Origins of philosophical progress: Take as an example the "mind-body problem", which one could state as follows: Our bodies appear to be machines made of meat, but somehow thinking doesn't tend to feel like an activity done by meat machines; how does that work out? Once upon a time, the great bulk of answers given by good philosophers would have fitted into the framework of "substance dualism"; there's mind-stuff and matter-stuff, and then various ways of explaining how they are connected (e.g., Descartes thought they interacted somehow in the pineal gland, Leibniz had his "pre-established harmonies", etc.).

Nowadays, there are still substance dualists but most philosophers are physicalists, and the terms of the debate have changed considerably. And I think this is mostly for two reasons. First, science and medicine have uncovered more and more reasons to think that our thinking is done by our brains, and that our brains are indeed meat machines. Second, religious belief has declined, mostly (I think) for reasons that have nothing much to do with the activities of professional philosophers in the intervening time, though some of them have a lot to do with the activities of scientists (e.g., Darwin and other evolutionary biologists giving a better explanation for the variety and adaptedness-to-environment of life; Newton and his many successors giving credible candidates for literally all-encompassing physical theories).

Morality: Assuming moral nonrealism, it isn't necessarily best to declare all moral judgements false. It might well be better to regard them as (e.g.) statements about the values of the person making those judgements (or the society they're in, or something). If we do -- and perhaps even if we don't -- then we should evaluate those statements by criteria other than truth. Suppose one person says "Sending Jews to the gas chambers is morally wrong" and another says "Sending Jews to the gas chambers is morally right". I have, and I bet you have, and I bet we would both prefer as many people as possible to have, a very strong preference (to say the least) for the first of those statements over the second. Which, still conditional on moral nonrealism, indicates that sometimes statements need evaluating on grounds other than objective truth even if at first glance they look like attempts to state objective truths.

(For the avoidance of doubt: I am not trying to make, explicitly or implicitly, the argument that goes "See, you're capable of seeing that 'gassing Jews is wrong' is better than 'gassing Jews is right'; therefore you must embrace moral realism because otherwise there's no coherent way to see that". I think that's a very wrong argument, though I recognize its psychological force.)