You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

Open thread, August 19-25, 2013

2 Post author: David_Gerard 19 August 2013 06:58AM

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.

Comments (325)

Sort By: Controversial
Comment author: gwern 25 August 2013 04:39:09PM *  1 point [-]

I have made it up to episode 5 of Umineko, and I've found one incident in particular unusually easy to resolve (easy enough that though the answer hasn't been suggested by anyone in-game, I am sure that I know how it was/could be done); I'm wondering how much it is due to specialized knowledge and whether it really looks harder to other people. (Because of the curse of knowledge, it's now difficult for me to see whether the puzzle really is as trivial as it looks to me.) So, a little poll, even though LWers are not the best people to ask.


In episode 5, an unknown caller phones Natsuhi in her locked personal room. He says he's predicted her favorite season of the year, and asks her what it really is. She replies 'winter', and he says that is what he predicted. She is skeptical and he tells her to look underneath a clock in her room. She does and finds a slip of paper with the word 'winter' on it: he had been there earlier and left it as proof of his prediction. Natsuhi is shocked and mystified.

How sure are you that you know how he did it?

Very No idea

How would you rate your familiarity with cryptography?

It's gibberish to me I use hashes all the time!

(Please rot13 any replies.)

Submitting...

Comment author: Alicorn 25 August 2013 04:49:47PM 3 points [-]

V'z abg fher V jbhyq unir pnyyrq guvf n sbez bs pelcgbtencul jrer V hacevzrq, ohg jvgu bayl sbhe cbffvoyr nafjref ur whfg unf gb cvpx sbhe uvqvat cynprf naq gryy ure gb ybbx va gur evtug bar, evtug?

Comment author: MugaSofer 26 August 2013 07:03:06PM 0 points [-]

Gurer jrer abgrf sbe rnpu bs gur sbhe frnfbaf uvqqra va qvssrerag cynprf nebhaq gur ebbz. Gur pnyyre fvzcyl ersreerq ure gb gur uvqvat-cynpr bs gur abgr gung zngpurq ure nafjre.

Zl svefg gubhtug ba ernqvat gur ceboyrz - juvpu fgvyy frrzf yvxr zl org thrff, ba ersyrpgvba, gubhtu.

Qvqa'g ibgr ba gur "ubj fher ner lbh", orpnhfr V'z ab ybatre fher ubj fher V nz - V'z hasnzvyvne jvgu gur fubj, naq gur ersrerapr gb pelcgbtencul fhttrfgf fbzr bgure fbyhgvba (V'z snzvyvne jvgu ehqvzragnel zntvp gevpxf, juvpu vf cebonoyl jurer ZL fbyhgvba pbzrf sebz.) Ohg V pregnvayl qba'g unir "ab vqrn" ubj vg jnf qbar.

Comment author: gjm 31 August 2013 08:49:56PM 1 point [-]

I'm rather alarmed at how many people appear to have said they're very sure they know how he did it, on (I assume, but I think it's pretty clear) the basis of having thought of one very credible way he could have done it.

I'm going to be optimistic and suppose that all those people thought something like "Although gwern asked how sure we are that we know how it was done, context suggests that the puzzle is really 'find a way to do it' rather than 'identify the specific way used in this case', so I'll say 'very' even though for all I know there could be other ways'.

(For what it's worth, I pedantically chose the "middle" option for that question, but I found the same obvious solution as everyone else.)

Comment author: gwern 01 September 2013 02:55:45PM 1 point [-]

I'm going to be optimistic and suppose that all those people thought something like "Although gwern asked how sure we are that we know how it was done, context suggests that the puzzle is really 'find a way to do it' rather than 'identify the specific way used in this case', so I'll say 'very' even though for all I know there could be other ways'.

In the case of Umineko, there's not really any difference between 'find a way' and 'find the way', since it adheres to a relativistic Schrodinger's-cat-inspired epistemology where all that matters is successfully explaining the observed evidence. So I don't expect the infelicitous wording to make a difference.

Comment author: David_Gerard 30 August 2013 10:53:37PM -1 points [-]

Zhygvcyr ovgf bs cncre, boivbhfyl.

Comment author: RichardKennaway 26 August 2013 08:44:29AM 6 points [-]

V pna guvax bs guerr jnlf bs qbvat guvf gevpx.

  1. Ur uvq sbhe fyvcf bs cncre, bar sbe rnpu frnfba. Cerfhznoyl ur jvyy erzbir gur bgure guerr ng gur svefg bccbeghavgl.

  2. Ur unf qbar fbzr erfrnepu gb qvfpbire fbzr snpg nobhg ure gb hfr va uvf qrzbafgengvba.

  3. Fur unf hfrq ure snibevgr frnfba nf gur nafjre gb n frphevgl dhrfgvba ba n jro fvgr gung ur unf nqzva-yriry npprff gb.

Gurer znl or bgure jnlf. Jvgu fb znal, V pnaabg or irel fher gung nal fvatyr bar gung V pubbfr vf evtug.

Comment author: NancyLebovitz 26 August 2013 08:02:58AM 1 point [-]

Posted before I read other replies:

V fhfcrpg gurer ner sbhe fyvcf bs cncre va qvssrerag cnegf bs ure ebbz. Naq vs ur pbhyq farnx gurz va, gura gurer'f n ernfbanoyr punapr ur pna farnx gur guerr fyvcf ersreevat gb aba-jvagre frnfbaf bhg orsber fur svaqf gurz.

Comment author: beoShaffer 26 August 2013 06:25:34AM 1 point [-]

Yvxr frireny bs gur bgure pbzzragref V dhvpxyl fnj ubj guvf pbhyq or qbar jvgu onfvp fgntr zntvp, ohg qrfcvgr orvat snveyl snzvyvne jvgu pelcgb V qvqa'g vzzrqvngryl znxr gur pbaarpgvba gb pelcgb hagvy V fnj lbhe pbzzrag ba unfu cer-pbzzvgzragf. Univat n fvatyr pnabavpny yvfg bs lbhe cer-pbzzvgzragf. choyvfurq va nqinapr jbhyq frrz gb fbyir cngpu guvf fcrpvsvp irarenovyvgl.

Comment author: Risto_Saarelma 26 August 2013 05:18:05AM 1 point [-]

V cnggrea zngpurq zl vqrn bs gur fbyhgvba gb gur onfvp fgntr zntvp gevpx bs univat znal uvqqra bcgvbaf naq znxvat gur znex guvax lbh bayl unq gur bar lbh fubjrq gurz, abg pelcgbtencul.

Comment author: Kindly 25 August 2013 10:30:15PM *  1 point [-]

Mentally subtract my vote from "No idea" onto "Very" since apparently I can read poll answers better than poll questions.

Comment author: ygert 25 August 2013 10:12:20PM 4 points [-]

Guvf "chmmyr" frrzf rnfl gb na rkgerzr, gb zr ng yrnfg. Gur gevivny fbyhgvba jbhyq or gb uvqr nyy gur cbffvoyr nafjref va qvssrerag cynprf, naq bayl gryy ure gb ybbx va gur cynpr jurer ur uvq gur nafjre ur trgf gbyq vf pbeerpg. (Va guvf pnfr, haqre gur pybpx.)

Comment author: Adele_L 25 August 2013 08:23:15PM 2 points [-]

My thought was the same as palladias'. I'm not seeing an obvious way involving cryptography though, but I am somewhat familiar with it (I understand RSA and its proof).

Comment author: gwern 25 August 2013 08:29:11PM 1 point [-]

Zl crefbany guvaxvat jnf "Bar bs gur rnfvrfg jnlf gb purng n pelcgbtencuvp unfu cerpbzzvgzrag vf gb znxr zhygvcyr fhpu unfurf naq fryrpgviryl erirny n fcrpvsvp bar nf nccebcevngr; gur punenpgre unf irevsvnoyl cerpbzzvggrq gb n cnegvphyne cerqvpgvba bs 'jvagre', ohg unf ur irevsvnoyl cerpbzvggrq gb bayl bar cerqvpgvba?"

(Nqzvggrqyl V unir orra guvaxvat nobhg unfu cerpbzzvgzragf zber guna hfhny orpnhfr V unir n ybat-grez cebwrpg jubfr pbapyhfvba vaibyirf unfu cerpbzzvgzragf naq V qba'g jnag gb zvfhfr gurz be yrnir crbcyr ebbz sbe bowrpgvba.)

Comment author: palladias 25 August 2013 11:37:24PM 1 point [-]

V qvqa'g guvax ng nyy nobhg unfurf (naq V qba'g unir zhpu rkcrevrapr jvgu gurz rkprcg n ovg bs gurbel). V whfg ena 'jung jbhyq V qb jvgu npprff gb gur ebbz nurnq bs gvzr naq jung qb V xabj?' naq bhg cbccrq sbhe furrgf bs cncre.

Comment author: palladias 25 August 2013 06:40:24PM 3 points [-]

Cerqvpgvba: Ur chg sbhe fyvcf bs cncre va gur ebbz (r.t. pybpx, grqql orne, fubr, cntr # bs grkgobbx), naq pubfr juvpu bowrpg gb qverpg ure gb onfrq ba ure erfcbafr. Ur'f unir gb erzbir gur bgure guerr fbbavfu, ohg ur boivbhfyl unq npprff bapr, naq vs gurl'er nyy va fhssvpvragyl bofpher cynprf, vg jbhyq or cerggl rnfl

Comment author: blacktrance 23 August 2013 04:38:44AM 0 points [-]

I find the idea of commitment devices strongly aversive. If I change my mind about doing something in the future, I want to be able to do whatever I choose to do, and don't want my past self to create negative repercussions for me if I change my mind.

Comment author: [deleted] 21 August 2013 06:08:03PM *  1 point [-]

This paper about AI from Hector J. Levesque seems to be interesting: http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hector/Papers/ijcai-13-paper.pdf

It extensively discusses something called 'Winograd schema questions': If you want examples of Winograd schema questions, there is a list here: http://www.cs.nyu.edu/faculty/davise/papers/WS.html

The paper's abstract does a fairly good job of summing it up, although it doesn't explicitly mention Winograd schema questions:

The science of AI is concerned with the study of intelligent forms of behaviour in computational terms. But what does it tell us when a good semblance of a behaviour can be achieved using cheap tricks that seem to have little to do with what we intuitively imagine intelligence to be? Are these intuitions wrong, and is intelligence really just a bag of tricks? Or are the philosophers right, and is a behavioural understanding of intelligence simply too weak? I think both of these are wrong. I suggest in the context of question-answering that what matters when it comes to the science of AI is not a good semblance of intelligent behaviour at all, but the behaviour itself, what it depends on, and how it can be achieved. I go on to discuss two major hurdles that I believe will need to be cleared.

If you have time, this seems worth a read. I started reading other Hector J. Levesque papers because of it.

Edit: Upon searching, I also found some critiques of Levesque's work as well, so looking up opposition to some of these points may also be a good idea.

Comment author: David_Gerard 20 August 2013 05:31:36PM *  5 points [-]

When you're trying to raise the sanity waterline, dredging the swamps can be a hazardous occupation. Indian rationalist skeptic Narendra Dabholkar was assassinated this morning.

Comment author: knb 20 August 2013 10:11:02PM *  4 points [-]

He was trying to pass a law to suppress religious freedoms of small sects. That doesn't raise the sanity waterline, it just increases tensions and hatred between groups.

Comment author: David_Gerard 21 August 2013 11:44:06AM *  1 point [-]

That's a ludicrously forgiving reading of what the bill (which looks like going through) is about. Steelmanning is an exercise in clarifying one's own thoughts, not in justifying fraud and witch-hunting.

