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Stuart_Armstrong comments on S.E.A.R.L.E's COBOL room - Less Wrong Discussion

29 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 01 February 2013 08:29PM

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Tags: ai philosophy consciousness chinese_room

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Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 01 February 2013 10:05:16PM 4 points [-]

That part of his argument is, in my opinion, the weakest part of his thesis.

Comment author: BerryPick6 01 February 2013 10:11:03PM 9 points [-]

Searle's response[1] :

This objection really is only worth a short reply. The problem in this discussion is not about how I know that other people have cognitive states, but rather what it is that I am attributing to them when I attribute cognitive states to them. The thrust of the argument is that it couldn't be just computational processes and their output because the computational processes and their output can exist without the cognitive state.

Talk about begging the question...

[1] Searle, John. 1980a. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417-424.

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