You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

gwern comments on Personal Evidence - Superstitions as Rational Beliefs - Less Wrong Discussion

3 Post author: OrphanWilde 22 March 2013 05:24PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (135)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: gwern 23 March 2013 02:29:07AM 3 points [-]

If they're presenting false evidence and are otherwise indistinguishable from truth-tellers, then I would guess that agreement would fall a lot or cease to happen; if they're the equivalent of random noise, then I'm not sure what would happen, but probably bad stuff if we go by Hanson's paper on communicating rare evidence; and if they're merely being selective about evidence, you can still infer stuff from their reports (the Bullock thesis in my backfire effect page would be relevant here).

Comment author: Will_Newsome 29 March 2013 02:12:33AM 1 point [-]

(This is obvious, but it took me a bit to explicitly notice: deceptive agents in the environment is exactly the same formally speaking as irrational agents in the notionally Bayesian community, so of course the agreement theorem doesn't apply.)