Lumifer comments on Is it immoral to have children? - Less Wrong Discussion
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Really? And kids are not persons and their happiness does not count?
That's not what the OP meant. Rather, "if the decision to have children is justified, then it is justified by considering how happy it makes you, not by how happy your children will be."
Why is that?
Kids are definitely persons and their happiness definitely counts, but so are the thousands of other people you could be helping with that $500k.
These thousands of people already exist. You're making new people to be happy.
And there is, of course, the obvious observation that if everyone follow that logic, this will be the last generation of humans on Earth.
Rachels considers this, and I agree with their argument:
Actually they already do.
And there's lots of literature on that, too.
There are many problems with this analogy -- for example, Rachels asks people NOT to do something so the proper parallel would be for billions of people not to come to her house which seems perfectly fine to me.
But to make clear the major flaw of this comparison let me ask you a question: What percentage of human population would you like to follow the advice of not having kids? And if it's less than 100% what would you consider to be the best way of dividing people into those who should have kids and those who should not?
This question solves the silly problem of "but what if everyone did that" -- please tell me how many people do you want to do that.
Having kids is justified altruistically if the benefit to the world of having kids is greater than the benefit to the world of spending a similar amount of money and time on the most effective charity. This isn't a percentage thing; it depends on people's individual situations. Right now donation probably wins for nearly everyone, but as more money went into the best charitable options it would become more and more expensive to dramatically improve a stranger's life, which would decrease the fraction of people that shouldn't have kids.
That's not what Rachels and you say. From her quote with which you agree:
I don't see any qualifications like "depending on your individual situation". Neither do I see them in the OP.
Rachels is inviting people to sainthood (" If we become saints...") and as far as I can see she wants as many people as possible to do so.
I'll repeat the question: in your opinion, right now, what is the fraction of people that shouldn't have kids?
Stuart Rachels is a male philosopher.
Thanks. I had an obvious contamination...
I interpret Rachels' use of "in our position" as being that qualification, and I think that's how it was intended.
100%. But I would also say that everyone reading this should spend their marginal dollar on the most effective charity and not on themself. This sense of "would the world be better if you did X instead of Y? Then X is moral and Y is not" is incredibly demanding.
Translating this into practical behavior, I think people should set a (high) bound for their altruism and then optimize for their own happiness and life satisfaction within that limit. Which is why I'm choosing to have kids anyway.
I don' see how
(1) "I interpret Rachels' use of "in our position" as being that qualification, and I think that's how it was intended."
and (2) "I'm choosing to have kids anyway."
is consistent with
(3) "100%"
The right thing to do would be to completely maximize earnings and minimize expenses to the point where any additional decrease in spending on yourself would decrease earnings by even more. This would involve not having kids, but also not eating at restaurants, traveling, having a phone, going to movies, or anything else optional. In practice I don't think this works, and so what I think people should actually do is divide up their money into two pools: set an amount to donate and an amount to keep. Within the amount you keep, spend the money in whatever way you think will make you happiest and most fulfilled.
So I divide my spending into 30% to donate and 70% for everything else (taxes, housing, food, fun). In choosing to have kids my wife and I are displacing a lot of spending we would do on ourselves, but still keeping that 30/70 split.
I don't see any answer to this other than "everybody should have kids at the replacement rate".
If you're going to f*** superrationality / rule consequentialism / TDT and be an act consequentialist, why not engage in prudent predation and give the proceeds to optimal charity?
(And even CDTically, if you discuss your motivations out loud in public you choose not only for yourselves but also for anyone who listens at them and is convinced by them.)
So, superrationality arguments aren't of the form "what if everyone did that?" but rather of the form "what if everyone did that for the same reasons?" It looks like the argument under consideration argues that on the margin, we'd be better off if more people gave to charity instead of having children. If everyone reasoned similarly, we'd have a decrease in birth rate and increase in charity until charity is no longer better than children on the margin. Which would be good. I think a TDT agent would reject spurious arguments like Rachels' cable technician example where the individual act doesn't hurt people, on net and on the margin.
Is the marginal bank robbery¹ worse than the marginal n kids dying from malaria (where n = (money you'd get by robbing a bank)/(money it costs for the AMF to save a kid))? If not, should we rob banks and give the proceeds to the AMF until it is?
So, that's an objection that any form of consequentialism has to tackle. I'm not sure why you're bringing it up here. I thought you were objecting to Rachels' rejection of superrational reasoning and their objection to the "what if no one had kids?" argument. I endeavored in the grandparent to show that it makes sense, from a superrational perspective, to invite the cable technician over and also to not have children. I am steelmanning Rachels here.
Can you clarify your position?
Er, no, in rule consequentialism there is a reason why you don't kill a healthy person who happens to be in your hospital to donate their organs to five people who need them, even if no-one is going to find out. See Consequentialism Need Not Be Nearsighted. It'd be a stretch to say that for a cable technician to come over is to defect in a PD-like problem.
We don't actually disagree here. I said that dilemmas like the transplant problem form the basis of an objection that any form of consequentialism has to tackle, and I agree that rule consequentialism successfully tackles the objection. I think we both agree that there are superrational consequentialisms that also successfully tackle the objection. If you disagree with any of the following:
then let's see where the dispute takes us; otherwise I'll be happy to tap out of the conversation.
I've seen people argue that we should prioritize the happiness of existing people over new people, but I haven't seen it the other way around before. Why do you value creating new people over improving the lives of existing ones?
(There are also charities that have the effect of creating new people.)
As all fun activities that involve more than one person, you're morally fine as long as you make a reasonable effort not to ruin their fun. Kids mostly turn out fine especially if you spend 500k on them, so if you want them and don't plan on making their lives hell, might as well have em