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Eugine_Nier comments on A confusion about deontology and consequentialism - Less Wrong Discussion

5 [deleted] 11 February 2013 07:19PM

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Comment author: Eugine_Nier 12 February 2013 05:58:18PM 1 point [-]

If you're a paper clip maximizer, then ...

That's still a moral theory.

Comment author: buybuydandavis 12 February 2013 11:37:47PM 2 points [-]

Which was the point I was making.

"A moral non-realist can have moral theories ..." So I presented the form of the moral theory a moral non-realist could have.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 13 February 2013 07:03:54AM 1 point [-]

Sorry, I was in a hurry when I posted the grandparent and was unclear:

Specifically my point was that the form of extreme be-yourself-ism implicit in your statement is still a moral theory, one that would make statements like:

"If you're a paper clip maximizer, then maximize paperclips."

"If you're a Nazi, kill Jews."

"If you're a liberal, try to stop the Nazis."

Comment author: buybuydandavis 13 February 2013 07:11:47AM 0 points [-]

Those aren't accurate statements of the kinds of moral theories I was speaking of.

I gave the example:

If you value A.B.C, then you value D.

That's not an imperative, it's an identification of the relationship between different values, in this case that A,B,C imply D.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 13 February 2013 07:18:05AM 1 point [-]

If you value A.B.C, then you value D.

That's not an imperative, it's an identification of the relationship between different values, in this case that A,B,C imply D.

Ok, that's not a moral theory unless you're sneaking in the statements I made in the parent as connotations.

Comment author: buybuydandavis 13 February 2013 07:56:35AM 0 points [-]

To me, a theory that identifies a moral value implied by other moral values would count as a moral theory.

What kind of theory do you want to call it?

Comment author: TimS 14 February 2013 02:44:50AM -1 points [-]

I think I agree with Eugine_Nier that it isn't a moral theory to be able to draw conclusions. One doesn't need to commit to any ethical or meta-ethical principles to notice that Clippy's preferences will be met better if Clippy creates some paperclips.

At the level of abstraction we are talking in now, moral theories exist to tell us what preferences to have, and meta-ethical theories tell us what kinds of moral theories are worth considering.

Comment author: buybuydandavis 14 February 2013 03:05:36AM 0 points [-]

Does one need to commit to a theory to have one?

It sounds to me like you only think a person has a moral theory then the moral theory has them.

moral theories exist to tell us what preferences to have,

For you, under your moral theories. Not for me. I'm happy to have theories that tell me what moral values I do have, and what moral values other people have.

What do you want to call those kinds of theories?

Comment author: TimS 14 February 2013 03:13:59PM *  1 point [-]

Does one need to commit to a theory to have one?

Obviously not - but it isn't your moral theory that tells you how Clippy will maximize its preferences.

Alice the consequentialist and Bob the deontologist disagree about moral reasoning. But Bob does not need to become a consequentialist to predict what Alice will maximize, and vice versa.

What do you want to call those kinds of theories?

Reasoning? More generally, thinking (and caring about) the consequences of actions is not limited to consequentialists. A competent deontologist knows that pointing guns at people and pulling the trigger tends to cause murder - that's why she tends not to do that.

moral theories exist to tell us what preferences to have,

For you, under your moral theories. Not for me.

I should be working now, but I don't want to. So I'm here, relaxing and discussing philosophy. But I am committing a minor wrong in that I am acting on a preference that is inconsistent with my moral obligation to support my family (as I see my obligations). Does that type of inconsistency between preference and right action never happen to you?