AspiringRationalist comments on Population Ethics Shouldn't Be About Maximizing Utility - Less Wrong Discussion
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How close is close enough? If my moral system has 20 distinct components, should I value a being with 19 of those 20 as a moral being? 95% of a moral being? What if it has 5 of those 20 components?
Assuming that all components are equally valuable (which probably isn't true in real life), and that the whole isn't greater than the sum of its parts (again, this is probably false in real life) then I think that being with "partial morality" may be "partially worth creating."
This sounds much less strange if you state it in more concrete terms. If you ask people to rank the following scenarios in preference order:
All life on Earth goes extinct.
Humanity, and all other life on Earth, survives perfectly fine.
Humanity dies out, but the other great apes do not.
Most people would rank, in order from most to least desirable, 2, 3, 1. This is because the other great apes likely share at least some moral values in common with humanity, so their survival is better than nothing.