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fubarobfusco comments on Removing Bias From the Definition of Reductionism - Less Wrong Discussion
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We might do well to observe Dennett's distinction between "reductionism" and "greedy reductionism".
Reductionism says that higher-level phenomena can be explained in terms of their parts and the interactions between them. Greedy reductionism is when we notice a particular lower level (e.g. atoms) and attempt to explain a much higher level (e.g. minds) directly in terms of it, underestimating complexities which may be better explained with intermediate layers.
Reductionism about minds and atoms would say that minds are made of a (fantastically complex) arrangement of atoms; that you don't need to posit extra mind-stuff in order to explain the behavior of minds. But it would be greedy reductionism to say that particular features of minds can be explained directly in terms of atomic behavior — for instance the view of Epicurus (and some later philosophers...) that atom-level indeterminacy explains human freedom of choice.
I agree that's a good distinction, though direct explanation of a higher level obviously works in some cases (e.g. the weight of the brain is a simple aggregate of the weight of the constituent atoms).
"Can be explained in terms of.." seems a much less biased way of framing the definition to me than the one in the wiki. I'll add it to my list of starting points for discussion!
It's also much more standard.
You see how you've basically characterized "reductionists on this site" as greedy reductionists?
I wasn't intending to unless that's what the Wiki definition characterizes it as, because I simply tried to re-express that definition without using the terms map and territory in ways that their definitions exclude.
I think perhaps I can see the problem. My phrase "for the purposes of causal explanation" is ambiguous. I wasn't meaning "as a way of explaining any particular behaviour" but rather "as a way of establishing the root causes underlying any behaviour". Does that make it more acceptable/less "greedy"?
Another possible cause of misunderstanding is that I have never seen the point of essentialism, in other words I think the questions that matter are always "how can something be most usefully described (for some stated purpose)" rather than "what is the essence of that something", so I instinctively avoided an essentialist definition. I'll think about rewording my version in a way that essentialists will recognize, as the sort of reductionism we are talking about does seem to hinge on reality being a sort of Platonic essence...
What made your characterization one of greedy reduction in my eyse was this
Describe it at whatever level is most convenient. All levels are real to the extent that they model accurately.
I'm still puzzled, as you seem to be both defending and contradicting EY's view that:
I'm not actually attacking this view so much as regarding it as a particular convention or definition of reality rather than a "thesis".
Perhaps you are reading "best characterized as" as "best modelled as"? I'm not saying that, just that this is the sense of "reality" that EY/the wiki writer prefers to adopt.
Well, no, according to Dennett, it's more the disregard of complexity. Which woukd be an epistemological matter...you seem to be grasping for an ontological version.