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Suryc11 comments on Caring about what happens after you die - Less Wrong Discussion

8 Post author: DataPacRat 18 December 2012 03:13PM

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Comment author: Suryc11 18 December 2012 10:03:29PM *  1 point [-]

This seems isomorphic to the mainstream debate, in academic philosophy, over whether one can be harmed by things happening after one's death; in other words, precisely how do one's preferences (for certain states of affairs) after one's death work?

See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/death/

"Third, what is the case for and the case against the harm thesis, the claim that death can harm the individual who dies, and the posthumous harm thesis, according to which events that occur after an individual dies can still harm that individual?"

Comment author: Manfred 19 December 2012 04:57:50AM 0 points [-]

Hm. I think worrying about whether something can "harm" a dead person carries much more semantic baggage, so the key ideas will probably be different.

Comment author: Suryc11 19 December 2012 05:52:33AM 0 points [-]

Good point. I think the main similarity derives from a specific understanding/definition of harm that holds that harming another is acting counter to another's preferences, in some sense. In that way then, it's similar to (the OP's trouble in getting his interlocutors to understand) preferences being sustained after one's death.