Comment author: knb 21 August 2013 07:56:27PM 1 point [-]

Did you even read my comment?

Comment author: David_Gerard 21 August 2013 10:22:14PM *  -2 points [-]

Yes, I did. Your characterisation of the new law is factually ridiculous.

Comment author: knb 21 August 2013 10:49:56PM 0 points [-]

That isn't all the law does, as you would know if you actually read it.

Comment author: fubarobfusco 22 August 2013 03:58:48AM -1 points [-]

I haven't been able to find the text of the bill — only summaries such as this one. Do you have a link?

Comment author: shminux 20 August 2013 05:45:47PM *  12 points [-]

Political activism, especially in the third world, is inherently dangerous, whether or not it is rationality-related.

Comment author: shminux 26 August 2013 06:26:39PM *  2 points [-]

I wonder if it makes sense to have something like a registry of the LW regulars who are experts in certain areas. For example, this forum has a number of trained mathematicians, philosophers, computer scientists...

Something like a table containing [nick, general area, training/credentials, area of interest, additional info (e.g. personal site)], maybe?

Comment author: NancyLebovitz 24 August 2013 10:12:58AM 2 points [-]

What if this were a video game? A way of becoming more strategic.

Comment author: [deleted] 20 August 2013 04:00:09PM 2 points [-]

Here's a question that's been distracting me for the last few hours, and I want to get it out of my head so I can think about something else.

You're walking down an alley after making a bank withdrawal of a small sum of money. Just about when you realize this may have been a mistake, two Muggers appear from either side of the alley, blocking trivial escapes.

Mugger A: "Hi there. Give me all of that money or I will inflict 3^^^3 disutility on your utility function."

Mugger B: "Hi there. Give me all of that money or I will inflict maximum disutility on your utility function."

You: "You're working together?"

Mugger A: "No, you're just really unlucky."

Mugger B: "Yeah, I don't know this guy."

You: "But I can't give both of you all of this money!"

Mugger A: "Tell you what. You're having a horrible day, so if you give me half your money, I'll give you a 50% chance of avoiding my 3^^^3 disutility. And if you give me a quarter of your money, I'll give you a 25% chance of avoiding my 3^^^3 disutility. Maybe the other Mugger will let you have the same kind of break. Sound good to you, other Mugger?"

Mugger B: "Works for me. Start paying."

You: Do what, exactly?

I can see at least 4 vaugely plausible answers:

Pay Mugger A: 3^^^3 disutility is likely going to be more than whatever you think your maximum is and you want to be as likely as possible of avoiding that. You'll just have to try resist/escape from Mugger B (unless he's just faking).

Pay Mugger B: Maximum disutility is by it's definition of greater than or equal to any other disutility, worse than 3^^^3, and has probably happened to at least a few people with utility functions (although probably NOT to a 3^^^3 extent), so it's a serious threat and you want to be as likely as possible of avoiding that. You'll just have to try resist/escape from Mugger A (unless he's just faking).

Pay both Muggers a split of the money: For example: If you pay half to each, and they're both telling the truth, you have a 25% chance of not getting either disutility and not having to resist/escape at all (unless one or both is faking, which may improve your odds.)

Don't Pay: This seems like it becomes generally less likely than in a normal Pascal's mugging since there are no clear escape routes, and you're outnumbered, so there is at least some real threat unless they're both faking.

The problem is, I can't seem to justify any of my vaugely plausible answers to this conundrum well enough to stop thinking about it. Which makes me wonder if the question is ill formed in some way.

Thoughts?

Comment author: Armok_GoB 27 August 2013 08:33:08PM 1 point [-]

Give it all to mugger B obviously. I almost certainly am experiencing -3^^^3 utilions according to almost any measure every millisecond anyway, given I live in a Big World.

Comment author: Emile 20 August 2013 05:21:31PM *  5 points [-]

I may be fighting the hypothetical here, but ...

If utility is unbounded, maximum disutility is undefined, and if it's bounded, then 3^^^3 is by definition smaller than the maximum so you should pay all to mugger B.

Pay both Muggers a split of the money: For example: If you pay half to each, and they're both telling the truth, you have a 25% chance of not getting either disutility and not having to resist/escape at all (unless one or both is faking, which may improve your odds.)

I think trading a 10% chance of utility A for a 10% chance of utility B, with B < A is irrational per the definition of utility (as far as I understand; you can have marginal diminishing utility on money, but not marginally diminishing utility on *utility. I'm less sure about risk aversion though.)

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 20 August 2013 06:14:05PM 9 points [-]

That's not fighting the hypothetical. Fighting the hypothetical is first paying one, then telling the other you'll go back to the bank to pay him too. Or pulling out your kung fu skills, which is really fighting the hypothetical.

Comment author: sixes_and_sevens 20 August 2013 04:34:49PM 3 points [-]

If you have some concept of "3^^^3 disutility" as a tractable measure of units of disutility, it seems unlikely you don't also have a reasonable idea of the upper and lower bounds of your utility function. If the values are known this becomes trivial to solve.

I am becoming increasingly convinced that VNM-utility is a poor tool for ad-hoc decision-theoretics, not because of dubious assumptions or inapplicability, but because finding corner-cases where it appears to break down is somehow ridiculously appealing.

Comment author: Khoth 20 August 2013 04:25:10PM *  3 points [-]

If they're both telling the truth: since B gives maximum disutility, being mugged by both is no worse than being mugged by B. If you think your maximum disutility is X*3^^^3, I think if you run the numbers you should give a fraction X/2 to B, and the rest to A. (or all to B if X>2)

If they might be lying, you should probably ignore them. Or pay B, whose threat is more credible if you don't think your utility function goes as far as 3^^^3 (although, what scale? Maybe a dust speck is 3^^^^3)

Comment author: Flipnash 19 August 2013 09:26:53PM 0 points [-]

what is a reliable way of identifying arbitrary solved or unsolved problems??

Comment author: Dorikka 19 August 2013 07:32:07PM *  9 points [-]

Open comment thread:

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own top-level comment in the open thread, it goes here.

(Copied since it was well received last time.)

Comment author: Armok_GoB 27 August 2013 07:49:08PM 0 points [-]

Open subcomment subthread:

If it's not worth saying anywhere, it goes here.

Comment author: shminux 19 August 2013 08:22:55PM 5 points [-]

What's the name of the bias/fallacy/phenomenon where you learn something (new information, approach, calculation, way of thinking, ...) but after awhile revert to the old ideas/habits/views etc.?

Comment author: RobbBB 20 August 2013 06:12:53AM 10 points [-]

Relapse? Backsliding? Recidivism? Unstickiness? Retrogression? Downdating?

Comment author: shminux 20 August 2013 05:40:52PM *  0 points [-]

Hmm, some of these are good terms, but the issue is so common, I assumed there would be a standard term for it, at least in the education circles.

Comment author: [deleted] 23 August 2013 11:45:51PM 3 points [-]

This essay on internet forum behavior by the people behind Discourse is the greatest thing I've seen in the genre in the past two or three years. It rivals even some of the epic examples of wikipedian rule-lawyering that I've witnessed.

Their aggregation of common internet forum rules could have been done by anyone, but it was ultimately they that did it. My confidence in Discourse's success has improved.

Comment author: David_Gerard 24 August 2013 04:14:08PM 0 points [-]

"Don't be a dick" is now "Wheaton's law"? Pfeh!

Comment author: Omid 20 August 2013 04:02:11PM *  15 points [-]

This article, written by Dreeve's wife has displaced Yvain's polyamory essay as the most interesting relationships article I've read this year. The basic idea is that instead of trying to split chores or common goods equally, you use auctions. For example, if the bathroom needs to be cleaned, each partner says how much they'd be willing to clean it for. The person with the higher bid pays the what the other person bid, and that person does the cleaning.

It's easy to see why commenters accused them of being libertarian. But I think egalitarians should examine this system too. Most couples agree that chores and common goods should be split equally. But what does "equally" mean? It's hard to quantify exactly how much each person contributes to a relationship. This allows the more powerful person to exaggerate their contributions and pressure the weaker person into doing more than their fair share. But auctions safeguard against this abuse requiring participants to quantify how much they value each task.

For example, feminists argue that women do more domestic chores than men, and that these chores go unnoticed by men. Men do a little bit, but because men don't see all the work women do, they end up thinking that they're doing their share when they aren't. Auctions safeguard against this abuse. Instead of the wife just cleaning the bathroom, she and her husbands bid for how much they'd be willing to clean the bathroom for. The lower bid is considered the fair market price of cleaning the bathroom. Then she and her husband engage in a joint-purchase auction to decide if the bathroom will be cleaned at all. Either the bathroom gets cleaned and the cleaner gets fairly compensated, or the bathroom doesn't get cleaned because the total utility of cleaning the bathroom is less than the disutility of cleaning the bathroom.

And that's it. No arguing about who cleaned it last. No debating whether it really needs to cleaned. No room for misogynist cultural machines to pressure the wife into doing more than her fair share. Just a market transaction that is efficient and fair.

Comment author: Multiheaded 22 August 2013 05:33:39PM *  3 points [-]

And that's it. No arguing about who cleaned it last. No debating whether it really needs to cleaned. No room for misogynist cultural machines to pressure the wife into doing more than her fair share. Just a market transaction that is efficient and fair.

P.S.: those last two sentences ("No room for misogynist cultural machines to pressure the wife into doing more than her fair share. Just a market transaction that is efficient and fair.") also remind me of "If those women were really oppressed, someone would have tended to have freed them by then."

Comment author: Omid 23 August 2013 12:59:22AM *  7 points [-]

The polyamory and BDSM subcultures prove that nerds can create new social rules that improve sex. Of course, you can't just theorize about what the best social rules would be and then declare that you've "solved the problem." But when you see people living happier lives as a result of changing their social rules, there's nothing wrong with inviting other people to take a look.

I don't understand your postscript. I didn't say there is no inequality in chore division because if there were a chore market would have removed it. I said a chore market would have more equality than the standard each-person-does-what-they-think-is-fair system. Your response seems like fully generalized counterargument: anyone who proposes a way to reduce inequality can be accused of denying that the inequality exists.

Comment author: Nornagest 26 August 2013 12:37:46AM *  5 points [-]

The polyamory and BDSM subcultures prove that nerds can create new social rules that improve sex

The modern BDSM culture's origins are somewhat obscure, but I don't think I'd be comfortable saying it was created by nerds despite its present demographics. The leather scene is only one of its cultural poles, but that's generally thought to have grown out of the post-WWII gay biker scene: not the nerdiest of subcultures, to say the least.

I don't know as much about the origins of poly, but I suspect the same would likely be true there.

Comment author: fubarobfusco 25 August 2013 11:48:03PM *  -1 points [-]

The polyamory and BDSM subcultures prove that nerds can create new social rules that improve sex.

Hmm, I don't know that I would consider those rules overall to be clearly superior for everyone, although they do reasonably well for me. Rather, I value the existence of different subcultures with different norms, so that people can choose those that suit their predilections and needs.

(More politically: A "liberal" society composed of overlapping subcultures with different norms, in a context of individual rights and social support, seems to be almost certain to meet more people's needs than a "totalizing" society with a single set of norms.)

There are certain of those social rules that seem to be pretty clear improvements to me, though — chiefly the increased care on the subject of consent. That's an improvement in a vanilla-monogamous-heteronormative subculture as well as a kink-poly-genderqueer one.

