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Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Open thread, August 19-25, 2013 - Less Wrong Discussion

2 Post author: David_Gerard 19 August 2013 06:58AM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 24 August 2013 12:54:16AM 6 points [-]

To be clear, I am unsure if pigs are objects of value, which incorporates both empirical uncertainty about their degree of reflectivity, philosophical uncertainty about the precise relation of reflectivity to degrees of consciousness, and ethical uncertainty about how much my idealized morals would care about various degrees of consciousness to the extent I can imagine that coherently. I can imagine that there's a sharp line of sentience which humans are over and pigs are under, and imagine that my idealized caring would drop to immediately zero for anything under the line, but my subjective probability for both of these being simultaneously true is under 50% though they are not independent.

However it is plausible to me that I would care exactly zero about a pig getting a dust speck in the eye... or not.