You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

Stuart_Armstrong comments on Naturalism versus unbounded (or unmaximisable) utility options - Less Wrong Discussion

34 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 01 February 2013 05:45PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (72)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 07 February 2013 11:12:48AM 0 points [-]

Actually, the third problem is probably the most relevant of them all - it's akin to a bounded paperclipper uncertain as to whether they've succeeded. Kind of like: "You get utility 1 for creating 1 paperclip and then turning yourself off (and 0 in all other situations)."

Comment author: Wei_Dai 07 February 2013 11:09:07PM 0 points [-]

I still don't see how it's relevant, since I don't see a reason why we would want to create an AI with a utility function like that. The problem goes away if we remove the "and then turning yourself off" part, right? Why would we give the AI a utility function that assigns 0 utility to an outcome where we get everything we want but it never turns itself off?

Comment author: Nebu 05 January 2016 08:50:07AM 0 points [-]

Why would we give the AI a utility function that assigns 0 utility to an outcome where we get everything we want but it never turns itself off?

The designer of that AI might have (naively?) thought this was a clever way of solving the friendliness problem. Do the thing I want, and then make sure to never do anything again. Surely that won't lead to the whole universe being tiled with paperclips, etc.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 08 February 2013 12:50:00PM 0 points [-]

This can arise indirectly, or through design, or for a host of reasons. That was the first thought that popped into my mind; I'm sure other relevant examples can be had. We might not assign such a utility - then again, we (or someone) might, which makes it relevant.