Comment author: Viliam_Bur 31 August 2013 11:34:48AM *  -1 points [-]

(More politically: A "liberal" society composed of overlapping subcultures with different norms, in a context of individual rights and social support, seems to be almost certain to meet more people's needs than a "totalizing" society with a single set of norms.)

This works best if none of the "subcultures with different norms" creates huge negative externatilies for the rest of the society. Otherwise, some people get angry. -- And then we need to go meta and create some global rules that either prevent the former from creating the externalities, or the latter from expressing their anger.

I guess in case of BDSM subculture this works without problems. And I guess the test of the polyamorous community will be how well they will treat their children (hopefully better than polygamous mormons treat their sons), or perhaps how will they handle the poly- equivalents of divorce, especially the economical aspects of it (if there is a significant shared property).

Comment author: shminux 20 August 2013 06:26:36PM 1 point [-]

I can see it working when all parties are trustworthy and committed to fairness, which is a high threshold to begin with. Also, everyone has to buy into the idea of other people being autonomous agents, with no shoulds attached. Still, this might run into trouble when one party badly wants something flatly unacceptable to the other and so unable to afford it and feeling resentful.

One (unrelated) interesting quote:

my womb is worth about the cost of one graduate-level course at Columbia, assuming I’m interested in bearing your kid to begin with.

Comment author: kalium 21 August 2013 05:46:58AM 11 points [-]

This sounds interesting for cases where both parties are economically secure.

However I can't see it working in my case since my housemates each earn somewhere around ten times what I do. Under this system, my bids would always be lowest and I would do all the chores without exception. While I would feel unable to turn down this chance to earn money, my status would drop from that of an equal to that of a servant. I would find this unacceptable.

Comment author: Fronken 24 August 2013 05:50:37PM 1 point [-]

Could one not change the bidding to use "chore points" of somesuch? I mean, the system described is designed for spouses, but there's no reason it couldn't be adapted for you and your housemates.

Comment author: Viliam_Bur 31 August 2013 10:58:41AM *  3 points [-]

my housemates each earn somewhere around ten times what I do. Under this system, my bids would always be lowest and I would do all the chores without exception.

I believe you are wrong. (Or I am; in which case please explain to me how.) Here is what I would do it if I lived with a bunch of millionaires, assuming my money is limited:

The first time, I would ask a realistic price X. And I would do the chores. I would put the gained money apart into "the money I don't really own, because I will use them in future to get my status back" budget.

The second time, I would ask 1.5 × X. The third time, 2 × X. The fourth time, 3 × X. If asked, I would explain the change by saying: "I guess I was totally miscalibrated about how I value my time. Well, I'm learning. Sorry, this bidding system is so new and confusing to me." But I would act like I am not really required to explain anything.

Let's assume I always do the chores. Then my income grows exponentially, which is a nice thing per se, but most importantly, it cannot continue forever. At some moment, my bid would be so insanely high, that even Bill Gates would volunteer to do the chores instead. -- Which is completely okay for me, because I would pay him the $1000000000 per hour from my "get the status back" budget, which at the given time already contains the money.

That's it. Keep your money from chores in a separate budget and use them only to pay others for doing the chores. Increase or decrease the bids depending on the state of that budget. If the price becomes relatively stable, there is no way you would do more chores than the other people around you.

The only imbalance I can imagine is if you have a housemate A which always bids more than a housemate B, in which case you will end up between them, always doing more chores than A but less than B. Assuming there are 10 A's and 1 B, and the B is considered very low status, this might result in a rather low status for you, too. -- The system merely guarantees you won't get the lowest status, even if you are the less wealthy person in the house; but you can still get the second-lowest place.

Comment author: NancyLebovitz 24 August 2013 10:06:04AM 3 points [-]

One datapoint: I know of one household (two adults, one child) which worked out chores by having people list which chores they liked, which they tolerated, and which they hated. It turned out that there was enough intrinsic motivation to make taking care of the house work.

Comment author: passive_fist 22 August 2013 08:06:30AM 8 points [-]

Most couples agree that chores and common goods should be split equally.

I'm skeptical that most couples agree with this.

Anyway, all of these types of 'chore division' systems that I've seen so far totally disregard human psychology. Remember that the goal isn't to have a fair chore system. The goal is to have a system that preserves a happy and stable relationship. If the resulting system winds up not being 'fair', that's ok.

Comment author: [deleted] 22 August 2013 09:20:14PM 2 points [-]

I'm skeptical that most couples agree with this.

Most couples worldwide, or most couples in W.E.I.R.D. societies?

Comment author: passive_fist 23 August 2013 02:12:41AM 4 points [-]

Both.

Comment author: knb 20 August 2013 10:39:06PM 7 points [-]

Wow someone else thought of doing this too!

My roommate and I started doing this a year ago. It went pretty well for the first few months. Then our neighbor heard about how much we were paying eachother for chores and started outbidding us.

Comment author: Vaniver 22 August 2013 11:54:58PM *  7 points [-]

Then our neighbor heard about how much we were paying eachother for chores and started outbidding us.

This is one of the features of this policy, actually- you can use this as a natural measure of what tasks you should outsource. If a maid would cost $20 to clean the apartment, and you and your roommates all want at least $50 to do it, then the efficient thing to do is to hire a maid.

Comment author: Viliam_Bur 31 August 2013 10:44:37AM 5 points [-]

The problem could be that they actually are willing to do it for $10, but it's a low-status thing to admit.

If we both lived in the same appartment, and we both pretended that our time is precious that we are only willing to clean the appartment for $1000... and I do it 50% of the time, and you do it 50% of the time, at the end none of us gets poor despite the unrealistic prices, because each of us gets all the money back.

Now when the third person comes and cares about money more than about status (which is easier for them, because they don't live in the same appartment with us), our pretending is exposed and we become either more honest or poor.

Comment author: maia 20 August 2013 06:14:14PM 3 points [-]

Roger and I wrote a web app for exactly this purpose - dividing chores via auction. This has worked well for chore management for a house of 7 roommates, for about 6 months so far.

The feminism angle didn't even occur to us! It's just been really useful for dividing chores optimally.

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 20 August 2013 06:04:41PM 5 points [-]

I can see this working better than a dysfunctional household, but if you're both in the habit of just doing things, this is going to make everything worse.

Comment author: dreeves 23 September 2013 01:37:26AM 1 point [-]

Very fair point! Just like with Beeminder, if you're lucky enough to simply not suffer from akrasia then all the craziness with commitment devices is entirely superfluous. I liken it to literal myopia. If you don't have the problem then more power to you. If you do then apply the requisite technology to fix it (glasses, commitment devices, decision auctions).

But actually I think decision auctions are different. There's no such thing as not having the problem they solve. Preferences will conflict sometimes. Just that normal people have perfectly adequate approximations (turn taking, feeling each other out, informal mental point systems, barter) to what we've formalized and nerded up with our decision auctions.

Comment author: Manfred 20 August 2013 05:16:54PM *  10 points [-]

Wasn't it Ariely's Predictably Irrational that went over market norms vs. tribe norms? If you just had ordinary people start doing this, I would guess it would crash and burn for the obvious market-norm reasons (the urge to game the system, basically). And some ew-squick power disparity stuff if this is ever enforced by a third party or even social pressure.

Comment author: maia 20 August 2013 06:16:35PM 2 points [-]

Empirically speaking, this system has worked in our house (of 7 people, for about 6 months so far). What kind of gaming the system were you thinking of?

We do use social pressure: there is social pressure to do your contracted chores, and keep your chore point balance positive. This hasn't really created power disparities per se.

Comment author: Manfred 20 August 2013 08:54:50PM 2 points [-]

What kind of gaming the system were you thinking of?

Yeah, bidding = deception. But in addition to someonewrong's answer, I was thinking you could just end up doing a shitty job at things (e.g. cleaning the bathroom). Which is to say, if this were an actual labor market, and not a method of communicating between people who like each other and have outside-the-market reasons to cooperate, the market doesn't have much competition.

Comment author: maia 21 August 2013 02:42:28AM 1 point [-]

Yeah, that's unfortunately not something we can really handle other than decreeing "Doing this chore entails doing X and it doesn't count if you don't do X." Enforcing the system isn't solved by the system itself.

a method of communicating between people who like each other and have outside-the-market reasons to cooperate

Good way to describe it.

Comment author: someonewrongonthenet 20 August 2013 08:36:39PM *  4 points [-]

What kind of gaming the system were you thinking of?

If the idea is to say exactly how much you are willing to pay, there would be an incentive to:

1) Broadcast that you find all labor extra unpleasant and all goods extra valuable, to encourage people to bid high

2) Bid artificially lower values when you know someone enjoys a labor / doesn't mind parting with a good and will bid accordingly.

In short, optimal play would involve deception, and it happens to be a deception of the sort that might not be difficult to commit subconsciously. You might deceive yourself into thinking you find a chore unpleasant - I have read experimental evidence to support the notion that intrinsically rewarding tasks lose some of their appeal when paired with extrinsic rewards.

No comment on whether the traditional way is any better or worse - I think these two testimonials are sufficient evidence for this to be worth people who have a willing human tribe handy to try it, despite the theoretical issues. After all,

we trust each other not to be cheats and jerks. That’s true love, baby

Edit: There is another, more pleasant problem: If you and I are engaged in trade, and I actually care about your utility function, that's going to effect the price. The whole point of this system is to communicate utility evenly after subtracting for the fact that you care about each other (otherwise why bother with a system?)

Concrete example: We are trying to transfer ownership of a computer monitor, and I'm willing to give it to you for free because I care about you. But if I were to take that into account, then we are essentially back to the traditional method. I'd have to attempt to conjure up the value at which i'd sell the monitor to someone I was neutral towards.

Of course, you could just use this as an argument stopper - whenever there is real disagreement, you use money to effect an easy compromise. But then there is monetary pressure to be argumentative and difficult, and social pressure not to be - it would be socially awkward and monetarily advantageous if you were constantly the one who had a problem with unmet needs.

Comment author: maia 21 August 2013 02:51:59AM 2 points [-]

1) Broadcast that you find all labor extra unpleasant and all goods extra valuable, to encourage people to bid high

But if other people bid high, then you have to pay more. And they will know if you bid lower, because the auctions are public. How does this help you?

2) Bid artificially lower values when you know someone enjoys a labor / doesn't mind parting with a good and will bid accordingly.

I don't understand how this helps you either; if you bid lower and therefore win the auction, then you have to do the chore for less than you value it at. That's no fun.

The way our system works, it actually gives the lowest bidder, not their actual bid, but the second lowest bid minus 1; that way you don't have to do bidding wars, and can more or less just bid what you value it at. It does create the issue that you mention - bid sniping, if you know what the lowest bidder will bid you can bid just above it so they get as little as possible - but this is at the risk of having to actually do the chore for that little, because bids are binding.

I'd very much like to understand the issues you bring up, because if they are real problems, we might be able to take some stabs at solving them.

whenever there is real disagreement, you use money to effect an easy compromise.

This has become somewhat of a norm in our house. We can pass around chore points in exchange for rides to places and so forth; it's useful, because you can ask for favors without using up your social capital. (Just your chore points capital, which is easier to gain more of and more transparent.)

Comment author: someonewrongonthenet 21 August 2013 01:19:24PM *  2 points [-]

if you bid lower and therefore win the auction, then you have to do the chore for less than you value it at. That's no fun.

You only do this when you plan to be the buyer. The idea is to win the auction and become the buyer, but putting up as little money as possible. If you know that the other guy will do it for $5, you bid $6, even if you actually value it at $10. As you said, I'm talking about bid sniping.

