant you Plato did not use this distinction, but while recognition allows us to access knowledge, Plato does claim that we already "... (read more)

[cite_note-GabbayWoods2007-0] ^ Graham Priest; John Woods (2007). "Paraconsistency and Dialetheism". The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic. Elsevier. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-444-51623-7.

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Things philosophers have debated

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