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shminux comments on Open Thread, June 2-15, 2013 - Less Wrong Discussion

5 Post author: TimS 02 June 2013 02:22AM

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Comment author: endoself 05 June 2013 09:20:22AM 2 points [-]

From If Many-Worlds had Come First:

the thought experiment goes: 'Hey, suppose we have a radioactive particle that enters a superposition of decaying and not decaying. Then the particle interacts with a sensor, and the sensor goes into a superposition of going off and not going off. The sensor interacts with an explosive, that goes into a superposition of exploding and not exploding; which interacts with the cat, so the cat goes into a superposition of being alive and dead. Then a human looks at the cat,' and at this point Schrödinger stops, and goes, 'gee, I just can't imagine what could happen next.' So Schrödinger shows this to everyone else, and they're also like 'Wow, I got no idea what could happen at this point, what an amazing paradox'. Until finally you hear about it, and you're like, 'hey, maybe at that point half of the superposition just vanishes, at random, faster than light', and everyone else is like, 'Wow, what a great idea!'"

Obviously this is a parody and Eliezer is making an argument for many worlds. However, this isn't that far from how the thought experiment is presented in introductory books and even popularizations. Why, then, don't more people realize that many worlds is correct? Why aren't tons of bright middle-school children who read science fiction and popular science spontaneously rediscovering many worlds?

Comment author: shminux 06 June 2013 05:33:13PM *  6 points [-]

Why, then, don't more people realize that many worlds is correct?

Note that you are using Eliezer!correct, not Physics!correct. The former is based on Bayesian reasoning among models with equivalent predictive power, the latter requires different predictive power to discriminate between theories. The problem with the former reasoning is that without experimental validation it is hard to agree on the priors and other assumptions going into the Bayesian calculation for MWI correctness. Additionally, proclaiming MWI "correct" is not instrumentally useful unless one can use it to advance physical knowledge.

'hey, maybe at that point half of the superposition just vanishes, at random, faster than light'

It's worse than that, actually. In some frames it means not just FTL but also back in time. But given that this is unmeasurable, it matters not in the slightest if you adopt the Physics!correct definition.

Comment author: TheOtherDave 06 June 2013 06:52:05PM 0 points [-]

Note that the OP wasn't asking about physicists, but people... explicitly "bright middle school children" for example.
It's certainly possible that the lack of differential predictive power or experimental validation for MWI explains that, but I'm inclined to doubt it.

Comment author: shminux 06 June 2013 07:08:34PM 3 points [-]

Good point, I missed it in my original reading. Certainly "bright middle school children" are unlikely to spontaneously discover the definition of correctness which matches either Eliezer!correct or Physics!correct. Certainly it's still an open issue for adult professionals.