But if other people bid high, then you have to pay more.

Ah, I should have written "broadcast that you find all labor extra unpleasant and all goods extra valuable when you are the seller (giving up a good or doing a labour) so that people pay you more to do it."

If you're willing to do a chore for _$10, but you broadcast that you find it more than -$10 of unpleasantness, the other party will be influenced to bid higher - say, $40. Then, you can bid $30, and get paid more. It's just price inflation - in a traditional transaction, a seller wants the buyer to pay as much as they are willing to pay. To do this, the seller must artificially inflate the buyer's perception of how much the item is worth to the seller. The same holds true here.

When you intend to be the buyer you do the opposite - broadcast that you're willing to do the labor for cheap to lower prices, then bid snipe. As in a traditional transaction, the buyer wants the seller to believe that the item is not of much worth to the buyer. The buyer also has to try to guess the minimum amount that the seller will part with the item.

it actually gives the lowest bidder, not their actual bid, but the second lowest bid minus 1

So what I wrote above was assuming the price was a midpoint between the buyer's and seller's bid, which gives them both equal power to set the price. This rule slightly alters things, by putting all the price setting power in the buyer's hands.

Under this rule, after all the deceptive price inflation is said and done you should still bid an honest $10 if you are only playing once - though since this is an iterated case, you probably want to bid higher just to keep up appearances if you are trying to be deceptive.

One of the nice things about this rule is that there is no incentive to be deceptive unless other people are bid sniping. The weakness of this rule is that it creates a stronger incentive to bid snipe.

Price inflation (seller's strategy) and bid sniping (buyer's strategy) are the two basic forms of deception in this game. Your rule empowers the buyer to set the price, thereby making price inflation harder at the cost of making bid sniping easier. I don't think there is a way around this - it seems to be a general property of trading. Finding a way around it would probably solve some larger scale economic problems.

Comment author: rocurley 21 August 2013 07:36:18PM 2 points [-]

(I'm one of the other users/devs of Choron)

There are two ways I know of that the market can try to defeat bid sniping, and one way a bidder can (that I know of).

Our system does not display the lowest bid, only the second lowest bid. For a one-shot auction where you had poor information about the others preferences, this would solve bid sniping. However, in our case, chores come up multiple times, and I'm pretty sure that it's public knowledge how much I bid on shopping, for example.

If you're in a situation where the lowest bid is hidden, but your bidding is predictable, you can sometimes bid higher than you normally would. This punishes people who bid less than they're willing to actually do the chore for, but imposes costs on you and the market as a whole as well, in the form of higher prices for the chore.

A third option, which we do not implement (credit to Richard for this idea), is to randomly award the auction to one of the two (or n) lowest bidders, with probability inversely related to their bid. In particular, if you pick between the lowest 2 bidders, both have claimed to be willing to do the job for the 2nd bidder's price (so the price isn't higher and noone can claim they were forced to do something for less than they wanted). This punishes bid-snipers by taking them at their word that they're willing to do the chore for the reduced price, at the cost of determinism, which allows better planning.

Comment author: someonewrongonthenet 23 August 2013 01:22:00AM *  1 point [-]

at the cost of determinism

And market efficiency.

Plus, I think it doesn't work when there are only two players? If I honestly bid $30, and you bid $40 and randomly get awarded the auction, then I have to pay you $40. And that leaves me at -$10 disutility, since the task was only -$30 to me.

Comment author: Tenoke 30 August 2013 01:33:04PM 5 points [-]

I lost an AI box experiment against PatrickRobotham with me as the AI today on irc. If anyone else wants to play against me then PM me here or contact me on #lesswrong.

Comment author: sixes_and_sevens 20 August 2013 11:46:51AM 5 points [-]

If you had to group Less Wrong content into eight categories by subject matter, what would those categories be?

Comment author: Emile 20 August 2013 01:06:47PM 15 points [-]
  • Self-improvement, optimal living, life hacks
  • Philosophy
  • Futurism (Cryonics, the singularity
  • Friendly AI and SIAI, I mean, MIRI
  • Maths, Decision Theory, Game theory
  • Meetups
  • General-interest discussion (biased towards the interests of atheist nerds)
  • Meta
Comment author: somervta 21 August 2013 02:05:40AM 2 points [-]

I would remove meetups, as that isn't really LW content as such.

Comment author: palladias 25 August 2013 06:36:32PM 1 point [-]

I'd subdivide Lifehacks into:

  • debiasing lifehacks - practical ways to subvert/avoid cognitive biases (CoZE exercises, Monday-Tuesday game, etc)
  • non-epistemological lifehacks - domain specific clever ideas (frameworks for chore negotiation, investment strategies, etc)
Comment author: Viliam_Bur 31 August 2013 12:11:53PM *  1 point [-]

epistemical lifehacks;
general instrumental lifehacks (e.g. how to overcome procrastination);
specific instrumental lifehacks (domain-specific)

Comment author: Dorikka 20 August 2013 07:32:46PM 3 points [-]

For unspecified levels of meta. :P

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 20 August 2013 06:49:12AM *  5 points [-]

Artificial intelligence and Solomonoff induction: what to read?

Olle Häggström, Professor of Mathematical Statistics at Chalmers University of Technology, reads some of Marcus Hutter's work, comes away unimpressed, and asks for recommendations.

One concept that is sometimes claimed to be of central importance in contemporary AGI research is the so-called AIXI formalism. [...] In the presentation, Hutter advices us to consult his book Universal Artificial Intelligence. Before embarking on that, however, I decided to try one of the two papers that he also directs us to in the presentation, namely his A philosophical treatise of universal induction, coauthored with Samuel Rathmanner and published in the journal Entropy in 2011. After reading the paper, I have moved the reading of Hutter's book far down my list of priorities, because gerneralizing from the paper leads me to suspect that the book is not so good.

I find the paper bad. There is nothing wrong with the ambition - to sketch various approaches to induction from Epicurus and onwards, and to try to argue how it all culminates in the concept of Solomonoff induction. There is much to agree with in the paper, such as the untenability of relying on uniform priors and the limited interest of the so-called No Free Lunch Theorems (points I've actually made myself in a different setting). The authors' emphasis on the difficulty of defending induction without resorting to circularity (see the well-known anti-induction joke for a drastic illustration) is laudable. And it's a nice perspective to view Solomonoff's prior as a kind of compromise between Epicurus and Ockham, but does this particular point need to be made in quite so many words? Judging from the style of the paper, the word "philosophical" in the title seems to mean something like "characterized by lack of rigor and general verbosity".4 Here are some examples of my more specific complaints [...]

I still consider it plausible to think that Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff induction are relavant to AGI7 (as well as to statistical inference and the theory of science), but the experience of reading Uncertainty & Induction in AGI and A philosophical treatise of universal induction strongly suggests that Hutter's writings are not the place for me to go in order to learn more about this. But where, then? Can the readers of this blog offer any advice?

Comment author: David_Gerard 30 August 2013 10:49:40PM *  6 points [-]

So, are $POORETHNICGROUP so poor, badly off and socially failed because they are about 15 IQ points stupider than $RICHETHNICGROUP? No, it may be the other way around: poverty directly loses you around 15 IQ points on average.

Or so says Anandi Mani et al. "Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function" Science 341, 976 (2013); DOI: 10.1126/science.1238041. A PDF while it lasts (from the nice person with the candy on /r/scholar) and the newspaper article I first spotted it in. The authors have written quite a lot of papers on this subject.

Comment author: Vaniver 01 September 2013 05:32:36PM 0 points [-]

So, I totally buy the "cognitive load decreases intellectual performance, both in life and on IQ tests" claim. This is very well replicated, and has immediate personal implications (don't try to remember everything, write it all down; try to minimize sources of stress in your life; try to think about as few projects at a time as possible).

I don't think it's valid to say "instead of A->B, it's B->A," or see this as a complete explanation, because the ~13 point drop is only present in times of financial stress. Take standardized school tests, and suppose that half of the minority students are under immediate financial stress (their parents just got a hefty car repair bill) and the other half aren't (the 'easy' condition in the test), whereas none of the majority students are under immediate financial stress. Then we should expect the minority students to be, on average, 6.5 points lower, but what we see is the gap of 15 points.

It's also plausible that the differentiatior between people is their reaction to stress--I know a lot of high-powered managers and engineers under significant stress at work, who lose much less than a standard deviation of their ability to make good decisions and focus on other things and so on. Some people even seem to perform better under stress, but it's hard to separate out the difference between motivation and fluid intelligence there.

Comment author: David_Gerard 01 September 2013 08:41:40PM *  -1 points [-]

Being poor means living a life of stress, financial and social. John Scalzi attempts to explain it. John Cheese has excellent ha-ha-only-serious stuff on Cracked on the subject too.

I wasn't meaning to put forward a study as settled science, of course; but I think it's interesting, and that they have a pile of other studies showing similar stuff. Now it's replication time.

Comment author: Vaniver 01 September 2013 09:04:04PM *  -1 points [-]

Being poor means living a life of stress, financial and social.

Then why, during the experiment, did the poor participants and the rich participants have comparable scores when presented with a hypothetical easy financial challenge (a repair of $150)?

The claim the paper makes is that there are temporary challenges which lower cognitive functionality, that are easier to induce in the poor than the rich. If you expect that those challenges are more likely to occur to the poor than the rich (which seems reasonable to me), then this should explain some part of the effect- but isn't on all the time, or the experiment wouldn't have come out the way it did.

I wasn't meaning to put forward a study as settled science, of course; but I think it's interesting, and that they have a pile of other studies showing similar stuff. Now it's replication time.

While I have my doubts about the replicability of any social science article that made it into Science, the interpretation concerns here are assuming the effect the paper saw is entirely real and at the strength they reported.

Comment author: Transfuturist 31 August 2013 01:52:41AM 2 points [-]

The biggest problem I have with racists claiming racial realism is this.

Comment author: David_Gerard 31 August 2013 07:56:49AM *  2 points [-]

The really interesting thing is that you see results from all over the world showing this. Catholics in Northern Ireland in the 1970s measuring 15 points lower than Protestants. Burakumin in Japan measuring 15 points lower than non-Burakumin. SAME GENE POOL. This strongly suggests you get at least 15 points really easily just from social factors, and these studies may (because a study isn't solid science yet, not even a string of studies from the same group) point to one reason.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 26 February 2014 06:11:36AM -2 points [-]

Burakumin in Japan measuring 15 points lower than non-Burakumin. SAME GENE POOL.

That's not obvious. Remember, there were strong taboos against interbreeding with Burakumin in Japan.

Comment author: David_Gerard 26 February 2014 02:26:27PM 0 points [-]

They separated only a few hundred years ago.

Comment author: Viliam_Bur 31 August 2013 12:31:55PM *  3 points [-]

Could be interesting to know how much of that is the status directly, and how much is better nutrition and medical care.

Comment author: Protagoras 31 August 2013 03:13:09AM *  6 points [-]

The racists claim that this is irrelevant because of research that corrects for socioeconomic status and still finds IQ differences. Of course, researchers have found plenty of evidence of important environmental influences on IQ not measured by SES. It seems especially bad for the racial realist hypothesis that people who, for example, identify as "black" in America have the the same IQ disadvantage compared to whites whether their ancestory is 4% European or 40% European; how much African vs. European ancestry someone has seems to matter only indirectly to the IQ effects, which seem to directly follow whichever artificial simplified category someone is identified as belonging to.

