The problem with the standard jargon is that "realism" is used to label a metaphysical and an epistemological claim. I like to call the epistemological claim, that there is a single set of moral truths, moral objectivism, which clearly is the opposite of moral subjectivism.

Uncertainty, even disagreement, about how to classify views is fine. It's not the same as inconsistency. Sayre-McCord's position on subjectivism is non-standard and treated as such. But I can still figure out what he thinks just from a single paragraph summarizing his position. He takes the standard definitions as a starting point and then makes an argument for his structure of theories. This is the sort of thing I'm asking you to do if you aren't going to use the standard terminology.

You seem to be concerned with bashing philosophy instead of explaining your usage. I'm not the field's standard bearer. I just want to know what you mean by the words you're using! Stop equivocating about realism and just state the ways in which the position is realist and the ways in which it is anti-realist. Or how it is realist but you don't think realism should mean what people think it means.

A Platonist who thinks the Form of the Good is revealed by mystical insight is a cognitivist and I don't know why you would think otherwise. Wikipedia:) "Cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false".

Or you're not using standard terminology, in which case, see above.

So, I think that is simply false regarding the analytic tradition, especially if we're comparing them to Less Wrong's use of specialized jargon (which is often hilariously ill-defined). I'd love to see some evidence for your claim. But that isn't the point.

There are standard introductory reference texts which structure theories of ethical semantics. They contain definitions. They don't contradict each other. And all of them will tell you what I'm telling you. Let's look, here's wikipedia. Here is the SEP on Moral Realism. Here is the SEP on Moral Anti-Realism. Here is the entry on Moral Cognitivism. All three are written by different philosophers and all use nearly identical definitions which define the moral realist as necessarily being a cognitivist. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy says the same thing.

We're not talking about something that is ambiguous or borderline. Cognitivism is the first necessary feature of moral realism in the standard usage. If you are using the term "moral realist", but don't think cognitivism is part of the definition then no one can figure out what you're saying! Same goes for describing someone as an anti-realist who believes in cognitivism, that moral statments can be true and that they are mind-indpendent. All the terms after "anti-realist" in that sentence make up the entire definition of moral realism

I'm not trying to be pedantic or force you to use jargon you don't like. But if you're going to use it, why not use the terms as they are used in easily available encyclopedia articles written by prominent philosophers? Or at least redefine the terms somewhere.

Clarification- do you mean inconsistencies within or between philosophers? Between philosophers I agree with you- within a single philosopher's work I'd be curious to see examples.