Philosophers working in decision theory are drastically worse at Newcomb than are other philosophers, two-boxing 70.38% of the time where non-specialists two-box 59.07% of the time (normalized after getting rid of 'Other' answers). Philosophers of religion are the most likely to get questions about religion wrong — 79.13% are theists (compared to 13.22% of non-specialists), and they tend strongly toward the Anti-Naturalism dimension. Non-aestheticians think aesthetic value is objective 53.64% of the time; aestheticians think it's objective 73.88% of the time. Working in epistemology tends to make you an internalist, philosophy of science tends to make you a Humean, metaphysics a Platonist, ethics a deontologist. This isn't always the case; but it's genuinely troubling to see non-expertise emerge as a predictor of getting any important question in an academic field right.

Decision theory supposes free will (equivalently, unpredictability of a future agent's decisions); Newcomb's problem supposes the opposite: predictability of an agents decisions even when the prediction is a factor in the decision. It makes sense that their answer should differ from Newcomb's. Theism is untestable and therefore not even wrong, rather than being objectively wrong. Likewise with objective aesthetics.

None of the specific things you say that experts get 'wrong' is objective or testable in a meaningful manner. Wouldn't it be better to say that you generally disagree with experts?