I think the idea is meant to be that "one of many simulations" = "low probability" = "unimportant".

If so, I think this is simply a mistake. MugaSofer: you say that being killed in one of N simulations is just like having a 1/N chance of death. I guess you really mean 1/(N+1). Anyway, now Omega comes to you and says: unless you give me $100k (replace this with some sum that you could raise if necessary, but would be a hell of an imposition), I will simulate one copy of you and then stop simulating it at around the point of it's life you're currently at. Would you pay up? Would you pay up in the same way if the threat were "I'll flip a coin and kill you if it comes up heads"?

The right way to think about this sort of problem is still contentious, but I'm pretty sure that "make another copy of me and kill it" is not at all the same sort of outcome as "kill me with probability 1/2".

Now, suppose there are a trillion simulations of you. If you really believe what it says at the start of this article, then I think the following positions are open to you. (1) All these simulations matter about as much as any other person does. (2) All these simulations matter only about 10^-12 as much as any other person -- and so do I, here in the "real" world. Only if you abandon your belief that there's no relevant difference between simulated-you and real-you, do you have the option of saying that your simulations matter less than you do. In that case, maybe you can say that each of N simulations matters 1/N as much, though to me this feels like a bad choice.