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Mestroyer comments on Open thread, September 2-8, 2013 - Less Wrong Discussion

0 Post author: David_Gerard 02 September 2013 02:07PM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 02 September 2013 11:23:38PM 12 points [-]

Assuming Rawls's veil of ignorance, I would prefer to be randomly born in a world where a trillion people lead billion-year lifespans than one in which a quadrillion people lead million-year lifespans.

Comment author: Mestroyer 03 September 2013 03:46:29AM 5 points [-]

Doesn't Rawls's veil of ignorance prove too much here though? If both worlds would exist anyway, I'd rather be born into a world where a million people lived 101 year lifetimes than a world where 3^^^3 people lived 100 year lifetimes.

Comment author: TrE 03 September 2013 05:47:05PM *  1 point [-]

So then, Rawls's veil has to be modified such that you are randomly chosen to be one of a quadrillion people. In scenario A, you live a million years. In scenario B, one trillion people live for one billion years each, the rest are fertilized eggs which for some reason don't develop.

I'd still choose B over A.

Comment author: ShardPhoenix 03 September 2013 04:55:53AM *  0 points [-]

Would you? A million probably isn't enough to sustain a modern economy, for example. (Although in the 3^^^3 case it depends on the assumed density since we can only fit a negligible fraction of that many people into our visible universe).

Comment author: Mestroyer 03 September 2013 05:01:38AM 4 points [-]

If the economies would be the same, then yes. Don't fight the hypothetical.

Comment author: ShardPhoenix 03 September 2013 11:25:04PM 1 point [-]

I think "fighting the hypothetical" is justified in cases where the necessary assumptions are misleadingly inaccurate - which I think is the case here.

Comment author: Creutzer 04 September 2013 05:40:13AM 3 points [-]

But compared to 3^^^3, it doesn't matter whether it's a million people, a billion, or a trillion. You can certainly find a number that is sufficient to sustain an economy and is still vastly smaller than 3^^^3, and you will end up preferring the smaller number for a single additional year of lifespan. Of course, for Rawls, this is a feature, not a bug.