gwern comments on XKCD - Frequentist vs. Bayesians - Less Wrong Discussion
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Well, I'll put it this way - if we take as our null hypothesis 'these 95% CIs really did have 95% coverage', would the observed coverage-rate have p<0.05? If it did, would you or him resort to 'No True Scotsman' again?
(A hint as to the answer: just a few non-coverages drive the null down to extremely low levels - think about multiplying 0.05 by 0.05...)
Yeah, I still think you're talking past one another. Wasserman's point is that something being a 95% confidence interval deductively entails that it has the relevant kind of frequentist coverage. That can no more fail to be true than 2+2 can stop being 4. The null, then, ought to be simply that these are really 95% confidence intervals, and the data then tell against that null by undermining a logical consequence of the null. The data might be excellent evidence that these aren't 95% confidence intervals. Of course, figuring out exactly why they aren't is another matter. Did the physicists screw up? Were their sampling assumptions wrong? I would guess that there is a failure of independence somewhere in the example, but again, I haven't read the paper carefully or really looked at the data.
Anyway, I still don't see what's wrong with Wasserman's reply. If they don't have 95% coverage, then they aren't 95% confidence intervals.
So, is your point that we often don't know when a purportedly 95% confidence interval really is one? Or that we don't know when the assumptions are satisfied for using confidence intervals? Those seem like reasonable complaints. I wonder what Wasserman would have to say about those objections.
I'm saying that this stuff about 95% CI is a completely empty and broken promise; if we see the coverage blown routinely, as we do in particle physics in this specific case, the CI is completely useless - it didn't deliver what it was deductively promised. It's like have a Ouija board which is guaranteed to be right 95% of the time, but oh wait, it was right just 90% of the time so I guess it wasn't really a Oujia board after all.
Even if we had this chimerical '95% confidence interval', we could never know that it was a genuine 95% confidence interval. I am reminded of Borges:
It is universally admitted that the 95% confidence interval is a result of good coverage; such is declared in all the papers, textbooks, biographies of illustrious statisticians and other texts whose authority is unquestionable...
(Given that "95% CIs" are not 95% CIs, I will content myself with honest credible intervals, which at least are what they pretend to be.)