Note that you could reverse this conversation: a deontologist could ask you why we should privilege the consequences so much, instead of just doing the right things regardless of the consequences. I would expect that your response would be pretty close to "that's just the way it is, it's the consequences that are the most important" - at least, I know that mine would be. And the deontologist would find this a very hard pill to swallow.
Except that deontology cares about consequences as well, so there's no need to convince them that the consequences of our actions have moral weight. If act A's consequences violate the Categorical Imperative, and act B's consequences don't, then the Kantian (for example) will pick act B.
The friction between deontology and consequentialism is that they disagree about what should be maximized, a distinction which is often simplified to consequentialists wanting to maximize the 'Good' and deontologists wanting to maximize the 'Right'.
I'll agree that past this point, much of the objections to the other side's positions hit 'moral bedrock' and intuitions are often seen as the solution to this gap.
If act A's consequences violate the Categorical Imperative, and act B's consequences don't, then the Kantian (for example) will pick act B.
For Kant, (and for all the Kantians I know of), consequences aren't evaluable in terms of the categorical imperative. This is something like a category mistake. Kant is pretty explicit that the consequences of an action well and truly do not matter to the moral value of an action. He would say, I think, that there is no way to draw boundary lines around 'consequences' that doesn't place all moral weight on something like the intention of the action.
Hi everyone,
If this has been covered before, I apologize for the clutter and ask to be redirected to the appropriate article or post.
I am increasingly confused about normative theories. I've read both Eliezer's and Luke's meta ethics sequences as well as some of nyan's posts, but I felt even more confused afterwards. Further, I happen to be a philosophy student right now, and I'm worried that the ideas presented in my ethics classes are misguided and "conceptually corrupt" that is, the focus seems to be on defining terms over and over again, as opposed to taking account of real effects of moral ideas in the actual world.
I am looking for two things: first, a guide as to which reductionist moral theories approximate what LW rationalists tend to think are correct. Second, how can I go about my ethics courses without going insane?
Sorry if this seems overly aggressive, I am perhaps wrongfully frustrated right now.
Jeremy