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DataPacRat comments on If you could take it with you, what would you take? - Less Wrong Discussion

4 Post author: DataPacRat 18 November 2012 12:12AM

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Comment author: DataPacRat 19 November 2012 08:11:47PM 0 points [-]

Bonus points for figuring out a way to store a cryptographic checksum of the original essay in a future-proof way, so I could tell if the essay contents had been altered after I deposited it.

Bruce Schneier designed the 'Solitaire' cryptographic algorithm to use a deck of cards - if you asked politely, he might be able to refer you to some system which can provide the checksum you describe. The reasons and specifications of what you're trying to accomplish might need to be made a bit more explicit.

Comment author: Risto_Saarelma 19 November 2012 09:10:35PM 1 point [-]

I don't see why I'd need Solitaire. There is probably going to be something much more seriously wrong than someone tampering with my diary if I end up in a future where I am unable to get my hands on any simple computer I can make run a contemporary crypto algorithm.

Basic scenario is, I don't completely trust the safety deposit box, so I want to put something in there that can't be easily changed and rebuilt (maybe the reanimators botch something bringing me back and then go mess with my personal effects trying to alter the evidence that could tip me off to something being wrong).

I could just use a standard digital signature with a huge private key which I would then destroy. But I'd need to store the public key somewhere outside the deposit box, or else the attackers could just re-sign the forgery and replace my public key with theirs in the box. I could commit the public key to memory, but might forget it with brain damage. I could also try to leave it in some public archives, since the key wouldn't contain any information I might want to keep private, like the deposit box would.