Well, that's pretty much the deontological claim: that there is something to an act being wrong other than its consequences.
For instance, some would assert that an act of incestuous sex is wrong even if all the standard negative consequences are denied: no deformed babies, no unhappy feelings, no scandal, and so on. Why? Because they say there exists a moral fact that incest is wrong, which is not merely a description or prediction of incestuous acts' effects.
"An incestuous act of sex at time t" is a descriptive statement of the world which could be able to change the output of a utility function, just as "a scandal at time t + 1 week" or "a deformed baby born at time t + 9 months" could, right? Now, my personal utility function doesn't seem to put any (terminal) value on the first statement either, but if someone else's utility function does, what makes mine "consequentialist" and theirs not?
Hi everyone,
If this has been covered before, I apologize for the clutter and ask to be redirected to the appropriate article or post.
I am increasingly confused about normative theories. I've read both Eliezer's and Luke's meta ethics sequences as well as some of nyan's posts, but I felt even more confused afterwards. Further, I happen to be a philosophy student right now, and I'm worried that the ideas presented in my ethics classes are misguided and "conceptually corrupt" that is, the focus seems to be on defining terms over and over again, as opposed to taking account of real effects of moral ideas in the actual world.
I am looking for two things: first, a guide as to which reductionist moral theories approximate what LW rationalists tend to think are correct. Second, how can I go about my ethics courses without going insane?
Sorry if this seems overly aggressive, I am perhaps wrongfully frustrated right now.
Jeremy