I can see how to convert a Consequentialist system into a series of Deontological rules with exceptions. However, not all Deontological systems can be converted to Consequentialist systems. Deontological systems usually contain Absolute Moral Wrongs which are not to be done no matter what, even if they will lead to even more Absolute Moral Wrongs.
I can see how to convert a Consequentialist system into a series of Deontological rules with exceptions
In the case of consequentialists that satisfy the VNM axioms (the only interesting kind) they need only one Deontological rule, "Maximise this utility function!".
However, not all Deontological systems can be converted to Consequentialist systems. Deontological systems usually contain Absolute Moral Wrongs which are not to be done no matter what, even if they will lead to even more Absolute Moral Wrongs.
I suggest that they can. With the ca...
My apologies if this doesn't deserve a Discussion post, but if this hasn't been addresed anywhere than it's clearly an important issue.
There have been many defences of consequentialism against deontology, including quite a few on this site. What I haven't seen, however, is any demonstration of how deontology is incompatible with the ideas in Elizier's Metaethics sequence- as far as I can tell, a deontologist could agree with just about everything in the Sequences.
Said deontologist would argue that, to the extent a human universial morality can exist through generalised moral instincts, said instincts tend to be deontological (as supported through scientific studies- a study of the trolley dilemna v.s the 'fat man' variant showed that people would divert the trolley but not push the fat man). This would be their argument against the consequentialist, who they could accuse of wanting a consequentialist system and ignoring the moral instincts at the basis of their own speculations.
I'm not completely sure about this, but figure it an important enough misunderstanding if I indeed misunderstood to deserve clearing up.