Comment author: Vaniver 01 September 2013 05:40:39PM *  2 points [-]

It seems especially bad for the racial realist hypothesis that people who, for example, identify as "black" in America have the the same IQ disadvantage compared to whites whether their ancestory is 4% European or 40% European

I've seen mixed reports on this. Human Varieties, for example, has a series of posts on colorism which finds a relationship between skin color and intelligence in the population of African Americans, as predicted by both the hereditarian and "colorist" (i.e. discrimination) theories, but does not find a relationship between skin color and intelligence within families (as predicted by the hereditarian but not the colorist theory), and I know there were studies using blood type which didn't support the hereditarian theory but appear to have been too weakly designed to do that even if hereditarianism were true. Are you aware of any studies that actually look at genetic ancestry and compare it to IQ? (Self-reported ancestry would still be informative, but not as accurate.)

Comment author: David_Gerard 31 August 2013 12:45:19PM 0 points [-]

It's because Europeans are 4% Neanderthal and partake of the Neanderthals' larger brains, and Africans aren't. </completelyspuriousjustsostory>

Comment author: Vaniver 01 September 2013 05:44:18PM 1 point [-]

There is large enough variance in Neanderthal ancestry among Europeans that we might actually be able to see differences within the European population (and then extrapolate those to guess how much of the European-African gap that explains). I seem to recall seeing some preliminary reports on this, but I can't find them right now so I'm not confident they were evidence-driven instead of theory-driven.

Comment author: Viliam_Bur 31 August 2013 12:30:27PM *  3 points [-]

Not completely serious, just wondering about possible implications, for sake of munchkinism:

Would it be possible to invent some new color, for example "purple", so that identifying with that color would increase someone's IQ?

I guess it would first require the rest of the society accepting the superiority (at least in intelligence) of the purple people, and their purpleness being easy to identify and difficult for others to fake. (Possible to achieve with some genetic manipulation.)

Also, could this mechanism possibly explain the higher intelligence of Jews? I mean, if we stopped suspecting them from making international conspiracies and secretly ruling the world (which obviously requires a lot of intelligence), would their IQs consequently drop to the average level?

Also... what about Asians? It is the popularity of anime than increases their IQ, or what?

Comment author: Protagoras 31 August 2013 03:35:09PM *  0 points [-]

Unfortunately, while we know there are lots of environmental factors that affect IQ, we mostly don't know the details well enough to be sure of very much, or to have much idea how to manipulate it. However, as I understand it, some research has suggested that there are interesting cultural similarities between Jews in most of the world and Chinese who don't live in China, and that the IQ advantage of Chinese is primarily among Chinese who don't live in China, so something in common between how the Chinese and Jewish cultures deal with being minority outsiders may explain part of why both show unusually high IQs when they are minority outsiders (and could explain a lot of East Asians generally; considering how enormous the cultural influence of China has been in the region, it would not be terribly surprising if many other East Asian groups had acquired whatever the relevant factor is).

This paper by Ogbu and Simons discusses some of the theories about groups that do poorly (the "involuntary" or "caste-like" minorities). Unfortunately I couldn't find a citation for any discussion of differences between voluntary minorities which would explain why some voluntary minorities outperform rather than merely equalling the majority, apart from Ned Block's passing reference to a culture of "self-respect" in his review of The Bell Curve.

Comment author: bogus 31 August 2013 01:59:42PM 0 points [-]

Would it be possible to invent some new color, for example "purple", so that identifying with that color would increase someone's IQ?

It's been done - many people do in fact self-identify as 'Indigo children', 'Indigos' or even 'Brights'. The label tends to come with a broadly humanistic and strongly irreligious worldview, but many of them are in fact highly committed to some form of spirituality and mysticism: indeed, they credit these perhaps unusual convictions for their increased intelligence and, more broadly, their highly developed intuition.

Comment author: David_Gerard 01 September 2013 08:46:35PM 2 points [-]

Ah, "Brights" is Dawkins and Dennett's terrible word for atheists; "Indigos" is completely insane and incoherent new-age nonsense about allegedly superpowered children. How did you conflate the two?

Comment author: David_Gerard 19 August 2013 06:59:14AM 10 points [-]

Weekly open threads - how do you think it's working?

Comment author: Emile 19 August 2013 07:22:52AM 19 points [-]

I think it's much better than monthly open threads - back then, I would sometimes think "Hmm, I'd like to ask this in an open thread, but the last one is too old, nobody's looking at it any more".

Comment author: Manfred 19 August 2013 12:49:16PM *  2 points [-]

You haven't ever posted a top-level comment in a weekly open thread.

Comment author: Tenoke 19 August 2013 01:10:51PM -1 points [-]

What has that to do with it?

Comment author: Manfred 19 August 2013 01:57:56PM *  4 points [-]

Suppose we were wondering about changing the flavor of our pizza. Someone says "Yeah, I'm really glad you've got these new flavors on your menu, I used to think the old recipe was boring and didn't order it much."

And then it turns out that this person hasn't ever actually tried any of your new flavors of pizza.

Sort of sets an upper bound on how much the introduction of new flavors has impacted this person's behavior.

Comment author: Tenoke 19 August 2013 02:16:31PM 5 points [-]

You can judge a lot more about a thread than about a pizza by just looking at it.

Also, if you seriously think that Open Threads can only be evaluated by people with top-level comments in them you probably misunderstand both how most people use the Open Threads and what is required to judge them.

Comment author: bogdanb 19 August 2013 07:34:42PM 4 points [-]

Note that he didn’t say “I didn’t post much”, he just said that there existed times when he thought about posting but didn’t because of the age of the thread. That is useful evidence, you can’t just ignore it if it so happens that there are no instances of posting at all.

(In pizza terms, Emile said “I used to think the old recipe was bad and I never ordered it. It’s not that surprising in that case that there are no instances of ordering.)

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 19 August 2013 06:18:08PM 11 points [-]

I have, and I agree with Emile's assessment.

Comment author: Omid 19 August 2013 04:28:21PM 21 points [-]

Commercials sound funnier if you mentally replace "up to" with "no more than."

Comment author: bbleeker 20 August 2013 02:56:22PM -1 points [-]

Also easier to translate. In fact, we often translate "up to" with "maximaal", the equivalent of "up to a maximum of" in Dutch. But of course that only translates the practical sense, and leaves out the implication of "up to a maximum of xx (and that is a LOT)". We could translate it with "wel" ("wel xx" ~ "even as much as xx"), but in most contexts, that sounds really... American, over the top, exaggerated. And also it doesn't sound exact enough, when it clearly is intended to be a hard limit.

Comment author: ciphergoth 02 September 2013 08:58:52AM 3 points [-]

I don't understand the graph in Stephen Hsu on Cognitive Genomics - help?

Comment author: gwern 02 September 2013 06:12:10PM *  4 points [-]

So to first quote Hsu's description:

This graph displays the number of GWAS hits versus sample size for height, BMI, etc. Once the minimal sample size to discover the alleles of largest impact (large MAF, large effect size) is exceeded, one generally expects a steady accumulation of new hits at lower MAF / effect size. I expect the same sort of progress for g. (MAF = Minor Allele Frequency. Variants that are common in the population are easier to detect than rare variants.)

We can’t predict the sample size required to obtain most of the additive variance for g (this depends on the details of the distribution of alleles), but I would guess that about a million genotypes together with associated g scores will suffice. When, exactly, we will reach this sample size is unclear, but I think most of the difficulty is in obtaining the phenotype data. Within a few years, over a million people will have been genotyped, but probably we will only have g scores for a small fraction of the individuals.

I'll try to explain it in different terms. What you are looking at is a graph of 'results vs effort'. How much work do you have to do to get out some useful results? The importance of this is that it's showing you a visual version of statistical power analysis (introduction).

Ordinary power analysis is about examining the inherent zero-sum trade-offs of power vs sample size vs effect size vs statistical-significance, where you try to optimize each thing for one's particular purpose; so for example, you can choose to have a small (=cheap) sample size and a small Type I (false positives) error rate in detecting a small effect size - as long as you don't mind a huge Type II error rate (low power, false negative, failure to detect real effects).

If you look at my nootropics or sleep experiments, you'll see I do power analysis all the time as a way of understanding how big my experiments need to be before they are not worthlessly uninformative; if your sample size is too small, you simply won't observe anything, even if there really is an effect (eg. you might conclude, 'with such a small n as 23, at the predicted effect size and the usual alpha of 0.05, our power will be very low, like 10%, so the experiment would be a waste of time').

Even though we know intelligence is very influenced by genes, you can't find 'the genes for intelligence' by looking at just 10 people - but how many do you need to look at?

In the case of the graph, the statistical-significance is hardwired & the effect sizes are all known to be small, and we ignore power, so that leaves two variables: sample size and number of null-rejection/findings. The graph shows us simply that as we get a larger sample, we can successfully find more associations (because we have more power to get a subtle genetic effect to pass our significance cutoffs). Simple enough. It's not news to anyone that the more data you collect, the more results you get.

What's useful here is that the slope of the points is encoding the joint relationship of power & significance & effect size for genetic findings, so we can simply vary sample size and spit out estimated number of findings. The intercept remains uncertain, though. What Hsu finds so important about this graph is that it lets us predict for intelligence how many hits we will get at any sample size once we have a datapoint which then nails down a unique line. What's the datapoint? Well, he mentions the very interesting recent findings of ~3 associations - which happened at n=126k. So to plot this IQ datapoint and guessing at roughly where it would go (please pardon my Paint usage):

Hsu edited with just the intercept

OK, but how does that let Hsu predict anything? Well, the slope ought to be the same for future IQ findings, since the procedures are basically the same. So all we have to do is guess at the line, and anchor it on this new finding:

With predictive regression

So if you want to know what we'll find at 200000 samples, you extend the line and it looks like we'll have ~10 SNPs at that point. Or, if you wanted to know when we'll have found 100 SNPs for intelligence, you simply continue extending the line until it reaches 100 on the y-axis, which apparently Hsu thinks will happen somewhere around 1000000 on the x-axis (which extends off the screen because no one has collected that big a sample yet for anything else, much less intelligence).

I hope that helps; if you don't understand power, it might help to look at my own little analyses where the problem is usually much simpler.

Comment author: ciphergoth 03 September 2013 12:19:50PM 1 point [-]

Many thanks for this!

So in broad strokes: the smaller a correlation is, the more samples you're going to need to detect it, so the more samples you take, the more correlations you can detect. For five different human variables, this graph shows number of samples against number of correlations detected with them on a log/log scale; from that we infer that a similar slope is likely for intelligence, and so we can use it to take a guess at how many samples we'll need to find some number of SNPs for intelligence. Am I handwaving in the right direction?

Comment author: [deleted] 25 August 2013 10:41:23AM *  2 points [-]

I have never consciously noticed a dust speck going into my eye, at least I don't remember it. This means it didn't make big enough effect on my mind so that it would have made a lasting impression on my memory. When I first read the post about dust specks and torture, I had to think hard about wtf the speck going into your eye even means.

Does this mean that I should attribute zero negative utility to dust speck going into my eye?

Comment author: gwern 25 August 2013 02:42:56PM 3 points [-]

Does this mean that I should attribute zero negative utility to dust speck going into my eye?

You could consider the analogous problem of waking up during surgery & then forgetting it afterwards.

Comment author: Locaha 25 August 2013 10:58:32AM 2 points [-]

The dust speck is just a symbol for the smallest negative utility unit. Just imagine something else.

Comment author: [deleted] 25 August 2013 12:34:20PM 2 points [-]

Oh, I was already aware of that (and this is not just hindsight bias, I remember reading about this today and someone suggested replacing the speck with the smallest actual negative utility unit). This isn't really about the original question anyway. I was just thinking if something that doesn't even register on a conscious level could have negative utility.

