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badger comments on Open Thread, June 2-15, 2013 - Less Wrong Discussion
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I'm don't specialize in auctions, but this sounds wrong. A second-price auction and an English auction are strategically equivalent in most formal models. Nearly all auctions yield identical revenue and allocations when bidders are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers with independent values. Experimentally, the second-price auction tends to generate more revenue than an English auction, at least in the case of private values.
With common or correlated values (where the winner's curse shows up), I'd think sealed bid auctions would lead to more winner overbidding than English or Dutch auctions. In these cases though, you really don't have to worry about efficiency since everyone values the item equally.
I should have been clearer by 'all-around'; I meant that the incentives are lined up correctly, the costs are lower (every person only needs to submit one bid, and does not need to expend any effort monitoring the auction), gets exact results without requiring massive numbers of bids, and more information is conveyed by the end of the auction.