Thanks! Do consequentialist kind of port the first axiom (completeness) from the VN-M utility theorem, changing it from decision theory to meta-ethics?
And for others, to put my original question another way: before we start comparing utilons or utility functions, insofar as consequentialists begin with moral intuitions and reason the existence of utility, is one of their starting intuitions that all moral questions have correct answers? Or am I just making this up? And has anybody written about this?
To put that in one popular context: in the Trolley Switch and Fat Man problem, it seems like most people start with the assumption that there exists a right answer (or preferable, or best, whatever your terminology), and that it could never be the case that an agent will do the wrong/immoral/unethical thing no matter what he or she chooses. Am I right that this assumption exists?
it could never be the case that an agent will do the wrong/immoral/unethical thing no matter what he or she chooses.
Most people do have this belief. I think it's a safe one, though. It follows from a substantive belief most people have, which is that agents are only morally responsible for things that are under their control.
In the context of a trolley problem, it's stipulated that the person is being confronted with a choice -- in the context of the problem, they have to choose. And so it would be blaming them for something beyond their control to s...
If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.