Konkvistador comments on On private marriage contracts - Less Wrong Discussion
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They aren't from what I read. This article cites several essays. To understand what Vladimir is commenting on I suggest you follow the links to the original thread.
Why, I've read it and understand what he's commenting on. I've seen arguments for unlimited enforcement of all private contracts building on the framework of "property rights" - for example, in Moldbug's idea of "Pronomianism". I agree with Vladimir that 1) this would be the "consistently libertarian" position, and that 2) it's kind of batshit insane (to put it mildly) and that attempting to put it into practice would terrify and outrage practically everyone. Therefore, I find it more meaningful to call the authors' platform "liberal"/"progressivist" rather than "libertarian". The title of "Libertarian paternalism" in particular sounds like it would involve various social-conservative points, explicit support for traditional marriage, etc - but it doesn't.
I'd bet that the authors were simply aware of how massively uncool/conformist/stale calling something "liberal" or "progressive" would sound nowdays, so they slapped a mostly arbitrary level on a system of (rather reasonable, hardly novel) "Prog" policy suggestions.
To put it another way:
As I hinted above, the "right" being asked for here is (in libertarian terminology) a positive right to others' help in enforcing the contract ... against those others' objection that they would not willingly choose to help enforce it.
In other words, the question that may need an answer is not "Why don't I have the right to enter into such a contract?" but "Why should anyone help the other party enforce it against me?"
An ideological "freedom of contract" answer runs into an opposing "freedom of association" response.
Because I ask them to. Indeed why not outsource this? Why not have the state allow people to pay non-government agencies to enforce contracts the government does not wish to.
State monopoly on legitimate violence is a Schelling point for all modern states, both autocracies and democracies. If you break it up, the problem of distributing the right to use violence so that it wouldn't just lead to tyrannies and chaos must practically be solved from scratch for the modern world.
De facto states do not have monopoly on violence. Also de jure private security firms do have some room for violence.
Also there is the minor issues of Government being this huge amorphous blob, that agents and institutions should have access to violence if and only if they belong to this strange set doesn't seem like necessarily something that helps to prevent tyrannies and chaos.
Also choosing between many small tyrannies and one big one I see good pro-liberty arguments for the former.
De jure security firms are specifically licensed for the violence that they do.
Most of the examples given are things governments already do enforce in other types of contracts. And many are things governments used to enforce in marriage contracts.
Can you give an example of a non-marriage-related contract that specifies a penalty for one party having sex with someone other than the other party? I'm aware of employment contracts that specify termination of contract for disreputable sexual behavior, but that's not really the same thing. Possibly the closest thing might be employment contracts for porn actors which require them to use protection against STDs, but I'm not sure if those apply to their non-professional sex acts.
Yes, policies change; as do societal norms.
Governments once enforced all sorts of conditions on marriage that are contrary to social norms today. For instance, in many Western societies a man could have his wife prosecuted and punished by the state with physical violence for being unsubmissive to him. This is no longer the case — and it certainly cannot be altered by contract, since it was a criminal matter ... and since the punishment required a society willing to participate in, e.g., mocking and throwing filth at the condemned "scold". The institution of marriage has changed in ways that cannot be reverted by mere consent of the spouses, since the surrounding society has changed.
Moreover, governments reject many sorts of claims on enforcement power which they once accepted, both within and beyond contractual matters. Governments in the West used to enforce slavery as a property right; they no longer do so — does that mean that they no longer enforce property rights at all? Similarly, they once enforced racially discriminatory covenants on real estate, but no longer do so — does that mean that they no longer enforce any covenants on real estate? They used to enforce the right of fathers to marry off their daughters against the daughter's wishes; they no longer do so — does that mean they do not enforce any parental rights?
In each case, no; rather, the enforcing party is picking and choosing which sorts of claims to enforce, on the basis of what I've called moral-like (see above; no more quibbling, please!) judgments as to which sorts of claims are harmful and shouldn't be enforced. This doesn't work particularly differently for claims on contract enforcement than for claims on property or parental-rights enforcement.
Actually I don't see much of a problem with fathers marrying off their daughters against their wishes because arranged marriages work out quite well by most metrics.
And yes fathers losing that right was part of a grand march in taking away most parental rights, in may ways it represents the crossing of an important Schelling fence. Today's exist only as very weak things since children are now legally de facto property of the state not parents.
You seem to be mistaking arranged marriage for forced marriage. This is a grievous error of fact about human social practices; it is not a difference of opinion or values.
The difference between arranged and forced marriage is mostly one of degree. Indeed many studies trying to measure the outcomes of arranged marriages don't really have good ways to screen out forced marriages, some don't even attempt to.
I think historically most Western people who used the legal right of forced marriage where closer to the arranged part of that spectrum.
But you know what? I just realized that I simply assumed the latter was the case without good reason. Which tells me that I should drop the conversation and continue it another time, when I'm perhaps more clear headed and have done some more study of history.
If the difference between arranged and forced marriage is one of degree, than the difference between employment and slavery is also one of degree.
Must ... resist .... urge to troll ... by steel maning that. :)
What are you talking about?
As a lawyer, I think I qualify as a relevant expert.
I said that I think a plausible steel man of the position that the abolition of slavery was closely tied to the abolition of other kinds of private property can be made. Not obviously from a legalistic perspective but from a moral and cultural one.
But that I think that would be trolling.
Ah. (I had taken “by steel manning that” to be modifying “resist” rather than “troll”, and couldn't make sense of it.)
I also think it's plausible. I don't think that would be trolling, I think that would be a highly useful way to examine one's values and ethics. Including your own views.
Consider the hardcore "reactionary" position on such relations of dominance and social control:
http://phdoctopus.com/2012/03/02/liberty-for-the-few-slavery-in-every-form-for-the-mass-the-deep-roots-of-the-birth-control-freakout/
And the "compassionate conservative" one (from an interview with a British author whom you've linked to, Roger Scruton):
http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2010/jun/05/roger-scruton-interview
As you can see, the latter view is inconsistent - as you have said yourself many times before, rallying against the futility and weakness of "mere conservatism", with its aquiescence to nearly any reform. The former view - no government or outsider should restrict a subject's control over his inferiors and subordinates, to do so in any one case is to threaten the whole structure of hierarchy and dominance - certainly seems to be a stable Schelling point. And to prevent any drift from that point, you'd need a ruthless zero-tolerance policy of enforcement.
So what is your judgment here? Any bullets you'd bite on the subject of hierarchy and dominance?
^ (1) The line in italics, although excluded in the linked quote, appears in the source text (Cannibals All: Slaves Without Masters). I assume that you can recognize the significance. Universalism - as a theistic creed or as a secular one - really did make tyrants "fear for their domination."