Recently, when considering why I've done something, I've been consciously distinguishing between historical cause and justification. I can't seem to find the sequence post that prompted this effort. In the process I've come across some moderately vile or at least disappointing motivations. I experience considerable cognitive dissonance when I find myself doing something that appears to be right for what I consider to be the wrong reasons. Usually that involves doing something for signaling purposes that I really should have done anyway; I can't justifiably change my behavior, but I despise signaling as a motivation.
On a separate note, when considering my personal future, I've been trying to make explicit predictions with probability estimates about what will happen, at least in my own head. The intent was to stem my tendancy to catastrophise, but it seems to have backfired; in cases where I was catastrophising it turned out to be correct catastrophising, and I walked around for a few days thinking things wouldn't really be that bad when they actually were that bad. That was depressing. I intend to continue the mental predictions anyway.
In both cases I think I've sacrificed hedons for bayes points. I'm comfortable with the tradeoff but it's still a tradeoff.
I despise signaling as a motivation.
I'm curious why. After you've thought about it: va zl rkcrevrapr, gur uvfgbevpny pnhfr nccrnef gb or fvtanyyvat sbe zbfg crbcyr.
This is the public group instrumental rationality diary for August 1-15.
Thanks to cata for starting the Group Rationality Diary posts, and to commenters for participating!
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