Prompted by this comment, looking for references on the reductionism and the laws of nature, specifically, to address this argument:
if physical laws are guiding "reality" than they are not reducible to quarks and leptons themselves, which does call the whole idea of reductionism in question.
Basically, where do the laws of "fundamental" physics fit in the map/territory model (trying to steel-man it for myself, given that I'm not a fan)? If they are in the territory, what does the ultimate reduction look like? Is Nature just a fancy mathematical formula and some initial conditions, Tegmark-style? And if the physical laws are in the map, what represents them in the territory?
The laws are in the map, of course (if it came from mind, it is necessarily of a map). And what we call the 'territory' is a map itself. The map/territory distinction is just a useful analogy for explaining that our models of reality aren't necessarily reality (whatever that actually is). Also, keep in mind that there are many incompatible meanings for 'reductionism'. A lot of LWers (like anonymous1) use it in a way that's not in line with EY, and EY uses it in a way that's not in line with philosophy (which is where I suspect most LWers get their definit...
If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post, even in Discussion, it goes here.