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Multiheaded comments on On private marriage contracts - Less Wrong Discussion
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Variations of this idea have been running through my head for the last few months as I've been trying to re-evaluate my views of how concepts like "oppression" and "coercion" ought to be defined, and how immensely such categories could (when taken seriously enough) complicate the search for an ethical and practicable socio-economic structure. [1] Seeing it spelled out explicitly here gives me a high prior on the authors' understanding of the ethics of choice.
Looking at the reviews of Nudge in mainstream liberal publications, I see praise for the specific examples of "nudges" proposed in the areas of finance, healthcare, etc, and I can't help but agree. However, civil unions are a much more important and sensitive matter, and the authors seem to lean heavily on the side of caution/liberalism here. What they have suggested - separation of religion/tradition and law; eliminating restrictions on who can participate; a set of unambiguious default rules that would favour the vulnerable party; the requirement to plan ahead for situations where emotions would run high, etc - is all well and good.
However, I can't see them saying anything about what Vladimir seems to be arguing against! It does not appear that the authors even hint at changing the boundaries of what is legally enforceable for a civil union contract, and what the methods of enforcement could be. That they don't even mention the possibility of "wild radical implications" such as "flogging for adultery", and that they propose denying all legal status to private "marriage", certainly puts me at ease as to the direction of their "libertarianism" - but how is it even distinctly libertarian at this point? Why not call it the updated and streamlined version of modern liberal progressivism?
Tl;dr: we ought to take note that this is not libertarianism or conservatism, the authors are just using libertarian concepts to make good old progressivism more coherent and effective. I'm totally fine with it :)
1] One of the effects is that I'm now considerably more pro-markets, yet still opposed to the actually existing capitalist or feudal modes of production. See e.g. here
They aren't from what I read. This article cites several essays. To understand what Vladimir is commenting on I suggest you follow the links to the original thread.
Why, I've read it and understand what he's commenting on. I've seen arguments for unlimited enforcement of all private contracts building on the framework of "property rights" - for example, in Moldbug's idea of "Pronomianism". I agree with Vladimir that 1) this would be the "consistently libertarian" position, and that 2) it's kind of batshit insane (to put it mildly) and that attempting to put it into practice would terrify and outrage practically everyone. Therefore, I find it more meaningful to call the authors' platform "liberal"/"progressivist" rather than "libertarian". The title of "Libertarian paternalism" in particular sounds like it would involve various social-conservative points, explicit support for traditional marriage, etc - but it doesn't.
I'd bet that the authors were simply aware of how massively uncool/conformist/stale calling something "liberal" or "progressive" would sound nowdays, so they slapped a mostly arbitrary level on a system of (rather reasonable, hardly novel) "Prog" policy suggestions.
To put it another way:
As I hinted above, the "right" being asked for here is (in libertarian terminology) a positive right to others' help in enforcing the contract ... against those others' objection that they would not willingly choose to help enforce it.
In other words, the question that may need an answer is not "Why don't I have the right to enter into such a contract?" but "Why should anyone help the other party enforce it against me?"
An ideological "freedom of contract" answer runs into an opposing "freedom of association" response.
Because I ask them to. Indeed why not outsource this? Why not have the state allow people to pay non-government agencies to enforce contracts the government does not wish to.
State monopoly on legitimate violence is a Schelling point for all modern states, both autocracies and democracies. If you break it up, the problem of distributing the right to use violence so that it wouldn't just lead to tyrannies and chaos must practically be solved from scratch for the modern world.
De facto states do not have monopoly on violence. Also de jure private security firms do have some room for violence.
Also there is the minor issues of Government being this huge amorphous blob, that agents and institutions should have access to violence if and only if they belong to this strange set doesn't seem like necessarily something that helps to prevent tyrannies and chaos.
Also choosing between many small tyrannies and one big one I see good pro-liberty arguments for the former.
De jure security firms are specifically licensed for the violence that they do.
Most of the examples given are things governments already do enforce in other types of contracts. And many are things governments used to enforce in marriage contracts.
Can you give an example of a non-marriage-related contract that specifies a penalty for one party having sex with someone other than the other party? I'm aware of employment contracts that specify termination of contract for disreputable sexual behavior, but that's not really the same thing. Possibly the closest thing might be employment contracts for porn actors which require them to use protection against STDs, but I'm not sure if those apply to their non-professional sex acts.
Yes, policies change; as do societal norms.
Governments once enforced all sorts of conditions on marriage that are contrary to social norms today. For instance, in many Western societies a man could have his wife prosecuted and punished by the state with physical violence for being unsubmissive to him. This is no longer the case — and it certainly cannot be altered by contract, since it was a criminal matter ... and since the punishment required a society willing to participate in, e.g., mocking and throwing filth at the condemned "scold". The institution of marriage has changed in ways that cannot be reverted by mere consent of the spouses, since the surrounding society has changed.
Moreover, governments reject many sorts of claims on enforcement power which they once accepted, both within and beyond contractual matters. Governments in the West used to enforce slavery as a property right; they no longer do so — does that mean that they no longer enforce property rights at all? Similarly, they once enforced racially discriminatory covenants on real estate, but no longer do so — does that mean that they no longer enforce any covenants on real estate? They used to enforce the right of fathers to marry off their daughters against the daughter's wishes; they no longer do so — does that mean they do not enforce any parental rights?
In each case, no; rather, the enforcing party is picking and choosing which sorts of claims to enforce, on the basis of what I've called moral-like (see above; no more quibbling, please!) judgments as to which sorts of claims are harmful and shouldn't be enforced. This doesn't work particularly differently for claims on contract enforcement than for claims on property or parental-rights enforcement.
Actually I don't see much of a problem with fathers marrying off their daughters against their wishes because arranged marriages work out quite well by most metrics.
And yes fathers losing that right was part of a grand march in taking away most parental rights, in may ways it represents the crossing of an important Schelling fence. Today's exist only as very weak things since children are now legally de facto property of the state not parents.
You seem to be mistaking arranged marriage for forced marriage. This is a grievous error of fact about human social practices; it is not a difference of opinion or values.
The difference between arranged and forced marriage is mostly one of degree. Indeed many studies trying to measure the outcomes of arranged marriages don't really have good ways to screen out forced marriages, some don't even attempt to.
I think historically most Western people who used the legal right of forced marriage where closer to the arranged part of that spectrum.
But you know what? I just realized that I simply assumed the latter was the case without good reason. Which tells me that I should drop the conversation and continue it another time, when I'm perhaps more clear headed and have done some more study of history.
Must ... resist .... urge to troll ... by steel maning that. :)
What are you talking about?
As a lawyer, I think I qualify as a relevant expert.
I said that I think a plausible steel man of the position that the abolition of slavery was closely tied to the abolition of other kinds of private property can be made. Not obviously from a legalistic perspective but from a moral and cultural one.
But that I think that would be trolling.
It is a libertarian approach to doing progressivism. Those have been tried in the past, most notably much of the progressivism in the first half of the 19th century was libertarian in approach, but I would argue they have been systematically underused at least in the 20th century.
Not that I'm a dirty prog mind you. (~_^)