Could it be possible that some peoples' intuitions are more deontologist or more consequentialist than others? While trying to answer this, I think I noticed an intuition that being good should make good things happen, and shouldn't make bad things happen. Looking back on the way I thought as a teenager, I think I must have been under that assumption then (when I hadn't heard this sort of ethics discussed explicitly). I'm not sure about further back then that, though, so I don't know that I didn't just hear a lot of consequentialist arguments and get used to thinking that way.
I think consequentialism could also come from having an intuition that morality should be universal and logically coherent. Humans often have that intuition, and also other intuitions that conflict with each other, so some form of reconciling intuitions has to happen.
No disputes on Paragraph 1, but:
An intuition that morality should be "universial" in your sense is not as common as you might think. In Victorian times there was a hierarchy of responsibilities depending on closeness, which fits modern intutions except that race has been removed. Confucius considered it the fillial duty of a son to cover up their father's crimes. Finally, there are general tribal in-group instincts. All these suggest that the intuition morality should be universial (as opposed to logically coherent, which is more common) is the "weaker" intuition that should give.
In addition, of course, see Elizier's articles about no universially persuasive argument.
My apologies if this doesn't deserve a Discussion post, but if this hasn't been addresed anywhere than it's clearly an important issue.
There have been many defences of consequentialism against deontology, including quite a few on this site. What I haven't seen, however, is any demonstration of how deontology is incompatible with the ideas in Elizier's Metaethics sequence- as far as I can tell, a deontologist could agree with just about everything in the Sequences.
Said deontologist would argue that, to the extent a human universial morality can exist through generalised moral instincts, said instincts tend to be deontological (as supported through scientific studies- a study of the trolley dilemna v.s the 'fat man' variant showed that people would divert the trolley but not push the fat man). This would be their argument against the consequentialist, who they could accuse of wanting a consequentialist system and ignoring the moral instincts at the basis of their own speculations.
I'm not completely sure about this, but figure it an important enough misunderstanding if I indeed misunderstood to deserve clearing up.