Comment author: Locaha 26 August 2013 06:58:14AM 1 point [-]

I was just thinking if something that doesn't even register on a conscious level could have negative utility.

I guess anything with a negative cumulative effect.

Imagine the dust specks piling in your eye until they start to interfere with your vision.

Comment author: linkhyrule5 29 August 2013 10:38:14AM 1 point [-]

Well, yes, but it's one dust speck per person...

And it's entirely possible that utility of dust speck isn't additive. In fact, it's trivially so: one dust speck is fine, a few trillion will do gruesome things to your head.

Comment author: Document 25 August 2013 08:32:34AM 2 points [-]

This is unrelated to rationality, but I'm posting it here in case someone decides it serves their goals to help me be more effective in mine.

I recently bought a computer, used it for a while, then decided I didn't want it. What's the simplest way to securely wipe the hard drive before returning it? Is it necessary to create an external boot volume (via USB or optical disc)?

Comment author: tut 25 August 2013 01:01:01PM 2 points [-]

Probably use dban.

Comment author: ahbwramc 24 August 2013 03:14:35AM 2 points [-]

I don't suppose there's any regularly scheduled LW meetups in San Diego, is there? I'll be there this week from Saturday to Wednesday for a conference.

Comment author: closeness 23 August 2013 01:50:13PM 3 points [-]

How can I apply rationality to business?

Comment author: wedrifid 23 August 2013 03:47:16PM 6 points [-]

How can I apply rationality to business?

  • Avoid sunk costs.
  • If stuff doesn't work figure out why and (in most cases) do different stuff.
  • When predicting how long a project will take consider how long similar tasks tend to take and use that as a (rather strong) guide.
Comment author: drethelin 22 August 2013 07:00:12PM 18 points [-]

I think one of my very favorite things about commenting on Lesswrong is that usually when you make a short statement or ask a question people will just respond to what you said rather than taking it as a sign to attack what they think that question implies is your tribe.

Comment author: Omid 22 August 2013 05:46:01PM 4 points [-]

Has anyone done a good analysis on the expected value of purchasing health insurance? I will need to purchase health when I turn 26. How comprehensive should the insurance I purchase be?

At first I thought I should purchase a high-deductible that only protects against catastrophes. I have low living expenses and considerable savings, so this wouldn't be risky. The logic here is that insurance costs the expected value of the goods provided plus overhead, so the cost of insurance will always be less than it's expected value. If I purchase less insurance, I waste less money on overhead.

On the other hand, there's a tax break for purchasing health insurance, and soon there will be subsidies as well. Also, insurance companies can reduce the cost of health care by negotiating lower prices for you. So the insurance company will pay less than the person who pays out of pocket. All these together might outweigh money wasted on overhead.

On the third hand, I'm a young healthy male. Under the ACA, my insurance premiums will be inflated so that old, sick, and female persons can have lower premiums. The money that's being transferred to these groups won't be spent on me, so it reduces the expected value of my insurance.

Has anyone added all these effects up? Would you recommend I purchase skimpy insurance or comprehensive?

Comment author: Randy_M 23 August 2013 03:32:16PM *  3 points [-]

"Also, insurance companies can reduce the cost of health care by negotiating lower prices for you. "

This is the case even with a high deductable plan. The insurance will have a different rate when you use an in-network doctor or hospital service. If you haven't met the deductible and you go in, they'll send you a bill--but that bill will still be much cheaper than if you had gone in and paid out of pocket (like paying less than half).

But make sure that the high deductable plan actually has a cheaper monthly payment by an amount that matters. With new regulations of what must be covered, the differences between plans may not end up being very big.

Comment author: linkhyrule5 21 August 2013 09:15:53PM 2 points [-]

Has anyone done a study on redundant information in languages?

I'm just mildly curious, because a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that English is about 4.7x redundant - which on a side note explains how we can esiayl regnovze eevn hrriofclly msispled wrods.

(Actually, that would be an interesting experiment - remove or replace fraction x of the letters in a paragraph and see at what average x participants can no longer make a "corrected" copy.)

I'd predict that Chinese is much less redundant in its spoken form, and that I have no idea how to measure redundancy in its written form. (By stroke? By radical?)

Comment author: wedrifid 22 August 2013 02:33:55AM *  1 point [-]

(Actually, that would be an interesting experiment - remove or replace fraction x of the letters in a paragraph and see at what average x participants can no longer make a "corrected" copy.)

Studies of this form have been done at least on the edge case where all the material removed is from the end (ie. tests of the ability of subjects to predict the next letter in an English text). I'd be interested to see your more general test but am not sure if it has been done. (Except, perhaps, as a game show).

Comment author: gwern 21 August 2013 10:05:32PM 4 points [-]

Yes, it's been studied quite a bit by linguists. You can find some pointers in http://www.gwern.net/Notes#efficient-natural-language which may be helpful.

Comment author: linkhyrule5 21 August 2013 10:51:54PM 1 point [-]

Thanks.

... huh. Now I'm thinking about actually doing that experiment...

Comment author: gwern 22 August 2013 09:47:32PM 3 points [-]

I ran into another thing in that vein:

To measure the artistic merit of texts, Kolmogorov also employed a letter-guessing method to evaluate the entropy of natural language. In information theory, entropy is a measure of uncertainty or unpredictability, corresponding to the information content of a message: the more unpredictable the message, the more information it carries. Kolmogorov turned entropy into a measure of artistic originality. His group conducted a series of experiments, showing volunteers a fragment of Russian prose or poetry and asking them to guess the next letter, then the next, and so on. Kolmogorov privately remarked that, from the viewpoint of information theory, Soviet newspapers were less informative than poetry, since political discourse employed a large number of stock phrases and was highly predictable in its content. The verses of great poets, on the other hand, were much more difficult to predict, despite the strict limitations imposed on them by the poetic form. According to Kolmogorov, this was a mark of their originality. True art was unlikely, a quality probability theory could help to measure.

--The Man Who Invented Modern Probability - Issue 4: The Unlikely - Nautilus

Comment author: mwengler 21 August 2013 06:50:29PM *  4 points [-]

We wonder about the moral impact of dust specks in the eyes of 3^^^3 people.

What about dust specks in the eyes of 3^^^3 poodles? Or more to the point, what is the moral cost of killing one person vs one poodle? How many poodles lives would we trade for the life of one person?

Or even within humans, is it human years we would account in coming up with moral equivalencies? Do we discount humans that are less smart, on the theory that we almost certainly discount poodles against humans because they are not as smart as us? Do we discount evil humans compared to helpful humans? Discount unproductive humans against productive ones? What about sims, if it is human*years we count rather than human lives, what of a sim which might be expected to run for more than a trillion subjective years in simulation, do they carry billions times more moral weight than a single meat human who has precommitted to eschew cryonics or upload?

And of course I am using poodle as an algebraic symbol to represent any one of many intelligences. Do we discount poodles against humans because they are not as smart, or is there some other measure of how to relate the moral value of a poodle to the moral value of a person? Does a sim (simulated human running in software) count equal to a meat human? Does an earthworm have epsilon<<1 times the worth of a human, or is it identically 0 times the worth of a human?

What about really big smart AI? Would an AI as smart as an entire planet be worth (morally) preserving at the expense of losing one-fifth the human population?

Comment author: David_Gerard 21 August 2013 07:06:01PM 0 points [-]

Do the nervous systems of 3^^^3 nematodes beat the nervous systems of a mere 7x10^9 humans? If not, why not?

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 21 August 2013 07:55:00PM 6 points [-]

I believe that I care nothing for nematodes, and that as the nervous systems at hand became incrementally more complicated, I would eventually reach a sharp boundary wherein my degree of caring went from 0 to tiny. Or rather, I currently suspect that an idealized version of my morality would output such.

Comment author: MugaSofer 23 August 2013 03:40:07PM 0 points [-]

... really?

Um, that strikes me as very unlikely. Could you elaborate on your reasoning?

Comment author: David_Gerard 21 August 2013 10:22:52PM *  1 point [-]

But zero is not a probability.

Edit: Adele_L is right, I was confusing utilities and probabilities.

Comment author: MugaSofer 23 August 2013 03:40:50PM 0 points [-]

... are you pointing out that there is a nonzero probability that Eliezer's CEV actually cares about nematodes?

Comment author: David_Gerard 24 August 2013 04:15:40PM 1 point [-]

No, Adele_L is right, I was confusing utilities and probabilities.

Comment author: Adele_L 22 August 2013 12:04:33AM 13 points [-]

Zero is a utility, and utilities can even be negative (i.e. if Eliezer hated nematodes).

Comment author: ahbwramc 22 August 2013 11:28:20PM 5 points [-]

I'm kind of curious as to why you wouldn't expect a continuous, gradual shift in caring. Wouldn't mind design space (which I would imagine your caring to be a function of) be continuous?

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 23 August 2013 12:58:16AM 7 points [-]

Something going from 0 to 10^-20 is behaving pretty close to continuously in one sense. It is clear that there are some configurations of matter I don't care about at all (like a paperclip), while I do care about other configurations (like twelve-year-old human children), so it is elementary that at some point my utility function must go from 0 to nonzero. The derivative, the second derivative, or even the function itself could easily be discontinuous at this point.

Comment author: MugaSofer 23 August 2013 03:57:07PM *  -1 points [-]

It is clear that there are some configurations of matter I don't care about at all (like a paperclip), while I do care about other configurations (like twelve-year-old human children), so it is elementary that at some point my utility function must go from 0 to nonzero.

And ... it isn't clear that there are some configurations you care for ... a bit? Sparrows being tortured and so on? You don't care more about dogs than insects and more for chimpanzees than dogs?

(I mean, most cultures have a Great Chain Of Being or whatever, so surely I haven't gone dreadfully awry in my introspection ...)

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 23 August 2013 06:46:54PM 3 points [-]

This is not incompatible with what I just said. It goes from 0 to tiny somewhere, not from 0 to 12-year-old.

Comment author: shminux 23 August 2013 06:59:24PM 0 points [-]

Can you bracket this boundary reasonably sharply? Say, mosquito: no, butterfly: yes?

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 23 August 2013 08:34:30PM 10 points [-]

No, but I strongly suspect that all Earthly life without frontal cortex would be regarded by my idealized morals as a more complicated paperclip. There may be exceptions and I have heard rumors that octopi pass the mirror test, and I will not be eating any octopus meat until that is resolved, because even in a world where I eat meat because optimizing my diet is more important and my civilization lets me get away with it, I do not eat anything that recognizes itself in a mirror. So a spider is a definite no, a chimpanzee is an extremely probable yes, a day-old human infant is an extremely probable no but there are non-sentience-related causes for me to care in this case, and pigs I am genuinely unsure of.

Comment author: Emile 25 August 2013 12:11:03PM *  1 point [-]

I do not eat anything that recognizes itself in a mirror.

Assuming pigs were objects of value, would that make it morally wrong to eat them? Unlike octopi, most pigs exist because humans plan on eating them, so if a lot of humans stopped eating pigs, there would be less pigs, and the life of the average pig might not be much better.

(this is not a rhetorical question)

Comment author: fubarobfusco 25 August 2013 11:37:53PM 0 points [-]

Does it matter to you that octopuses are quite commonly cannibalistic?

