If neurons sometimes aim for individual advantage that doesn't serve the brain/person, rather than cooperating reliably, it's worth understanding.
And if that's an important part of how brains operate, then you'd want to know about it if you're simulating brains.
I don't see anything in the quoted passage that suggests that individual neurons do something in their own interest to the detriment of the brain/person. But much more importantly, neurons don't aim for anything. They're not, you know, agents.
So this is why I'm objecting: the anthropomorphization is singularly unhelpful in understanding any of this, because whatever the mechanism behind what's going on, goal-directed intentional behavior is very far from it.
Dennett:
I hadn't thought about any of this-- I thought the hard problem of brains was that dendrites grow so that neurons aren't arranged in a static map. Apparently that is just one of the hard problems.
He also discusses the question of how much of culture is parasitic, that philosophy has something valuable to offer about free will (I don't know what he has in mind there), the hard question of how people choose who to trust and why they're so bad at it (he thinks people chose their investment advisers more carefully than they chose their pastors, I suspect he's over-optimistic), and a detailed look at Preachers Who Are Not Believers. That last looks intriguing-- part of the situations is that preachers have been taught it's very bad to shake someone else's faith, so there's an added layer of inhibition which keeps preachers doing their usual job even after they're no longer believers themselves.