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Lumifer comments on Is it immoral to have children? - Less Wrong Discussion

15 Post author: jkaufman 22 October 2013 12:13PM

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Comment author: Lumifer 22 October 2013 07:52:35PM -1 points [-]

These thousands of people already exist. You're making new people to be happy.

And there is, of course, the obvious observation that if everyone follow that logic, this will be the last generation of humans on Earth.

Comment author: jkaufman 22 October 2013 09:10:18PM *  5 points [-]

Rachels considers this, and I agree with their argument:

Some objections point to disastrous consequences that would ensue if everyone remained childless. If nobody had kids, then the human race would die out, and before it did, there would be the Era of the Elderly, when every living person would be over 70. After that would come the Era of the Very Elderly, the Era of the Half Dead, and, finally, the Era of Please Kill Me But There’s No One Still Around Able to Do That. A different objection laments the prospect of taking all the good people out of parenting. It says that if every good person were to refrain from procreating, then tomorrow’s parents would come only from the Pool of Scoundrels, and the future of humankind would be bleak. The first objection is of the form, “What if everybody did that?” The second objection is of the form, “What if all the good people did that?”

It would be fair, if un-philosophical-sounding, to respond by saying, “But they won’t.”Both objections are fallacious. Consider the principle underlying them: it would be wrong to do x if some very large number of people’s doing x would have bad consequences. On this principle, it would be wrong for the cable guy to come to my house, because if billions of people came to my house, then there would be no place for anyone to park. Or, it would be wrong for me to go to law school, because if everyone did that, then who would teach the classes? The principle is indefensible.

I have not been arguing that we should all refrain from having kids; I’ve only been arguing that you, the reader, shouldn’t have kids. Or, to put the thesis more generally: anyone in our position shouldn’t have kids (where “our position” includes facts about how others will behave as well as facts about our own economic situation).

There is nothing paradoxical in saying that you should do something but that it might be bad if everyone or if many people did it. In deciding what to do, we need to be realistic about what others will do. If we become saints, then we do so alone. The rest of the world won’t follow our lead, nor will all the people whom we think would make good parents. Kant notwithstanding, we choose only for ourselves. And the choice that you or I should make is not to have children.

Comment author: [deleted] 24 October 2013 08:02:26AM *  2 points [-]

It would be fair, if un-philosophical-sounding, to respond by saying, “But they won’t.”

Actually they already do.

Comment author: Lumifer 24 October 2013 03:22:10PM 3 points [-]

Actually they already do.

And there's lots of literature on that, too.

Comment author: Lumifer 23 October 2013 03:53:04PM 2 points [-]

On this principle, it would be wrong for the cable guy to come to my house, because if billions of people came to my house, then there would be no place for anyone to park.

There are many problems with this analogy -- for example, Rachels asks people NOT to do something so the proper parallel would be for billions of people not to come to her house which seems perfectly fine to me.

But to make clear the major flaw of this comparison let me ask you a question: What percentage of human population would you like to follow the advice of not having kids? And if it's less than 100% what would you consider to be the best way of dividing people into those who should have kids and those who should not?

This question solves the silly problem of "but what if everyone did that" -- please tell me how many people do you want to do that.

Comment author: jkaufman 23 October 2013 07:34:38PM 0 points [-]

What percentage of human population would you like to follow the advice of not having kids?

Having kids is justified altruistically if the benefit to the world of having kids is greater than the benefit to the world of spending a similar amount of money and time on the most effective charity. This isn't a percentage thing; it depends on people's individual situations. Right now donation probably wins for nearly everyone, but as more money went into the best charitable options it would become more and more expensive to dramatically improve a stranger's life, which would decrease the fraction of people that shouldn't have kids.

Comment author: Lumifer 23 October 2013 08:09:36PM *  4 points [-]

This isn't a percentage thing; it depends on people's individual situations.

That's not what Rachels and you say. From her quote with which you agree:

I’ve only been arguing that you, the reader, shouldn’t have kids.

I don't see any qualifications like "depending on your individual situation". Neither do I see them in the OP.

Rachels is inviting people to sainthood (" If we become saints...") and as far as I can see she wants as many people as possible to do so.

which would decrease the fraction of people that shouldn't have kids.

I'll repeat the question: in your opinion, right now, what is the fraction of people that shouldn't have kids?

Comment author: Pablo_Stafforini 25 October 2013 12:05:17AM 2 points [-]

That's not what Rachels and you say. From her quote

Stuart Rachels is a male philosopher.

Comment author: Lumifer 25 October 2013 12:59:06AM *  1 point [-]

Thanks. I had an obvious contamination...

Comment author: jkaufman 23 October 2013 09:45:23PM -1 points [-]

I don't see any qualifications like "depending on your individual situation".

I interpret Rachels' use of "in our position" as being that qualification, and I think that's how it was intended.

right now, what is the fraction of people that shouldn't have kids?

100%. But I would also say that everyone reading this should spend their marginal dollar on the most effective charity and not on themself. This sense of "would the world be better if you did X instead of Y? Then X is moral and Y is not" is incredibly demanding.

Translating this into practical behavior, I think people should set a (high) bound for their altruism and then optimize for their own happiness and life satisfaction within that limit. Which is why I'm choosing to have kids anyway.