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 24 August 2013 12:54:16AM 6 points [-]

To be clear, I am unsure if pigs are objects of value, which incorporates both empirical uncertainty about their degree of reflectivity, philosophical uncertainty about the precise relation of reflectivity to degrees of consciousness, and ethical uncertainty about how much my idealized morals would care about various degrees of consciousness to the extent I can imagine that coherently. I can imagine that there's a sharp line of sentience which humans are over and pigs are under, and imagine that my idealized caring would drop to immediately zero for anything under the line, but my subjective probability for both of these being simultaneously true is under 50% though they are not independent.

However it is plausible to me that I would care exactly zero about a pig getting a dust speck in the eye... or not.

Comment author: Bakkot 24 August 2013 06:48:08PM 1 point [-]

The derivative, the second derivative, or even the function itself could easily be discontinuous at this point.

But needn't be! See for example f(x) = exp(-1/x) (x > 0), 0 (x ≤ 0).

Wikipedia has an analysis.

(Of course, the space of objects isn't exactly isomorphic to the real line, but it's still a neat example.)

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 24 August 2013 07:11:47PM 1 point [-]

Agreed, but it is not obvious to me that my utility function needs to be differentiable at that point.

Comment author: wedrifid 22 August 2013 02:26:19AM 3 points [-]

What about dust specks in the eyes of 3^^^3 poodles? Or more to the point, what is the moral cost of killing one person vs one poodle? How many poodles lives would we trade for the life of one person?

I observe that the answer to the last question is not constrained to be positive.

Comment author: Randy_M 23 August 2013 03:49:15PM 4 points [-]

"Letting those people die was worth it, because they took their cursed yapping poodle with them!"

(quote marks to indicate not my actual views)

Comment author: brazil84 21 August 2013 02:51:15PM 6 points [-]

Sorry if this has been asked before, but can someone explain to me if there is any selfish reason to join Alcor while one is in good health? If I die suddenly, it will be too late to have joined, but even if I had joined it seems unlikely that they would get to me in time.

The only reason I can think of is to support Alcor.

Comment author: [deleted] 21 August 2013 03:43:47PM *  -1 points [-]

There is some background base rate of sudden, terminal, but not immediately fatal, injury or illness.

For example, I currently do not value life insurance highly, and therefore I value cryonics insurance even less.

Otherwise, there's only some marginal increase in the probability of Alcor surviving as an institution. Seeing as there's precedent for healthy cryonics orgs to adopt the patients of unhealthy cryonics orgs, this marginal increase should be viewed as a yet more marginal increase in the survival of cryonics locations in your locality.

(Assuming transportation costs are prohibitive enough to be treated as a rounding error.)

Comment author: Randy_M 23 August 2013 03:25:47PM 6 points [-]

It's like what the TV preacher told Bart Simpson: "Yes, a deathbed conversion is a pretty sweet angle, but if you join now, you're also covered in case of accidental death and dismemberment!"

(may not be an exact quote)

Comment author: Turgurth 22 August 2013 01:08:16AM 5 points [-]

I don't think it's been asked before on Less Wrong, and it's an interesting question.

It depends on how much you value not dying. If you value it very strongly, the risk of sudden, terminal, but not immediately fatal injuries or illnesses, as mentioned by paper-machine, might be unacceptable to you, and would point toward joining Alcor sooner rather than later.

The marginal increase your support would add to the probability of Alcor surviving as an institution might also matter to you selfishly, since this would increase the probability that there will exist a stronger Alcor when you are older and will likely need it more than you do now.

Additionally, while it's true that it's unlikely that Alcor would reach you in time if you were to die suddenly, compare this risk to the chance of your survival if alternately you don't join Alcor soon enough, and, after your hypothetical fatal car crash, you end up rotting in the ground.

And hey, if you really want selfish reasons: signing up for cryonics is high-status in certain subcultures, including this one.

There are also altruistic reasons to join Alcor, but that's a separate issue.

Comment author: brazil84 22 August 2013 10:13:24PM 1 point [-]

Thank you for your response; I suppose one would need to estimate the probability of dying in such a way that having previously joined Alcor would make a difference.

Perusing Ben Best's web site and using some common sense, it seems that the most likely causes of death for a reasonably healthy middle aged man are cancer, stroke, heart attack, accident, suicide, and homicide. We need to estimate the probability of sudden serious loss of faculties followed by death.

It seems that for cancer, that probability is extremely small. For stroke, heart attack, and accidents, one could look it up but just guesstimating a number based on general observations, I would guess roughly 10 to 15 percent. Suicide and homicide are special cases -- I imagine that in those cases I would be autopsied so there would be much less chance of cryopreservation even if I had already joined Alcor.

Of course even if you pre-joined Alcor, there is still a decent chance that for whatever reason they would not be able to preserve you after, for example, a fatal accident which killed you a few days later.

So all told, my rough estimate is that the improvement in my chances of being cryopreserved upon death if I joined Alcor now as opposed to taking a wait and see approach is 5% at best.

Does that sound about right?

Comment author: metastable 21 August 2013 12:18:21AM 1 point [-]

Do consequentialists generally hold as axiomatic that there must be a morally preferable choice (or conceivably multiple equally preferable choices) in a given situation? If so, could somebody point me to a deeper discussion of this axiom (it probably has a name, which I don't know.)

Comment author: somervta 21 August 2013 01:34:11AM 2 points [-]

Not explicitly as an axiom AFAIK, but if you're valuing states-of-the-world, any choice you make will lead to some state, which means that unless your valuation is circular, the answer is yes.

Basically, as long as your valuation is VNM-rational, definitely yes. Utilitarians are a special case of this, and I think most consequentialists would adhere to that also.

Comment author: asr 21 August 2013 05:08:50AM *  3 points [-]

What happens if my valuation is noncircular, but is incomplete? What if I only have a partial order over states of the world? Suppose I say "I prefer state X to Z, and don't express a preference between X and Y, or between Y and Z." I am not saying that X and Y are equivalent; I am merely refusing to judge.

My impression is that real human preference routinely looks like this; there are lots of cases people refuse to evaluate or don't evaluate consistently.

It seems like even with partial preferences, one can be consequentialist -- if you don't have clear preferences between outcomes, you have a choice that isn't morally relevant. Or is there a self-contradiction lurking?

Comment author: pengvado 21 August 2013 05:37:45PM *  1 point [-]

Suppose I say "I prefer state X to Z, and don't express a preference between X and Y, or between Y and Z." I am not saying that X and Y are equivalent; I am merely refusing to judge.

If the result of that partial preference is that you start with Z and then decline the sequence of trades Z->Y->X, then you got dutch booked.

Otoh, maybe you want to accept the sequence Z->Y->X if you expect both trades to be offered, but decline each in isolation? But then your decision procedure is dynamically inconsistent: Standing at Z and expecting both trade offers, you have to precommit to using a different algorithm to evaluate the Y->X trade than you will want to use once you have Y.

Comment author: Salemicus 20 August 2013 09:29:43PM 3 points [-]

I've got an (IMHO) interesting discussion article written up, but I am unable to post it; I get a "webpage cannot be found" error when I try. I'm using IE 9. Is this a known issue, or have I done something wrong?

Comment author: gwern 20 August 2013 09:51:48PM 4 points [-]

Have you tried searching the LW bugtracker or using a different browser?

Comment author: Salemicus 20 August 2013 10:24:54PM 4 points [-]

Thank you for this suggestion. I have discovered that this works in Chrome.

Comment author: mstevens 20 August 2013 10:39:18AM 10 points [-]

I want to know more (ie anything) about game theory. What should I read?

Comment author: Manfred 20 August 2013 05:02:37PM *  3 points [-]

I actually found The Selfish Gene a pretty good book for developing game theory intuitions. I'd put it as #2 on my list after "the first 2/3 of The Strategy of Conflict".

Comment author: [deleted] 20 August 2013 01:19:30PM 3 points [-]

If you're looking for something shorter than a full text, I can recommend this entry at the Standord Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Comment author: sixes_and_sevens 20 August 2013 11:30:13AM 9 points [-]

If you have the time, I heartily recommend Ben Polak's Introduction to Game Theory lectures. They are highly watchable and give a very solid introduction to the topic.

In terms of books, The Strategy of Conflict is the classic popular work, and it's good, but it's very much a product of its time. I imagine there are more accessible books out there. Yvain recommends The Art of Strategy, which I haven't read.

Comment author: diegocaleiro 20 August 2013 04:56:23AM 5 points [-]

There is a circulating google docs for people who are moving into the Bay Area soonish.

Any tips for people moving in from those who are in?

People who have available rooms or houses. Let Nick Ryder know.

Comment author: knb 20 August 2013 01:15:13AM *  8 points [-]

I don't know how technically viable hyperloop is, but it seems especially well suited for the United States.

Investing in a hyperloop system doesn't make as much sense in Europe or Japan for a number of reasons:

  1. European/Japanese cities are closer together, so Hyperloop's long acceleration times are a larger relative penalty in terms of speed. The existing HSR systems reach their lower top speeds more quickly.

  2. Most European countries and Japan already have decent HSR systems and are set to decline in population. Big new infrastructure projects tend not to make as much sense when populations are declining and the infrastructure cost : population ratio is increasing by default.

  3. Existing HSR systems create a natural political enemy for Hyperloop proposals. For most countries, having HSR and Hyperloop doesn't make sense.

In contrast, the US seems far better suited:

  1. The US is set for a massive population increase, requiring large new investments in transportation infrastructure in any case.

  2. The US has lots of large but far-flung cities, so long acceleration times are not as much of a relative penalty.

  3. The US has little existing HSR to act as a competitor. The political class has expressed interest in increasing passenger rail infrastructure.

  4. Hyperloop is proposed to carry automobiles. Low walkability of US towns is the big killer of intercity passenger rail in the US. Taking HSR might be faster than driving, but in addition to other benefits, driving saves money on having to rent a car when you reach the destination city.

Another possible early adopter is China (because they still need more transport infrastructure, land acquisition is a trivial problem for the Communist party, and they have a larger area, mitigating the slow acceleration problem.) I see China as less likely than the US because they do have a fairly large HSR system and it is expanding quickly. Also, China is set for population decline within a few decades, although they have some decades of slow growth left.

Russia is another possible candidate. Admittedly they have the declining population problem, but they still need more transport infrastructure and they have several big, far-flung cities. The current Russian transportation system is quite unsafe, so they could be expected to be willing to invest in big new projects. The slow acceleration problem would again be mitigated by Russia's large size.

Comment author: DanielLC 20 August 2013 05:57:51AM 0 points [-]

I've been told that railways primarily get money from freight, and nobody cares that much about freight getting there immediately. As such, high speed railways are not a good idea.

I know you can't leave this to free enterprise per se. If someone doesn't want to sell their house, you can't exactly steer a railroad around it. However, if eminent domain is used, then if it's worth building, the market will build it. Let the government offer eminent domain use for railroads, and let them be built if they're truly needed.

Comment author: kalium 20 August 2013 05:19:41PM 1 point [-]

Much of Amtrak uses tracks owned by freight companies, and that this is responsible for a good chunk of Amtrak's poor performance. However, high-speed rail on non-freight-owned tracks works pretty well in the rest of the world; it just needs its own right-of-way (in some cases running freight at night when the high-speed trains aren't running, but still having priority over freight traffic).

Comment author: CellBioGuy 20 August 2013 04:29:09AM *  5 points [-]

In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is.

I continue to fail to see how this idea is anything more than a cool idea that would take huge amounts of testing and engineering hurdles to get going if it indeed would prove viable. Nothing is as simple as its untested dream ever is.

Not hating on it, but seriously, hold your horses...

