Among new atheists even the notion that the nature of truth is up for discussion is a very threatening question.
I don't know if it's threatening, and I doubt that it applies to Dennett, but the other guys can't seem to even conceive of truth beyond correspondence.
But if it's a matter of people being open to changing their world view, to even understanding that they have one, and other people have other world views, it's Korzybski they need to read, not Jaynes.
The guy with the blog is Chapman?
I don't see a discussion. I see a pretty good video, and blog comments that I don't see any value at all in. I had characterized them more colorfully, but seeing that Chapman is on the list, I decided to remove the color.
I'm not trying to be rude here, but his comments are just very wrong about probability, and thereby entirely clueless about the people he is criticizing.
As an example
It’s all just arithmetic.
No! Probability as inference most decidedly is not "just arithmetic". Math tells you nothing axiomatically about the world.. All our various mathematics are conceptual structures that may or may not be useful in the world.
That's where Jaynes, and I guess Cox before him, adds in the magic. Jaynes doesn't proceed axiomatically. He starts with problem of representing confidence in a computer, and proceeds to show how the solution to that problem entails certain mathematics. He doesn't proceed by "proof by axiomatic definitions", he shows that the conceptual structures work for the problem attacked.
Also, in Jaynes presentation of probability theory as an extension of logic, P(A|B) isn't axiomatically defined as P(AB)/P(B), it is the mathematical value assigned to the plausibility of a proposition A given that proposition B is taken to be true. It's not about counting, it's about reasoning about the truth of propositions given our knowledge.
I guess if he's failing utterly to understand what people are talking about, what they're saying might look like ritual incantation to him. I'm sure it is for some people.
Is there some reason I should take David Chapman as particularly authoritative? Why do you find his disagreement with senior LW people of particular note?
Is there some reason I should take David Chapman as particularly authoritative? Why do you find his disagreement with senior LW people of particular note?
Because senior LW people spent effort in replying to him. The post lead to LW posts such as what bayesianism taught me. Scott Alexander wrote in response: on first looking into chapmans pop-bayesianism. Kaj Sotala had a lively exchange in the comments of that article.
I think in total that exchange provides a foundation for clearing the question of what Bayesianism is. I do consider that an important qu...
I used to teach logic to undergraduates, and they regularly made the same simple mistake with logical quantifiers. Take the statement "For every X there is some Y such that P(X,Y)" and represent it symbolically:
∀x∃y P(x,y)
Now negate it:
!∀x∃y P(x,y)
You often don't want a negation to be outside quantifiers. My undergraduates would often just push it inside, like this:
∀x∃y !P(x,y)
If you could just move the negation inward like that, then these claims would mean the same thing:
A) Not everything is a raven: !∀x raven(x)
B) Everything is not a raven: ∀x !raven(x)
To move a negation inside quantifiers, flip each quantifier that you move it past.
!∀x∃y P(x,y) = ∃x!∃y P(x,y) = ∃x∀y !P(x,y)
Here's the findings of a 1982 article [1] from JAMA Psychiatry (formerly Archives of General Psychiatry), back in the days when the medical establishment was busy denouncing the Feingold diet:
Now pay attention; this is the part everyone gets wrong, including most of the commenters below.
The methodology used in this study, and in most studies, is as follows:
People make the error because they forget to explicitly state what quantifiers they're using. Both the t-test and the F-test work by assuming that every subject has the same response function to the intervention:
response = effect + normally distributed error
where the effect is the same for every subject. If you don't understand why that is so, read the articles about the t-test and the F-test. The null hypothesis is that the responses of all subjects in both groups were drawn from the same distribution. The one-tailed versions of the tests take a confidence level C and compute a cutoff Z such that, if the null hypothesis is false,
P(average effect(test) - average effect(control)) < Z = C
ADDED: People are making comments proving they don't understand how the F-test works. This is how it works: You are testing the hypothesis that two groups respond differently to food dye.
Suppose you measured the number of times a kid shouted or jumped, and you found that kids fed food dye shouted or jumped an average of 20 times per hour, and kids not fed food dye shouted or jumped an average of 17 times per hour. When you run your F-test, you compute that, assuming all kids respond to food dye the same way, you need a difference of 4 to conclude with 95% confidence that the two distributions (test and control) are different.
If the food dye kids had shouted/jumped 21 times per hour, the study would conclude that food dye causes hyperactivity. Because they shouted/jumped only 20 times per hour, it failed to prove that food dye affects hyperactivity. You can only conclude that food dye affects behavior with 84% confidence, rather than the 95% you desired.
Finding that food dye affects behavior with 84% confidence should not be presented as proof that food dye does not affect behavior!
If half your subjects have a genetic background that makes them resistant to the effect, the threshold for the t-test or F-test will be much too high to detect that. If 10% of kids become more hyperactive and 10% become less hyperactive after eating food coloring, such a methodology will never, ever detect it. A test done in this way can only accept or reject the hypothesis that for every subject x, the effect of the intervention is different than the effect of the placebo.
So. Rephrased to say precisely what the study found:
Converted to logic (ignoring time):
!( ∀child ( eats(child, coloring) ⇨ behaviorChange(child) ) )
Move the negation inside the quantifier:
∃child !( eats(child, coloring) ⇨ behaviorChange(child) )
Translated back into English, this study proved:
However, this is the actual final sentence of that paper:
Translated into logic:
!∃child ( eats(child, coloring) ⇨ hyperactive(child) ) )
or, equivalently,
∀child !( eats(child, coloring) ⇨ hyperactive(child) ) )
This refereed medical journal article, like many others, made the same mistake as my undergraduate logic students, moving the negation across the quantifier without changing the quantifier. I cannot recall ever seeing a medical journal article prove a negation and not make this mistake when stating its conclusions.
A lot of people are complaining that I should just interpret their statement as meaning "Food colorings do not affect the behavior of MOST school-age children."
But they didn't prove that food colorings do not affect the behavior of most school-age children. They proved that there exists at least one child whose behavior food coloring does not affect. That isn't remotely close to what they have claimed.
For the record, the conclusion is wrong. Studies that did not assume that all children were identical, such as studies that used each child as his or her own control by randomly giving them cookies containing or not containing food dye [2], or a recent study that partitioned the children according to single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) in genes related to food metabolism [3], found large, significant effects in some children or some genetically-defined groups of children. Unfortunately, reviews failed to distinguish the logically sound from the logically unsound articles, and the medical community insisted that food dyes had no influence on behavior until thirty years after their influence had been repeatedly proven.
[1] Jeffrey A. Mattes & Rachel Gittelman (1981). Effects of Artificial Food Colorings in Children With Hyperactive Symptoms: A Critical Review and Results of a Controlled Study. Archives of General Psychiatry 38(6):714-718. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1981.01780310114012.
[2] K.S. Rowe & K.J. Rowe (1994). Synthetic food coloring and behavior: a dose response effect in a double-blind, placebo-controlled, repeated-measures study. The Journal of Pediatrics Nov;125(5 Pt 1):691-8.
[3] Stevenson, Sonuga-Barke, McCann et al. (2010). The Role of Histamine Degradation Gene Polymorphisms in Moderating the Effects of Food Additives on Children’s ADHD Symptoms. Am J Psychiatry 167:1108-1115.