Those are both good, coherent answers. I'll assume from your lack of comment on (3) and (4) that you currently find them difficult, so I'll aim in that direction.
Here is the one point I want to expand upon a little. You said that the reason that you "feel" like you have free will is the following:
We animals ascribe agency to all kinds of wacky shit, including these bodies. Hence, the ego.
Now, that explains why we assign souls to other people and to clearly non-conscious things like rain and disease. It also explains much of the belief in God. But does it explain why we assign souls to ourselves? How do you justify to yourself the fact that you can personally feel your thoughts, emotions, and sensory input?
If you think you know the answer to this, or if you think that's a silly question in the first place, elaborate. If you think it's a reasonable and difficult question, or if you think the question is unanswerable, we'll come back to it later.
Oh, also: I believe that this question is the puzzle that lies at the crux of the B.I.A.S. Please elaborate if you disagree with me on that.
---Anyway, moving on.
You didn't define free will like I asked, but that's okay - it indicates that you are implicitly using a definition of free will which is impossible in any logical universe, and thus cannot be coherently defined without contradiction. And you correctly perceive that the universe runs, and you and I are portions of that process. So far so good.
A universe of made axioms makes sense, right? You can imagine a deterministic multiverse / random world-line. You can even create some simple universes.
Now answer me this:
Can you imagine creating a person within a consistent set of axioms? I'm not saying that you actually know how to construct a person of course - I'm just asking whether it is an intuitively, gut level truth that a set of axioms could in principle create conscious beings. I know that you already intellectually believe it possible - but do you alieve that it is possible?
Note that I'm not asking whether or not you personally could exist within this set of axioms and still have subjective experience....though we will get to that later. I'm just asking whether or not it's intuitive that beings similar to you could exist within a set of axioms.
If it is intuitive to you that axioms can construct people, elaborate a little on the very basics outline of how this might be done.
If it's not intuitive, let me know and we'll focus on making it so.
I did not comment on 3 and 4 because I thought you wanted to judge first whether I understood the first two.
But does it explain why we assign souls to ourselves? How do you justify to yourself the fact that you can personally feel your thoughts, emotions, and sensory input?
To me, yes. I think that a theory of mind is ascribed to oneself first, then extends to other people. On a beginner level, developing a theory of mind toward yourself is easy because you get nearly instant feedback. Your proprioception as a child is defined by instant and (mostly) ac...
It would be a stretch to call this an article, but the answers that can be addressed by the questions it poses are potentially far-reaching with regard to revealing possible reasoning flaws, either in my own philosophy, or perhaps even yours. The flaws under my suspicion are caused by the modularity of the brain's systems, and the ability to hold to conflicting beliefs when they are not held directly against one another.
These particular ones escape notice, I think, because they tend to only be given reflection in specific situations; my thought experiment here should help to hold them near each other.
The Setup: Julian finds himself in the waiting-room of the Speedy-dupe office. Beyond that waiting room are three isolated rooms (P, Q, and R). Anyone who walks into Room P, which contains the Speedy-dupe device, will be scanned down to the most exact level imaginable, causing them to lose consciousness. Anyone who has used the Speedy-dupe will remember everything up until the point they entered the waiting-room, and begin forming new memories within seconds after regaining consciousness.
Situation 1:
If Julian walks into Room P, and the Speedy-dupe runs, and then Julian walks out of Room P, and also another Julian walks out of Room Q, which is the "original" Julian? What makes Julian-P more original than Julian-Q?
Possible Answers 1:
You probably would say that Julian-P is the original Julian, due to your prior beliefs regarding causality--but how many times have you encountered the Speedy-dupe? For all we know, the person who walks into Room P is vaporized after scanning, and duplicated in Room P and in Room Q. If you still feel that Julian-P is the original, ask yourself what other reason do you have for the way you feel? What is it that you aren't mentioning?
Situation 2:
If Julian walks into Room P, runs the Speedy-dupe, and Julian walks out of Rooms Q and R, but not out of Room P, which is the original Julian? Why not?
Possible Answers 2:
You might be saying to yourself, "Ah, now, you can't trick me. Neither of them is the original!" If they are both practically identical copies of the original Julian, what now stops you from identifying the original Julian with his identical copies? Are legal property issues really the only thing stopping you from modifying your views on identity?
Situation 3:
But what about if Julian walks into Room P, is scanned by the Speedy-dupe, and walks out of Room P ten years later? Does that mean it is the "original" Julian?
Possible Answers 3:
Getting increasingly annoyed or bored with these questions, you might retort, "I see what you're doing, and it's not going to work. You are obviously anti-cryonics, but you are wrong here. Cryonics in some way preserves the original material, but your Speedy-dupe vaporizes it. The copy which emerges ten years later is not a direct continuation of the original physical material."
Based on what we've already thought about here, is continuation of the original physical material the important thing that counts toward your identifying with your future post-cryonic-revival self? If so, why? If the pattern is recreated precisely (or even well enough) at a temporal or spacial distance from the original, what is actually different between Speedy-dupe and Cryonics?
My Suspicion:
If you answered on a completely different track than the Possible Answers did, just ignore me for now (if you have not already done so). I think that what is lurking beneath most of these typical objections or feelings is actually B.I.A.S.--Belief In A Soul. Despite all scientific evidence, a part of you still believes that each person has some special little spark that goes on after death, that is ultimately the thing that makes you who you are.
It's easy to gloss over all those things, but just because everyone would like it to be that way, doesn't make it true. If I am clearly Wrong, tell me why I am Wrong, in order that I may be Less so. If not, I hope that this has helped you in Overcoming B.I.A.S.
Credits: The original function and name of the Speedy-dupe come from The Duplicate, a story by William Sleator, my favorite childhood author. (Many of his books combine normal childhood problems with mind-bending philosophical and physical concepts not normally found in youth literature.)
The idea for the multiple rooms came from the episode "The Girl Who Waited" from Doctor Who.
Any other content, if objectionable, can simply be considered personal mind-spew.
Enjoy.