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AlexMennen comments on Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and what it means for CEV - Less Wrong Discussion

21 Post author: AlexMennen 05 January 2013 09:38PM

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Comment author: AlexMennen 06 January 2013 09:02:48PM 3 points [-]

Under Harsanyi's original axioms, you cannot say anything about the signs of the coefficients. My axioms are slightly stronger, but I think still not quite enough. However, if you make the even stronger (but still reasonable, I think) assumption that the agents' utility functions are linearly independent, then you can prove that all of the coefficients are non-negative. This is because the linear independence allows you create situations where each agent prefers A to B by arbitrarily specifiable relative amounts. As in, for all agents k, we can create choices A and B such that every agent prefers A to B, but the margin by which every agent other than k prefers A to B is arbitrarily small compared to the margin by which k prefers A to B, so since FAI prefers A to B, c_k must be nonnegative.