Only vaguely relatedly, there's a short story out there somewhere where the punch-line is that the normative forces of magic reincarnate the man who'd horribly abused his own prepubescent daughter as his own prepubescent daughter.
Which, when looked at through the normative model you invoke here, creates an Epimenidesian version of the same deal: if abusing a vicious pedophile is not vicious, then presumably the man is not vicious, since it turns out his daughter was a vicious pedophile... but of course, if he's not vicious, then it turns out his daughter wasn't a vicious pedophile, so he is vicious... at which point all the Star Trek robots' heads explode.
For my own part, I reject the premise that abusing a vicious pedophile is not vicious. There are, of course, other ways out.
Ah.. Now you understand the frustrations of a typical Hindu who believes in re-incarnation. ;)
There's a recent science fiction story that I can't recall the name of, in which the narrator is traveling somewhere via plane, and the security check includes a brain scan for deviance. The narrator is a pedophile. Everyone who sees the results of the scan is horrified--not that he's a pedophile, but that his particular brain abnormality is easily fixed, so that means he's chosen to remain a pedophile. He's closely monitored, so he'll never be able to act on those desires, but he keeps them anyway, because that's part of who he is.
What would you do in his place?
In the language of good old-fashioned AI, his pedophilia is a goal or a terminal value. "Fixing" him means changing or erasing that value. People here sometimes say that a rational agent should never change its terminal values. (If one goal is unobtainable, the agent will simply not pursue that goal.) Why, then, can we imagine the man being tempted to do so? Would it be a failure of rationality?
If the answer is that one terminal value can rationally set a goal to change another terminal value, then either