Comment author: knb 21 August 2013 09:48:28AM 1 point [-]

I feel like I covered this in the first sentence with, "I don't know how technically viable hyperloop is." My point is just to argue that the US would be especially well-suited for hyperloop if it turns out to be viable. My goal was mainly to try to argue against the apparent popular wisdom that hyperloop would never be built in the US for the same reason HSR (mostly) wasn't.

Comment author: luminosity 20 August 2013 11:24:09AM 10 points [-]

Don't forget Australia. We have a few, large cities separated by long distances. In particular, Melbourne to Sydney is one of the highest traffic air routes in the world, roughly the same distance as the proposed Hyperloop, and there has been on and off talk of high speed rail links. Additionally, Sydney airport has a curfew, and is more or less operating at capacity. Offloading Melbourne-bound passengers to a cheaper, faster option would free up more flights for other destinations.

Comment author: CAE_Jones 20 August 2013 02:30:06AM 2 points [-]

I was only vaguely following the Hyperloop thread on Lesswrong, but this analysis convinced me to Google it to learn more. I was immediately bombarded with a page full of search results that were pecimmistic at best (mocking, pretending at fallasy of gray but still patronizing, and politically indignant (the LA Times) were among the results on the first page)[1]. I was actually kinda hopeful about the concept, since America desperately needs better transit infrastructure, and KND's analysis of it being best suited for America makes plenty of sense so far as I can tell.

[1] I didn't actually open any of the results, just read the titles and descriptions. The tone might have been exaggerated or even completely mutated by that filter, but that seems unlikely for the titles and excerpts I read.

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 20 August 2013 07:11:32PM 2 points [-]

I suggest that this is very weak evidence against the viability, either political, economic, or technical, of the Hyperloop. Any project that is obviously viable and useful has been done already; consequently, both useful and non-useful projects get the same amount of resistance of the form "Here's a problem I spent at least ten seconds thinking up, now you must take three days to counter it or I will pout. In public. Thus spoiling all your chances of ever getting your pet project accepted, hah!"

Comment author: Adele_L 19 August 2013 11:39:54PM 3 points [-]

Consider the following scenario. Suppose that it can be shown that the laws of physics imply that if we do a certain action (costing 5 utils to perform), then in 1/googol of our descendent universes, 3^^^3 utils can be generated. Intuitively, it seems that we should do this action! (at least to me) But this scenario also seems isomorphic to a Pascal's mugging situation. What is different?

If I attempt to describe the thought process that leads to these differences, it seems to be something like this. What is the measure of the causal descendents where 3^^^3 utils are generated? In typical Pascal's mugging, I expect there to be absolutely zero causal descendents where 3^^^3 utils are generated, but in this example, I expect there to be "1/googol" such causal descendents, even though the subjective probability of these two scenarios is roughly the same. I then do my expected utility maximization with (# of utils)(best guess of my measure) instead of (# of utils)(subjective probability), which seems to match with my intuitions better, at least.

But this also just seems like I am passing the buck to the subjective probability of a certain model of the universe, and that this will suffer from the mugging problem as well.

So does thinking about it this way add anything, or is it just more confusing?

Comment author: pan 19 August 2013 10:12:51PM 23 points [-]

Why doesn't CFAR just tape record one of the workshops and throw it on youtube? Or at least put the notes online and update them each time they change for the next workshop? It seems like these two things would take very little effort, and while not perfect, would be a good middle ground for those unable to attend a workshop.

I can definitely appreciate the idea that person to person learning can't be matched with these, but it seems to me if the goal is to help the world through rationality, and not to make money by forcing people to attend workshops, then something like tape recording would make sense. (not an attack on CFAR, just a question from someone not overly familiar with it).

Comment author: Benito 21 August 2013 01:59:35PM 4 points [-]

Is a CFAR workshop like a lecture? I thought it would be closer to a group discussion, and perhaps subgroups within. This would make a recording highly unfocused and difficult to follow.

Comment author: somervta 22 August 2013 09:25:36AM *  3 points [-]

Any one unit in the workshop is probably something in between a lecture, a practice session and a discussion between the instructor and the attendees. Each unit is different in this respect. For most of the units, a recording of a session would probably not be very useful on its own.

Comment author: sixes_and_sevens 21 August 2013 11:39:43AM 8 points [-]

I'm a keen swing dancer. Over the past year or so, a pair of internationally reputable swing dance teachers have been running something called "Swing 90X", (riffing off P90X). The idea is that you establish a local practice group, film your progress, submit your recordings to them, and they give you exercises and feedback over the course of 90 days. By the end of it, you're a significantly more badass dancer.

It would obviously be better if everything happened in person, (and a lot does happen in person; there's a massive international swing dance scene), but time, money and travel constraints make this prohibitively difficult for a lot of people, and the whole Swing 90X thing is a response to this, which is significantly better than the next best thing.

It's worth considering if a similar sort of model could work for CFAR training.

Comment author: somervta 21 August 2013 01:51:24AM 3 points [-]

(April 2013 Workshop Attendee)

(The argument is that) A lot of the CFAR workshop material is very context dependent, and would lose significant value if distilled into text or video. Personally speaking, a lot of what I got out of the workshop was only achievable in the intensive environment - the casual discussion about the material, the reasons behind why you might want to do something, etc - a lot of it can't be conveyed in a one hour video. Now, maybe CFAR could go ahead and try to get at least some of the content value into videos, etc, but that has two concerns. One is the reputational problem with 'publishing' lesser-quality material, and the other is sorta-almost akin to the 'valley of bad rationality'. If you teach someone, say, the mechanics of aversion therapy, but not when to use it, or they learn a superficial version of the principle, that can be worse than never having learned it at all, and it seems plausible that this is true of some of the CFAR material also.

Comment author: pan 21 August 2013 03:33:22PM 3 points [-]

I agree that there are concerns, and you would lose a lot of the depth, but my real concern is with how this makes me perceive CFAR. When I am told that there are things I can't see/hear until I pay money, it makes me feel like it's all some sort of money making scheme, and question whether the goal is actually just to teach as many people as much as possible, or just to maximize revenue. Again, let me clarify that I'm not trying to attack CFAR, I believe that they probably are an honest and good thing, but I'm trying to convey how I initially feel when I'm told that I can't get certain material until I pay money.

It's akin to my personal heuristic of never taking advice from anyone who stands to gain from my decision. Being told by people at CFAR that I can't see this material until I pay the money is the opposite of how I want to decide to attend a workshop, I instead want to see the tapes or read the raw material and decide on my own that I would benefit from being in person.

Comment author: palladias 25 August 2013 06:23:24PM *  1 point [-]

We do offer some free classes in the Bay Area. As we beta-test tweaks or work on developing new material, we invite people in to give us feedback on classes in development. We don't charge for these test sessions, and, if you're local, you can sign up here. Obviously, this is unfortunately geographically limited. We do have a sample workshop schedule up, so you can get a sense of what we teach.

If the written material online isn't enough, you can try to chat with one of us if we're in town (I dropped in on a NYC group at the beginning of August). Or you can drop in an application, and you'll automatically be chatting with one of us and can ask as many questions as you like in a one-on-one interview. Applying doesn't create any obligation to buy; the skype interview is meant to help both parties learn more about each other.

Comment author: somervta 22 August 2013 09:21:09AM 1 point [-]

I feel your concerns, but tbh I think the main disconnect is the research/development vs teaching dichotomy, not (primarily) the considerations I mentioned. The volunteers at the workshop (who were previous attendees) were really quite emphatic about how much they had improved, including content and coherency as well as organization.

(Relevant)

Comment author: metastable 21 August 2013 07:16:22PM 3 points [-]

Yeah, I feel these objections, and I don't think your heuristic is bad. I would say, though, and I hold no brief for CFAR, never having donated or attended a workshop, that there is another heuristic possibly worth considering: generally more valuable products are not free. There are many exceptions to this, and it is possible for sellers to counterhack this common heuristic by using higher prices to falsely signal higher quality to consumers. But the heuristic is not worthless, it just has to be applied carefully.

Comment author: tgb 21 August 2013 06:28:37PM 2 points [-]

While you have good points, I would like to say that making money is not unaligned with the goal of teaching as many people as possible. It seems like a good strategy is to develop high-quality material by starting off teaching only those able to pay. This lets some subsidize the development of more open course material. If they haven't gotten to the point where they have released the subsidized material, then I'd give them some more time and judge them again in some years. It's a young organization trying to create material from scratch in many areas.

Comment author: ChristianKl 19 August 2013 10:28:05PM 8 points [-]

One of the core ideas of CFAR is to develop tools to teach rationality. For that purpose it's useful to avoid making the course material completely open at this point in time. CFAR wants to publish scientific papers that validate their ideas about teaching rationality.

Doing things in person helps with running experiments and those experiments might be less clear when some people already viewed the lectures online.

Comment author: Frood 20 August 2013 06:07:16AM 4 points [-]

I'm guessing that the goal here is to gather information on how to teach rationality to the 'average' person? As in, the person off of the street who's never asked themselves "what do I think I know and how do I think I know it?". But as far as I can tell, LWers make up a large portion of the workshop attendees. Many of us will have already spent enough time reading articles/sequences about related topics that it's as if we've "already viewed the lectures online".

Also, it's not as if the entire internet is going to flock to the content the second that it gets posted. There will still be an endless pool of people to use in the experiments. And wouldn't the experiments be more informative if the data points weren't all paying participants with rationality as a high priority? Shouldn't the experiments involve trying to teach a random class of high-schoolers or something?

What am I missing?

Comment author: ChristianKl 26 August 2013 05:26:30PM 1 point [-]

And wouldn't the experiments be more informative if the data points weren't all paying participants with rationality as a high priority?

As far as I understand that isn't the case. They do give out scholarship, so not everyone pays. I also thinks that they do testing of the techniques outside of the workshops.

Shouldn't the experiments involve trying to teach a random class of high-schoolers or something?

Doing research costs money and CFAR seems to want to fund itself through workshop fees. If they would focus on high school classes they would need a different source of funding.

Comment author: pan 19 August 2013 11:31:23PM 5 points [-]

I guess I don't see why the two are mutually exclusive, I doubt everyone would stop attending workshops if the material was freely available, and I don't understand why something can't be published if it's open sourced first?

Comment author: Anders_H 19 August 2013 09:13:31PM *  11 points [-]

Last week, I gave a presentation at the Boston meetup, about using causal graphs to understand bias in the medical literature. Some of you requested the slides, so I have uploaded them at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/huitfeldt/files/using_causal_graphs_to_understand_bias_in_the_medical_literature.pptx

Note that this is intended as a "Causality for non-majors" type presentation. If you need a higher level of precision, and are able the follow the maths, you would be much better off reading Pearl's book.

(Edited to change file location)

Comment author: Adele_L 19 August 2013 10:35:49PM 1 point [-]

Thanks for making these available.

Even if you can follow the math, these sorts of things can be useful for orienting someone new to the field, or laying a conceptually simple map of the subject that can be elaborated on later. Sometimes, it's easier to use a map to get a feel for where things are than it is to explore directly.

Comment author: JoshuaZ 19 August 2013 05:07:35PM 2 points [-]

A new study shows that manipulative behavior could be linked to the development of some forms of altruism. The study itself is unfortunately behind a paywall.

Comment author: somervta 21 August 2013 02:02:17AM 3 points [-]

I have access - PM me if you're interested in it.

Comment author: diegocaleiro 20 August 2013 04:45:48AM 1 point [-]

Didn't Sci Hub work to find an upaid version, it often does......http://sci-hub.org/