Comment author: Lumifer 24 October 2013 12:54:07AM 2 points [-]

I don' see how

(1) "I interpret Rachels' use of "in our position" as being that qualification, and I think that's how it was intended."

and (2) "I'm choosing to have kids anyway."

is consistent with

(3) "100%"

Comment author: jkaufman 24 October 2013 01:28:28AM -1 points [-]

The right thing to do would be to completely maximize earnings and minimize expenses to the point where any additional decrease in spending on yourself would decrease earnings by even more. This would involve not having kids, but also not eating at restaurants, traveling, having a phone, going to movies, or anything else optional. In practice I don't think this works, and so what I think people should actually do is divide up their money into two pools: set an amount to donate and an amount to keep. Within the amount you keep, spend the money in whatever way you think will make you happiest and most fulfilled.

So I divide my spending into 30% to donate and 70% for everything else (taxes, housing, food, fun). In choosing to have kids my wife and I are displacing a lot of spending we would do on ourselves, but still keeping that 30/70 split.

Comment author: Strange7 14 December 2013 12:23:49PM 2 points [-]

Not having a phone? Really? That degree of isolation would make it harder to acquire or maintain gainful employment.

Comment author: jkaufman 15 December 2013 08:52:07PM 0 points [-]

I think it depends what field you're in and how you use your phone. You basically can't be a plumber without a phone, but until 2011 I didn't have a phone working as a programmer and it didn't seem to be causing me any work trouble. (Just social trouble, like people no longer having functional doorbells and expecting you to call them when you arrived.)

For this "incredibly demanding" view (which I don't actually think humans should apply) the question is "does the phone bring in more money than it costs, all things considered?" and if it does then I've mischaracterized it above.

Comment author: ikrase 23 October 2013 05:11:04PM -1 points [-]

I don't see any answer to this other than "everybody should have kids at the replacement rate".

Comment author: [deleted] 23 October 2013 11:47:28AM 0 points [-]

Kant notwithstanding, we choose only for ourselves.

If you're going to f*** superrationality / rule consequentialism / TDT and be an act consequentialist, why not engage in prudent predation and give the proceeds to optimal charity?

(And even CDTically, if you discuss your motivations out loud in public you choose not only for yourselves but also for anyone who listens at them and is convinced by them.)

Comment author: Nisan 23 October 2013 03:53:47PM 7 points [-]

So, superrationality arguments aren't of the form "what if everyone did that?" but rather of the form "what if everyone did that for the same reasons?" It looks like the argument under consideration argues that on the margin, we'd be better off if more people gave to charity instead of having children. If everyone reasoned similarly, we'd have a decrease in birth rate and increase in charity until charity is no longer better than children on the margin. Which would be good. I think a TDT agent would reject spurious arguments like Rachels' cable technician example where the individual act doesn't hurt people, on net and on the margin.

Comment author: [deleted] 25 October 2013 09:48:50AM 0 points [-]

Is the marginal bank robbery¹ worse than the marginal n kids dying from malaria (where n = (money you'd get by robbing a bank)/(money it costs for the AMF to save a kid))? If not, should we rob banks and give the proceeds to the AMF until it is?

  1. That's supposed to be an abstract example (I know literal bank robberies aren't actually such a great deal); feel free to mentally replace it with a better one.
Comment author: Nisan 25 October 2013 05:26:43PM 1 point [-]

So, that's an objection that any form of consequentialism has to tackle. I'm not sure why you're bringing it up here. I thought you were objecting to Rachels' rejection of superrational reasoning and their objection to the "what if no one had kids?" argument. I endeavored in the grandparent to show that it makes sense, from a superrational perspective, to invite the cable technician over and also to not have children. I am steelmanning Rachels here.

Can you clarify your position?

Comment author: [deleted] 26 October 2013 07:06:57AM *  1 point [-]

Er, no, in rule consequentialism there is a reason why you don't kill a healthy person who happens to be in your hospital to donate their organs to five people who need them, even if no-one is going to find out. See Consequentialism Need Not Be Nearsighted. It'd be a stretch to say that for a cable technician to come over is to defect in a PD-like problem.

Comment author: Nisan 27 October 2013 12:26:48AM 0 points [-]

We don't actually disagree here. I said that dilemmas like the transplant problem form the basis of an objection that any form of consequentialism has to tackle, and I agree that rule consequentialism successfully tackles the objection. I think we both agree that there are superrational consequentialisms that also successfully tackle the objection. If you disagree with any of the following:

  1. It's good for the cable technician to visit.
  2. It's bad to kill the healthy person.
  3. If one could do more good by donating than by having children, then it's better to donate.
  4. (1)-(3) fall out of both rule consequentialism and superrationality.

then let's see where the dispute takes us; otherwise I'll be happy to tap out of the conversation.

Comment author: [deleted] 27 October 2013 09:22:32AM 0 points [-]

Would you agree with 3'. If one could do more good by donating the healthy person's organs than by not killing them, then it's better to do so?

(BTW, I was using “superrationality” and “rule consequentialism” more or less synonymously, but you seem to be taking them to be distinct; what's the difference?)

Comment author: Nisan 27 October 2013 08:00:16PM 0 points [-]

I still don't understand your position; I'm going to respectfully tap out.

Comment author: jkaufman 23 October 2013 01:15:18AM 2 points [-]

You're making new people to be happy.

I've seen people argue that we should prioritize the happiness of existing people over new people, but I haven't seen it the other way around before. Why do you value creating new people over improving the lives of existing ones?

(There are also charities that have the effect of creating new people.)

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