You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

benelliott comments on [LINK] Steven Landsburg "Accounting for Numbers" - response to EY's "Logical Pinpointing" - Less Wrong Discussion

9 Post author: David_Gerard 14 November 2012 12:55PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (46)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: benelliott 14 November 2012 05:27:59PM 3 points [-]

I thought he was asking if it had ever happened in any not-yet-axiomatised subject, presumably looking for examples other than arithmetic.

Comment author: Plasmon 15 November 2012 09:17:18AM *  3 points [-]

Yes. I think the mathematicians were lucky that it didn't happen on the sort of integers they were discussing (there was, after all, great discussion about irrational numbers, zero , later imaginary numbers, and even Archimedes' attempt to describe big integers was probably not without controversy ).

Comment author: JoshuaZ 14 November 2012 05:47:24PM 2 points [-]

Hmm, in that case, it might be relevant to point out examples that don't quite fit Plasmon's situation but are almost the same: There are a variety of examples where due to a lack of rigorous axiomatization, statements were believed to be true that just turned out to be false. One classical example is the idea that of a function continuous on an interval and nowhere differentiable. Everyone took for granted that for granted that a continuous function could only fail differentiability at isolated points until Weierstrass showed otherwise.

Comment author: benelliott 15 November 2012 08:44:50AM 1 point [-]

For another one, Russell's paradox seems like it was a consequence naively assuming our intuitions about what counts as a 'set' would necessarily be correct, or even internally consistent.