handoflixue comments on Empirical claims, preference claims, and attitude claims - Less Wrong Discussion
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"How do you know there aren't objective standards."
Because "Sucks" and "Crappy" are words which relate to subjective valuation concepts. You can redefine the words to have some objective criteria, then measure his music. However, redefining words doesn't change the original definition, it just clouds language. And p(0.98) that 98% of all people claiming he "sucks" have NOT come up with a clear objective standard using a new definition (excluding that new definition being along the lines of "me and/or my social circle do not like his music".)
You can have a set of Objective Criteria For Evaluating Music, but that's not what most people mean when they say his music sucks.
Says you. But if I say Trabants are crappy compared to Ferraris, aren't I experessing something reasonably objective?
Most everyone will get what you MEAN, but that doesn't mean that it's ACTUALLY become objective. It's just a colloquial usage that most people recognize, and it's probably hazardous to your memetic health to let yourself believe that just because people understand it, that it's literally true :)
Going a bit more extreme than a mere Trabant: If you had a car which exploded after any impact of more than 5 MPH, wiping out half a city, it would be crappy to everyone EXCEPT terrorist bombers who are going "Wow, I'll take three!"
I am pretty sure that you two use different definitions of the term "objective". Tabooing (a LW jargon for "defining") "objective" might be helpful.
Stealing from RobbBB: subjective shall be those things without a clear truth condition. You can taboo the word in question ("sucks") and replace it with a clear truth condition ("I want a fuel efficient car"), at which point it becomes object-- has a clear truth condition :)
Subjective things have clear truth conditions: "I like vanilla" is true because I like vanilla. The thing is that they have truth conditions that are indexed to individuals.
You might consider that a clear truth condition, but it would be fairly complex for me to determine whether or not you're lying, or just mistaken. Thus, while it has a truth condition, it's not really a clear one. "Peterdjones professed to like vanilla on 17/11/2012" is much clearer, and I'd say about the limit of what we can objectively say.
You might consider it a clear truth condition, since, we strongly tend not to question such reports by default.
http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Highly_Advanced_Epistemology_101_for_Beginners
You seem deeply confused by what is meant by "truth". Suffice to say, "not questioned by most people" has nothing to do with what I mean by the word.
"if you are not cofused by it, you don't understand it".
You may mean something that floats free of common intutions. I can only wish you the best of luck in arguing a theory of truth from ground zero -- an intuition-free basis.
Empirical truth? I have the intuition that if I can see and touch it, its there. How can I prove that?
Mathematical truth? I have the intution that if you can prove something from intuittivle obvious axioms truth-value-preserving rules of inference, then they are true But why would the axioms be true absent intution? and what's so specual about truth-preservation?
Etc
Etc.
Whole History of Human Thought 101.
Maybe someone could tell me what would be better evidence of what someone thinks or feels than their own reports.
The issue is that just because it is strong evidence may not make it a clear truth condition (although I suspect what one means by "clear truth condition" may be need more detail). But one obvious issue is that observed human behavior can matter a lot. Someone might claim that they really care a lot about the poor, but if they never give to charity or do anything else to assist the poor, their behavior is pretty strong evidence that their report isn't very useful.
This is quite an onerous requirement, given that people disagree on that "clear truth" thing a lot.
In your example, people may disagree on what "a fuel efficient car" is. Does it include the energy required to manufacture and later dispose of the batteries? If so, what total mileage does one use to properly amortize it?
Something along the lines of "measurable with an agreed upon procedure" might be better for the group of people who can agree on the measurement procedure. Under this dentition, if no such group includes both Abd and his teen daughter, then "Justin Bieber sucks" is "objectively" a subjective comment. Specifically, everyone who agrees with the above definition of objectiveness and will apply it: "look for a group of people who agree on ways to measure musical suckiness and include both Abd and his daughter, and come up empty" will then conclude that there is no measurement procedure which can resolve their dispute, and therefore the statement under consideration is objectively subjective. Not to be confused with subjectively objective.
Well, not sure how much of the above made sense.
I like the idea that if there is no method-of-measure such that both parties can agree to that definition, then it is subjective. It nicely encapsulates my intuitive feelings on subjective vs objective, while being much more technically precise :)
EDIT: I'd go on to say that "a clear truth condition" and "an agreed upon method of measuring", to me, work out as having the same meaning. People disagree on "truth" quite a lot, but such people are also unlikely to agree to a specific method of measuring. If they have agreed, then there is a clear truth condition. But having it spelled out was still Very Useful to me, and probably is a better way of communicating it :)
There's a clear something condition. Elsewhere, you object to the idea tha presence of agreement, or lack of disagreement, ("not questioned by most people") is sufficient for truth:-
http://lesswrong.com/lw/fgz/empirical_claims_preference_claims_and_attitude/7vcg
I'm glad that you found my comment helpful. It was certainly worthwhile for me trying to articulate my qualifications of the term "clear truth".
I dislike using the word "truth" outside of its precise meaning in mathematical logic, because it is not very useful instrumentally -- there is often no way to check whose interpretation is closer to "what really happened" or what would happen in every single one of many counterfactual scenarios.
For example, one of the standard things a therapist says during a couple's counseling in response to the contradictory versions of what happened at some point in the rocky relationship is that "you have to accept that there is one partner's truth and there is the other partner's truth". Both are completely sure in their version of what had transpired, and that the other partner has it wrong. Unfortunately, there is almost never a way to tell what "actually" happened, and even if there were, it would not be nearly as helpful going forward as working out real issues instead of dwelling on who said/did what and when and how this grudge can never be resolved without some major restitution.
Thank you! I shall also steal this, though in my case for more nefarious purposes. It is a useful tactic.
I don't see why. Aren't things like 0-60 timings objective?
That makes it a good bomb, not a good car.
http://lesswrong.com/lw/fgz/empirical_claims_preference_claims_and_attitude/7udr seems to cover it at this point :)
Not very well, though. I think Mainstream Philosophy is way ahead on this.
What do you mean by 'subjective valuation concept'? Rationality is a 'subjective valuation concept,' in several senses; its metric is relativized to, established by, and finds much or all of its content in individual mental states, and it is an evaluative term whose applicability standards are likewise stipulated by a mixture of common language usage and personal preferences. What makes 'X is rational' more objective than 'X sucks'?
Well, the answer is either: a) Rationality is better defined, similar to how 2+2=4 is more objective b) Rationality is not more objective than suckiness.
My gut says A, but I suspect that a random population survey would be evidence more towards B.
Now, if you've redefined Rationality in to a technical term, like it's generally used here on LessWrong, AND you're speaking in a context where your audience understands that you mean the technical term, no issue. Same as how "Bieber is crappy" communicates plenty to people who already know YOUR definition of crappy.
I would agree that the main problem is a lack of clear truth conditions for "x sucks;" the fact that it's a claim about subjective states, and that it relies on implicature, is immaterial. But this is a problem to some extent for nearly all natural-language terms, including "x is rational" in the colloquial sense. And the problem can be resolved by stipulating truth-conditions for "x sucks" just as easily as for "x is rational." So I think we'd agree that we should focus on getting people to taboo and clarify all their words, not just on feigning 'objectivity' by avoiding making any appeals to preferences or other mental states. Preferences are real.
"a lack of clear truth conditions"
That is a very useful definition, thank you :)
Or even just undefine the words and inherit their literal meanings regarding lower relative air pressure and faeces.