Well, consider this: it takes only a very small functional change to the human brain to make 'raising it as a human child' a questionable strategy at best. Crippling a few features of the brain produces sociopaths who, notably, cannot be reliably inculcated with our values, despite sharing 99.99etc% of our own neurological architecture.
Mind space is a tricky thing to pin down in a useful way, so let's just say the bubble is really tiny. If the changes your making are larger than the changes between a sociopath and a neurotypical human, then you shouldn't employ this strategy. Trying to use it on any kind of denovo AI without anything analagous to our neurons is foolhardy beyond belief. So much of our behavior is predated on things that aren't and can't be learned, and trying to program all of those qualities and intuitions by hand so that the AI can be properly taught our value scheme looks broadly isomorphic to the FAI problem.
At the current AGI-12 conference, some designers have been proponents of keeping AGI's safe by bringing them up in human environments, providing them with interactions and feedback in a similar way to how we bring up human children. Obviously that approach would fail for a fully smart AGI with its own values - it would pretend to follow our values for as long as it needed, and then defect. However, some people have confidence if we started with a limited, dumb AGI, then we could successfully inculcate our values in this way (a more sophisticated position would be that though this method would likely fail, it's more likely to succeed than a top-down friendliness project!).
The major criticism of this approach is that it anthropomorphises the AGI - we have a theory of children's minds, constructed by evolution, culture, and our own child-rearing experience. And then we project this on the alien mind of the AGI, assuming that if the AGI presents behaviours similar to a well-behaved child, then it will become a moral AGI. The problem is that we don't know how alien the AGI's mind will be, and if our reinforcement is actually reinforcing the right thing. Specifically, we need to be able to find some way of distinguishing between: