If you don't believe in qualia, what does "the Utility Monster's positive utility outweighs everyone else's misery" mean?

The traditional depiction of a utility monster is a creature with such intense emotions that its emotions overshadow everyone else's. Obviously this depiction doesn't work under a preference utilitarian framework.

But it might also be possible to conceive of an entity so good at converting resources into satisfied preferences that it would count as a Utility Monster under that framework. Amartya Sen called such an entity a "pleasure wizard." The Monster might be able to do this because it is a superintelligence, or it might have a very, very long life span.

It's probably easier to imagine if you consider a "disutility monster," an entity that is worse at converting resources into satisfied preferences than a normal person. For instance, people with severe illnesses need thousands of dollars to satisfy basic preferences, such as not dying, not pooping blood, walking, and so on, which other people can satisfy nearly for free.

If one is a preference utlitarian, it means something like: "any given (or at least the modal) person would be willing to accept near-certain misery for a 1/7 billion shot of being the Utility Monster

That is a good point. I wonder if positing a sufficiently talented utility monster would count as Pascal's Mugging.

I'm also wondering how reliable something like "being willing to pay for a chance of being a utility monster is" as a measure of utility. If probability is in the mind then I know ahead of time that I already have a 100% chance of not being the utility monster, owing to the rather obvious fact that I am not the utility monster. But it's quite possible that I don't understand probability correctly, I've always had trouble with math.