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Kaj_Sotala comments on Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and what it means for CEV - Less Wrong Discussion

21 Post author: AlexMennen 05 January 2013 09:38PM

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Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 06 January 2013 06:43:10AM 7 points [-]

Axiom 1: Every person, and the FAI, are VNM-rational agents.

[...]

So why should you accept my axioms?

Axiom 1: The VNM utility axioms are widely agreed to be necessary for any rational agent.

Though of course, humans are not VNM-rational.

Comment author: AlexMennen 06 January 2013 09:10:39PM 1 point [-]

Only a VNM-rational agent can have preferences in a coherent way, so if we're talking about aggregating people's preferences, I don't see any way to do it other than modeling people as having underlying VNM-rational preferences that fail to perfectly determine their decisions.

Comment author: Academian 07 January 2013 06:22:57PM 2 points [-]

Non-VNM agents satisfying only axiom 1 have coherent preferences... they just don't mix well with probabilities.

Comment author: steven0461 06 January 2013 08:40:26PM 1 point [-]

Presumably there would be first be an extrapolation phase resulting in rational preferences.