No, it's a tax on currency-denominated wealth
I'm aware; I strongly suspect that it is much easier for the poor (that would be receiving this help) to store their wealth in the local currency than any of the forms you listed.
The issue is more that the small elite controls the legal economy, with most of the economy occurring off the books, leading to very little in the way for legal protection of the more sophisticated economic organizations which help people accumulate wealth.
(de Soto tells the story of being a government economist in Peru, where they were all worried that the construction market was collapsing because of declining revenues and permits. But something seemed odd- there were still cranes and buildings going up all over Lima, and concrete sales were seeing steady growth. They scratched deeper and discovered that extra-legal construction, which they thought was a few percent of legal construction, turned out to be significantly larger- the majority of the construction economy in the country was off the books.)
I strongly suspect that it is much easier for the poor (that would be receiving this help) to store their wealth in the local currency than any of the forms you listed.
Ok, fair enough. As noted, I don't make any claim on the extent to which the problem consists of cash being mainly in elite hands. That said, if you were willing to start with a blank slate, you might be able to redistribute with a one-time inflation event. Making up numbers: Suppose a 10% elite controls 90% of the wealth in both currency and non-currency forms, and suppose that these two...
In a recent Facebook status update, Eliezer Yudkowsky asked a question:
My first thought was object-level; the obvious answer is that some fraction of the money given will eventually be converted into imports, transferring the burden of inflation out and onto richer countries which can easily afford it. This seems plausible. If true, it implies that we should multiply our effectiveness estimates by dImports/d$, which is (asspull) 0.5. By this line of reasoning, direct giving is less effective than we thought, but still a reasonably good deal.
My second thought was that it's likely true that some developing country governments could improve their economies by printing and distributing money, but they won't because they're corrupt, and giving directly is a workaround to force that policy upon them. This seems plausible at first, but it feels forced; the leaders' incentives here are ambiguous, not clearly aligned against this sort of policy.
My third thought was that it's likely true that developing countries' governments could improve their economies by printing and distributing money, and they might not know this.
Sanity check. What sort of people do the poorest countries' governments have, in their economic advisory roles? Is anyone making a serious effort to connect good economists with governments that need them?
If developing countries are short on competent economic advisors at the top levels, and no one is working to fix this, then funding that charity would outperform direct giving by multiple orders of magnitude. But what reason do we have to think that a well-placed economist can make a difference? Well, history does contain at least one big, salient success story: Brazil, where a clever scheme halted hyperinflation and turned the economy around. And on a smaller scale, Otjivero-Namibia.
So now I have some questions for the efficient altruism community:
- Which developing nations have competent economic advisors, and which ones need them?
- If a developing nation's leader needs good economic advisors to fill his/her cabinet, does he/she get them?
- Do any nations have economic problems that seem especially amenable to fixing by clever economists?