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Jack comments on What do professional philosophers believe, and why? - Less Wrong Discussion

31 Post author: RobbBB 01 May 2013 02:40PM

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Comment author: Jack 10 May 2013 10:19:21AM 0 points [-]

You are not, because you are ignoring them when they say centres don't exist.

I don't agree that I am.

In which case SH is not implied to exist. But I knew that it is a fictitious story. The point was that "the number the 3 is prime" doens't imply that 3 exists, since properties can be correctly or incorrectly ascribe to fictive entities. There is no obvious implication from a statement being true to a statement involving entities that actually exist. Mathematical formalism and fictivism hold 3 to be no more existent than SH, and are not obviously false.

I don't understand what you're trying to accomplish with this line of reasoning. Obviously, "truths" about fictitious stories do not imply the existence of the entities they quantify over. A fiction is a sort of mutually agreed upon lie. (I don't agree, btw, that a statement about Sherlock Holmes is true in the same way that "There are white Swans" is true). But it is none the less the case that the assertion "Sherlock Holmes is a bachelor" implies the existence of Sherlock Holmes. It just so happens that everyone plays along with the story. But unlike the stories of Sherlock Holmes I really do believe in quantum mechanics and so take the theory's word for it that the entities it implies exist actually do exist.

I'm obviously aware there are alternatives to Platonism and that there is plenty of debate. I presumably have reasons for rejecting the alternatives. But instead of actually asserting a positive case for any alternative you seem to just be picking at things and disagreeing with me without explaining why (plus a decent amount of misunderstanding the position). If you'd like to continue this discussion please do that instead of just complaining about my position. It's unpleasant and not productive.

Comment author: Juno_Watt 10 May 2013 11:01:25AM *  0 points [-]

So do I. But I take "the entities it implies" to mean "the entities that you are supposed to believe in according to the informal interpretation of the formalism", not "the entities quantified over".

"Maddy's first objection to the indispensability argument is that the actual attitudes of working scientists towards the components of well-confirmed theories vary from belief, through tolerance, to outright rejection (Maddy 1992, p. 280). The point is that naturalism counsels us to respect the methods of working scientists, and yet holism is apparently telling us that working scientists ought not have such differential support to the entities in their theories. Maddy suggests that we should side with naturalism and not holism here. Thus we should endorse the attitudes of working scientists who apparently do not believe in all the entities posited by our best theories. We should thus reject P1."

SEP