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CAE_Jones comments on Open thread, August 19-25, 2013 - Less Wrong Discussion

2 Post author: David_Gerard 19 August 2013 06:58AM

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Comment author: pengvado 21 August 2013 05:37:45PM *  1 point [-]

Suppose I say "I prefer state X to Z, and don't express a preference between X and Y, or between Y and Z." I am not saying that X and Y are equivalent; I am merely refusing to judge.

If the result of that partial preference is that you start with Z and then decline the sequence of trades Z->Y->X, then you got dutch booked.

Otoh, maybe you want to accept the sequence Z->Y->X if you expect both trades to be offered, but decline each in isolation? But then your decision procedure is dynamically inconsistent: Standing at Z and expecting both trade offers, you have to precommit to using a different algorithm to evaluate the Y->X trade than you will want to use once you have Y.

Comment author: asr 21 August 2013 07:46:18PM *  0 points [-]

I think I see the point about dynamic inconsistency. It might be that "I got to state Y from Z" will alter my decisionmaking about Y versus X.

I suppose it means that my decision of what to do in state Y no longer depends purely on consequences, but also on history, at which point they revoke my consequentialist party membership.

But why is that so terrible? It's a little weird, but I'm not sure it's actually inconsistent or violates any of my moral beliefs. I have all sorts of moral beliefs about ownership and rights that are history-dependent so it's not like history-dependence is a new strange thing.

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