If act A's consequences violate the Categorical Imperative, and act B's consequences don't, then the Kantian (for example) will pick act B.
For Kant, (and for all the Kantians I know of), consequences aren't evaluable in terms of the categorical imperative. This is something like a category mistake. Kant is pretty explicit that the consequences of an action well and truly do not matter to the moral value of an action. He would say, I think, that there is no way to draw boundary lines around 'consequences' that doesn't place all moral weight on something like the intention of the action.
He would say, I think, that there is no way to draw boundary lines around 'consequences' that doesn't place all moral weight on something like the intention of the action.
Well then the Kantian would pick B because he intends to not violate the CI with his actions? I'm not actually sure how this is different than valuing the consequences of your actions at all?
Hi everyone,
If this has been covered before, I apologize for the clutter and ask to be redirected to the appropriate article or post.
I am increasingly confused about normative theories. I've read both Eliezer's and Luke's meta ethics sequences as well as some of nyan's posts, but I felt even more confused afterwards. Further, I happen to be a philosophy student right now, and I'm worried that the ideas presented in my ethics classes are misguided and "conceptually corrupt" that is, the focus seems to be on defining terms over and over again, as opposed to taking account of real effects of moral ideas in the actual world.
I am looking for two things: first, a guide as to which reductionist moral theories approximate what LW rationalists tend to think are correct. Second, how can I go about my ethics courses without going insane?
Sorry if this seems overly aggressive, I am perhaps wrongfully frustrated right now.
Jeremy