Well then the Kantian would pick B because he intends to not violate the CI with his actions?
In your initial set up, you said that A and B differ in that A's consequences violate the CI, while B's consequences do not. I'm claiming that, for Kant, consequences aren't evaluable in terms of the CI, and so we don't yet have on the table a way for a Kantian to distinguish A and B. Consequences aren't morally evaluable, Kant would say, in the very intuitive sense in which astronomical phenomena aren't morally evaluable (granting that we sometimes assess astronomical phenomena as good or bad in a non-moral sense).
I once again find Kantianism immensely counter-intuitive and confusing, so at this point I must thank you for correcting my misconceptions and undoing my rationalizations. :)
Hi everyone,
If this has been covered before, I apologize for the clutter and ask to be redirected to the appropriate article or post.
I am increasingly confused about normative theories. I've read both Eliezer's and Luke's meta ethics sequences as well as some of nyan's posts, but I felt even more confused afterwards. Further, I happen to be a philosophy student right now, and I'm worried that the ideas presented in my ethics classes are misguided and "conceptually corrupt" that is, the focus seems to be on defining terms over and over again, as opposed to taking account of real effects of moral ideas in the actual world.
I am looking for two things: first, a guide as to which reductionist moral theories approximate what LW rationalists tend to think are correct. Second, how can I go about my ethics courses without going insane?
Sorry if this seems overly aggressive, I am perhaps wrongfully frustrated right now.
Jeremy