I think you really have to think in terms of individual neurons as micro-agents, and ask what's in it for them?
You don't need goal-directed behavior to explain this; we're probably looking at a load-balancing process of some sort, but that doesn't mean that it's working in a way that's well modeled by agents acting on desires. Analogously, the branches of a red-black tree appear from the outside to even themselves out if one gets much longer than its sibling, a process that looks pretty goal-oriented, but all the meat of the algorithm goes into reflexively satisfying local constraints that have nothing obviously to do with branch length.
Truthfully, this reads as a "when all you have is a hammer" sort of thought process to me.
It depends on how one uses the hammer. If you are a philosopher there's nothing wrong with trying your hammer at all problems and seeing whether some useful insight comes out of it.
Dennett:
I hadn't thought about any of this-- I thought the hard problem of brains was that dendrites grow so that neurons aren't arranged in a static map. Apparently that is just one of the hard problems.
He also discusses the question of how much of culture is parasitic, that philosophy has something valuable to offer about free will (I don't know what he has in mind there), the hard question of how people choose who to trust and why they're so bad at it (he thinks people chose their investment advisers more carefully than they chose their pastors, I suspect he's over-optimistic), and a detailed look at Preachers Who Are Not Believers. That last looks intriguing-- part of the situations is that preachers have been taught it's very bad to shake someone else's faith, so there's an added layer of inhibition which keeps preachers doing their usual job even after they're no longer believers themselves.