You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

Ghatanathoah comments on Population Ethics Shouldn't Be About Maximizing Utility - Less Wrong Discussion

0 Post author: Ghatanathoah 18 March 2013 02:35AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (46)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Ghatanathoah 19 March 2013 02:50:55AM -1 points [-]

I would argue that the solution to this may be to make the value of having humans, or some other type of moral being, exist, be discontinuous in some fashion.

In other words, adding paperclip satisficers might add some value, but in a world where no humans (or other type of moral being) exists there is no amount of paperclip satisficers you can add that would be as valuable as creating humans. Similarly, there is no amount of paperclip satisficers that can be added that could ever replace the human race.

Now please note that I am not trying to be speciesist when I talk about humans and human values. A creature that shares human values, but isn't genetically a member of the human species, is far more worth creating than a creature that is genetically a member of the human species, but lacks certain values. For instance, an alien that had evolved human-like values through parallel evolution is far more worth creating than a human sociopath.